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     This dissertation explores the problem of what kind of impacts can education of 
employees have on firms’ financial and economical performances, the problem of how 
monetary policy made by Federal Reserve Bank can influence the market share of banks 
in the loan market, and the problem of why Chinese firms give up the premium and  IPO 
overseas.  
Building upon the previous research, this dissertation proposes the methodology of 
combining machine learning and econometrics to answer the questions that both finance 
researchers and economists don’t have answers to. The methodological innovation of this 
dissertation includes the non-linear control function approach, the inference for marginal 
effects of cubic polynomial variables, and methods of text mining on financial reports. 
     By using these methods/approaches proposed, this dissertation finds out that the 
education of employees have non-linear effects on firms’ financial/economic performance, 
that the interest rate adjustments made by Federal Reserve Bank can squeeze small banks 
out of the loan market, and that the Chinese firms which IPO overseas are giving up the 
premium for the government protection and information disclosure requirements. These 





CHAPTER 1. DO THE COLLEGE DEGREES OF 
EMPLOYEES HAVE IMPACTS ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: INSIGHTS FROM A NON-LINEAR 
APPROACH 
1.1 Introduction 
Whether hiring people with higher education levels improves the performance of a 
firm remains a puzzle: Hiring people with higher education levels implies higher wage 
costs. Smart (1991) shows that the average salaries of groups with different education 
levels are significantly different. Laborers with college degrees earn significantly higher 
salaries than high school graduates. On the other hand, employees with higher education 
levels are expected to have better skillsets and knowledge foundations, which might 
increase the overall effectiveness and hence, the overall performance of the firm1. Doong 
et al. (2011) use the data of Taiwan to prove that firms that have more employees with 
college degrees will have higher market values. In reality,  recently many firms believe in 
degrees and believe that employees with a better educational background can create more 
profits for the firm, especially in the U.S. 
 
 
1 A study by Bontis and Fitzenz (2002) found that the consequences of human capital management 
and they established the relationship between human capital management and economic and business 
outcomes. Human capital has a direct impact on the intellectual capital assets that will yield effectiveness measured by 
four metrics; revenue factor, expense factor, income factor and HC ROI, and a direct impact on higher financial results 
per employee. 
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1.1.1 The case of China 
   In China, the human capital issue is an on-going area of active research. Fleisher 
et al. (2010) discuss the role of human capital in the total factor productivity growth of 
China; Wang et al. (1999) explore the impact of human capital accumulation on economic 
growth in China.  
  As a significant part of human capital, higher education in China has been a  
primary focus. For that reason, the National Higher Education Entrance Examination2 has 
been one of the most critical events for decades. Because the universities independently 
decide whether to accept the students or not solely based on the student’s scores and 
rankings, regardless of family background, family wealth, and political background, this 
exam is seen as a fair mechanism of selection. Each year, only the top 45% 3  of the 
examinees can get into four-year colleges and get bachelor's degrees. Because of the 
existence of such a “fair” mechanism, most Chinese firms prefer applicants who have 
bachelors’ degrees or even graduate degrees when hiring4. Currently, many firms in China 
define minimum education requirements when hiring, and some require at least a 
bachelors’ degree.5 Also, Chinese firms usually pay higher salaries to those who have 
higher levels of education6. The demand-side pressure incentivizes more young people to 
take the National Higher Education Entrance Examination and try to get bachelors’ 
 
2 Details of National Higher Education Entrance Examination: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Higher_Education_Entrance_Examination 
3  Source: Sohu China education channel. Website: http://www.sohu.com/a/82447900_177136 
4 An article showing the placement statistics of different degree levels in China: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/interface/toutiaonew/53002523/2016-05-10/cd_25191515.html 
5 Information obtained from the news article published by China Daily on 2015/03/13. The full news article can be 
accessed through http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/jl/2015-03/13/content_19803508.htm 
6 An article proving that average salaries are higher for firms with more employees that have graduate degrees: 
https://hk.saowen.com/a/0b4f67d8929705b47e020891d4c04bb6635b4fe2cebdfa2f4151e937b502ce79 
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degrees. These condition helped cultivate an educational service industry 7  that now 
conditions for about 5% of national GDP.8 
1.1.2 Key question and findings 
  Given the current situation of the labor market and education system, many 
questions remain unresolved for the employers: For example, do workers with bachelor’s 
degrees create more profit for the employers? Is it better to have a higher overall education 
level for the firms? In this paper, I use data from Chinese public firms to empirically 
explore these questions and provide new insights on the impact that a more educated 
workforce has on firm performance.   
   Most previous empirical human capital research focuses primarily on the national 
level 9 . Though some management literature focuses on the firm level, these studies 
typically restrict their scope by either studying one or two industries or analyzing the 
management team or board of directors10. This paper differs from these studies in that I 
examine the firm performance effects associated with the overall education level of the 
firm’s workforce, measured by the proportion of bachelor’s degree holders. Further, I 
explore possible alternative channels through which the overall education level of a firm’s 
workforce can impact a firm’s performance.   
 
7  Generally, the educational service sector in China includes curriculum design, test preparation and training, 
educational device manufacturing and sales, educational facility management service and admission consulting service. 
A complete list and detailed information can be found at 
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E6%9C%8D%E5%8A%A1 
8 Data sources: http://www.chyxx.com/industry/201609/450644.html 
9As summarized in the literature review section, Nelson and Phelps(1966); Romer, (1990a); Sergio Rebelo(1991) 
developed and completed the endogenous growth model incorporating the human capital factor.  Romer (1990b), Barro 
(1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) , Levine and Renelt (1992) and Levine and Zervos (1993) confirms that education, as a 
part of human capital, does contribute to the economic growth nationally.  
10As summarized in the literature review section, Hitt et al(2001), Shrader and Siegel (2007) show the education level 
of the managers and board members have positive correlation with firm performance.  
 4 
   The principal empirical methodology of this paper follows the estimation 
framework from Murray (1989), Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2006), Li, et al. (2008) and 
Giroud and Holger (2010), in which they build up reduced-form model to estimate the 
effects of a specific component in firm operation on firm performance. I use a 
comprehensive data set that covers the public firms in all industries in China. Based on the 
empirical results, I find that the proportion of employees having bachelors’ degrees within 
a Chinese public firm has significant positive impacts on its performance. However, the 
impact is non-linear. I also find out that the source of the improvement of firm performance 
is the increase in operating income. This paper confirms the positive effects of employee 
education on firm performance and confirms that the impacts vary from one industry to 
another. This study also finds that Chinese firms with more college degree holders pursue 
riskier investments and generate higher operational income.  
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 A brief view of related literature  
1.2.1.1 Human Capital and Endogenous Growth 
 Many scholars and economists in macroeconomics tried to identify whether 
workers’ human capital has economic impacts on the whole economy. Nelson and Phelps 
(1966), Romer (1990a), and Rebelo (1991) developed endogenous growth models from a 
macro perspective to explain how human capital contributes to the total output of a closed 
economy. These models not only tell why the level of output is higher when a country has 
more human capital but also why the growth rate is higher. These models explain why 
human capital is a crucial factor in the economy, finding that the accumulation of human 
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capital contributes to the high level of innovation, and hence more advanced technology. 
Those technologies increase productivity, and hence the final output level. In addition, 
these models propose that education and experience, that is, real-world practice are 
pathways for increasing and human capital stocks 11.  
1.2.1.2 Education and Endogenous Growth 
Subsequent theoretical and empirical research in endogenous growth models 
analysed how education, as a part of the human capital, influences output growth. Romer 
(1990b), Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Levine and 
Zervos (1993) use the primary- or secondary-school enrolment rate as a proxy of a 
country’s education level and find that, for nearly all states, these rates have significant and 
positive impacts on the economy’s growth rate12. In particular, they find that the school 
enrolment rate has significant positive effects on the growth of the economy.  
Building on this finding, a more recent paper (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000) 
measures the quality of the labor force using comparative tests of mathematics and 
scientific skills and finds that math and science skill scores are positively correlated with 
higher economic growth, which also confirms the positive impact that human capital 
accumulation has on economic growth. At the same time, many micro- econometricians 
and labor economists (e.g., Krueger and Lindahl, 2000; and Card, 1999) examined this 
issue from a microeconomic perspective. Recently, Jones (2014) re-examines the 
relationship among income difference, human capital level, and the aggregated education 
 
11 Romer, 1990a points out that learning by doing is also a way to accumulate human capital and it has some spill-over 
effects over the macroeconomy. Detailed model and derivation can be found in the paper.  
12 The measurement metrics of economic growth do vary across this research. However, the mostly commonly used 
ones are GDP growth and GNP growth rate. 
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level of laborers. He proposes a new method for aggregating different human capital skill 
levels named “Generalized Division of Labor” human capital aggregator. Based on Caselli 
(2005)’s data, his analysis shows that only when workers are a perfect substitute for each 
other, the wage can reflect the productivity accurately. Moreover, he uses the new 
aggregation method to show a significant portion of cross-section differences between 
countries might be coming from human capital variations, and this portion is bigger than 
what previous research finds under the perfect substitute assumptions.  
Consistent with the findings in the macroeconomic literature, using cross-country 
analysis, these microeconomic studies find that the change in the education level of a 
country’s general population is positively associated with the shift in economic growth. 
Though at this stage, many researchers step out from the endogenous growth theory and 
start to empirically test the effect from individuals’ human capital level, measured by 
education or skill level of labors, on economic growth, their scope is still restricted on the 
level of country due to the lack of micro-level data.  
1.2.1.3 Human capital of firm principals and management 
After entering the 21st century, the increasing availability of micro-level data and 
the development of information technologies enable economic and management 
researchers to study the human capital effects on firm strategic management. In the 
business literature, this line of research focuses on how the education level of principals13 
influences the firm’s human resource management and firm strategy (e.g., Hitt et al., 2001; 
 
13 Hitt et al (2001), Hillman (2003), and Shrader and Siegel (2007) define principals of a firm as the middle level 
managers, high level managers, executive level managers or/and board of director members. 
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Shrader and Siegel, 2007). Hitt et al. (2001) conducted a regression analysis of law firms. 
The study uses the law school education and practical experience of the vital principle 
partners as a proxy for human capital, and they use a profit-revenue ratio to measure the 
firm’s performance14. The study finds a positive correlation between a law firm’s human 
capital and firm performance.  Shrader and Siegel (2007) analyze the impact of 
management level characteristics on the performance of venture capital firms. Based on 
Compustat data, the study finds that the educational and functional area experiences of the 
managers have positive impacts on the firm’s sale growth and rate of return on assets 
(ROA).  Although this research provides new insights on the importunate of human capital 
and education to firm management, the research is quiet on how the overall educational 
levels of a firm’s non-executive employees, including managers or board members, 
influence its performance.  
1.2.1.4 The labor factor labor and firm performance 
  Until the early 1980s, there existed few studies examining the impact of employee 
education level on firm performance. Research in management science started exploring 
the determinants of firm performance during the 1980s. Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) 
propose that person-specific factors, which include labor skills, should have significant 
impacts on the organizational climate, and hence on overall firm productivity. The study 
uses Fortune 500 firm data in regression analysis and finds that the labor skills and labor 
structure have significant positive effects on firm performance, as measured by 
profitability. Stierwald (2009) seeks to identify factors that influence firm performance. 
 
14 The legal industry is kind of special therefore, they are using the data reported by the American Lawyer. Details can 
be found in Hitt et al (2001). 
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She uses an error correction method to analyze the firm performance impacts of firm 
productivity and the number of employees. In the study, she finds that the estimated firm 
productivity and number of employees have positive effects on firm performance measured 
by profit to asset ratio (which is equivalent to the ROA ratio). Addison (2005) finds out 
that the presence of worker unions and worker representatives are essential to improving 
firm performance. In this paper, the author confirms the important role of labor on firm 
performance, finding that a better labor structure with a worker union can improve the 
productivity of the firm and increase output and firm revenues. Although focused on the 
firm, the scope of the role of labor in the production process is relatively general.  
1.2.1.5 Labor quality and firm performance 
  Some other researchers go further and are more specific about the role of labor 
quality in firm performance: Ton (2009), for example, shows that customer service quality 
is positively correlated with overall firm profitability. Based on longitudinal data of a large 
retailer, the study uses conformance quality15 and service quality as independent variables 
and profitability of the firm as a dependent variable to conduct a regression analysis. The 
study finds that both the quality of labor and the number of employees are key factors of 
conformance quality which is positively related to profitability. In related work, some 
researchers find a positive correlation between a firm’s financial performance and service 
quality. Ittner and Larcker (1998) find a positive relationship between customer satisfaction 
(measured by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ASCI)) and market equity value. 
 
15 Conformance quality, according to Ton (2009), refers to the degree to which a good or service meets certain design 
standards determined by the employer. It’s one of the measures of the employee’s performance which uses the 
objective standards set up by the employer to determine how well an employee is doing.  
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In a study of 200 firms in the U.S., Anderson et al. (2004) also find a positive relationship 
between customer satisfaction and market value of a firm (measured as Tobin’s Q). 
Notwithstanding this relationship, the study doesn’t explore sources of differences in 
service qualities across firms.  
1.2.1.6 Employee education and firm performance 
   Recently, a few researchers further explore the relationship between firm 
performance and human capital. The work that is most similar to this study is Doong et al. 
(2011), which discusses the relationship between market value and human capital using 
data from Taiwan. The authors assume that education is input to human capital 
accumulation. Under this assumption, they use the proportion of employees with some 
higher education (i.e., some college education) to measure the education level of a firm’s 
employees and to reflect, at least the educational part of the firm’s human capital level. The 
study finds a positive correlation between the employee education level and the market 
value of the firm.  
1.2.2 Innovation and contribution 
   Though many researchers shed light on the relationship between employee 
quality and firm performance, few researchers explored the specific relationship between 
firm performance and firm workforce education level. Briefly, our work is distinct from 
their work on the following aspects:  
   1, Previous researchers merely look at the relationship between employee 
education level and firm market value while this paper mainly looks at the relationship 
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between employee education level and general firm performance, which firm market value 
is a subset of.  
   2, This paper uses spline regression, polynomial regression, LASSO regression 
to get more established empirical models and enhance the accuracy of estimation. In 
addition to that, this paper also proposes a new control function approach to overcome the 
non-linearity problem16.  
  3, Previous researchers don’t go much further to examine the mechanism behind 
the scene while this paper tries to dig into the rationale behind the scene to see which part 
of the revenue or which part of the expenditure the cross-section variation of performance 
is coming from. 
   The findings of this paper shall contribute to the existing corporate finance and 
labor economics literatures in the sense that this paper fills in the blank in the literature 
examining the relationship between employee education level and firm performance. In 
addition to that, this paper demonstrates the possibility of applying machine learning to 
economic research. Despite the contribution mentioned above, many questions remain 
unanswered in the end: Why firms have more employees with a bachelor’s degree will gain 
increases in operational incomes? After taking the self-selection of going public into 
account, will the findings remain robust? To resolve those puzzles, further economics, 
psychology, or/and sociology research must be conducted, which are out of the scope of 
this paper.  
 
16 The Non-linearity issue here refers to the non-linear structure between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable of interests, and the non-linear relationship between the instrumental variable and the dependent variable. The 
proofs and the details can be found in section 1.5.  
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1.3 Theoretical framework 
1.3.1 Structural framework: short-run (restricted) profit maximization 
  The following theoretical model for this paper mainly comes from the classical 
microeconomics theory. The focus of this paper is on the microeconomic side and to 
investigate the issue by using the scope of firms. Assuming firms are always solving the 
following profit maximization problem, and more precisely, in the short-run, firms are 
solving a restricted profit optimization problem since, in the short-run, not all input factors 
can be adjusted according to Varian (1992). Based on previous research examined in the 
literature review section, human capital can be modeled as a stock value that is similar to 
the physical capital of the firm.17 Considering a typical firm is trying to maximize the short-
run profit in each period by choosing the optimal unskilled labor, and the physical capital 
and skilled labor are quasi-fixed in this context, immediately:18 
max 𝜋𝑡(𝐿𝑢,𝑡; 𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡) =𝑝𝑡𝑄(𝐿𝑢,𝑡; 𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡) − 𝑤𝑢,𝑡𝐿𝑢,𝑡                            (1) 
where 𝑝𝑡 is the price of goods/services, 𝑄 is the quantity function of goods/services  sold 
depending on the inputs and technology level 𝐴𝑡 which is exogenous,  𝑤𝑢,𝑡 is the wage of 
unskilled labor which is determined by the market equilibrium, 𝐿𝑢,𝑡 denotes the number of 
unskilled labor that a firm can choose over to maximize the profit. 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 denotes the number 
 
17 Krueger and Lindahl (2000), Card (1999) and Jones (2014) discuss the accumulation on the nation level. In their 
research they find out that the accumulation of human capital has significant impacts on output level just like the 
physical capital does.  
18 According to Jones (2014), skilled labors are much less substitutable than unskilled labors. Therefore, it means it’s 
relatively much more difficult to adjust the number of skilled labors hired in short run. Thereby, WE assume in short 
run, firms don’t optimize the profit over skilled labors. 
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of unskilled labor that a firm has at time t Kt is the physical capital that the firm has at time 
t. 
    When the firm solves for the optimal level for 𝐿𝑢,𝑡 ,  it will become a non-
stochastic function of parameters 𝑝𝑡, 𝐴𝑡, 𝑤𝑢,𝑡,, with restricted levels of 𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt. 
𝐿𝑢,𝑡
∗ = 𝑓(𝑝𝑡, 𝑤𝑢,𝑡, ;  𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡)                                                                            (2) 
By plugging the optimal level into the restricted indirect profit function: 
 𝜋𝑡(𝐿𝑢,𝑡; 𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡) =𝑝𝑡𝑄(𝐿𝑢,𝑡; 𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡) − 𝑤𝑢,𝑡𝐿𝑢,𝑡
∗                                    (3)  
Therefore, we can model 𝜋𝑡
∗ as a function of 𝑝𝑡, 𝐴𝑡, 𝑤𝑢,𝑡,, with restricted levels of 
𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, we can write the indirect restricted profit function as  
 𝜋𝑡
∗ = 𝐹(𝑝𝑡, 𝑤𝑢,𝑡, ;  𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡 )                                                                             (4) 
where the 𝐹 denotes the indirect profit function of the firm, and it’s a function conditional 
upon 𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡, which is either determined by the market equilibrium level in the short 
run or exogenous. Thereby, the indirect restricted profit function is a function of 𝐿𝑠,𝑡 of a 
firm at time t. The restricted profit function is a short-run case of the general profit function. 
Therefore, it still inherits the property of the general profit function in the sense that it’s 
non-decreasing in 𝑝𝑡 and non-increasing in 𝑤𝑢,𝑡. Besides, it’s convex in 𝑤𝑢,𝑡 as well. 
More specifically, in this paper, I am using the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q as the 




𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
                                                                             (5) 
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The amount of physical capital leveraged in production can always be defined as a 
proportion of total asset, therefore, 𝑚 =
Kt
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
. We can have 






= ℎ(𝑝𝑡, 𝑤𝑢,𝑡, ;  𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡)                                                               (6) 




𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
                                                                            (7) 
Since the amount of physical capital leveraged in production can always be defined 
as a proportion of total asset, therefore, 𝑚 =
Kt
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
. Since 𝜑 =
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 and assume financial leverage is 











= g(𝑝𝑡 , 𝑤𝑢,𝑡, ;  𝐿𝑠,𝑡 , Kt, 𝐴𝑡)              (8) 
As for Tobin’s Q, by definition:  
 Tobin’s Q𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
                                                             (9) 
Tobin’s Q𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡∗1/𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
   
=  




                                                                         (10) 
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If the total market value is evaluated on the foundation of P/E ratio 𝜌, which is 
exogenous,19 then: 
                 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌 ∗ 𝜋𝑡
∗                                                 (11) 






= 𝑡(𝑝𝑡, 𝑤𝑢,𝑡, ;  𝐿𝑠,𝑡, Kt, 𝐴𝑡)                                        (12) 
Thereby, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE are functions of the skilled labor of the firm, 
as derived above. By using the proportion of college employee that has bachelor’s’ degree 
as a proxy for the skilled labor, Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE are functions of the proportion 
of employees that have bachelors’ degrees, which motivates the empirical specification in 
section 1.5.  
1.3.2 Conceptual framework from the literature 
   Hitt et al. (2001) develop a highly complete conceptual framework regarding the 
relationship between human capital and firm performance. The study argues that intangible 
resources are more likely than tangible resources to produce a competitive advantage for 
firms and that intangible firm-specific resources such as knowledge allow firms to add 
value to incoming factors of production. They also cite Grant (1996), arguing that 
knowledge is the most critical competitive asset that a firm possesses, and human capital 
embodies much of an organization's knowledge. Lane & Lubatkin (1998) and Polanyi 
(1967) propose to classify knowledge as articulable or tacit: Articulable knowledge can be 
codified and, therefore, written and easily transferred through education. Labor obtains 
 
19 PE ratio for a specific firm is usually computed by using the average of P/E ratios of all other firms in the same 
sector or using the average of P/E ratios of public firms with similar characteristics. Thereby, it’s exogenous by nature.  
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articulable knowledge through formal education (and codified firm practices) while tacit 
(non-codified) knowledge must be gained from real-world practices through articulable 
knowledge (Liebeskind, 1996). Hitt, et al (2001) also note that higher education and 
training usually provide a high level of articulable knowledge in the field of specialty. In 
addition, D'Aveni (1996) believes that the value of professionals' education often holds 
throughout one’s career and is stable. 20  Then, after the professionals finish their education 
and training, they apply the explicit knowledge derived from their formal education and 
build firm-specific tacit knowledge through experience. Hitt et al. (2001) also argue that 
professionals graduating from the highest-ranked programs in their fields can bring the 
most human capital to firms through intellectual ability, articulable knowledge, social 
contacts, and prestige. 
   Hitt et al. (2001) also recognize that although increasing human capital has many 
positive benefits for the firm, more human capital incurs higher costs. The study cites 
Bierman and Gely (1995) that firms usually pay employees more than their marginal 
productivity early in their careers with the expectation of recouping the investment through 
high productivity as the employee gains tacit knowledge and learns to apply both 
articulable and tacit knowledge through practice. In other words, firms believe that, at the 
time of hire, the present value of expected wages paid to the employee will at least be equal 
to the present value of the expected productivity of the worker in daily operating activities. 
Therefore, they suggest that there exists a curvilinear relationship between human capital 
and firm performance since at the early stage of employment, the wage expenses exceed 
 
20 In this paper they define the professional education as two parts: 1, the law school, medical school, nursing school, 
engineering school and business school education experience, 2, the training programs in industrial practices.  
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the productivity of the employees created while later productivity of employees exceed the 
wage expenses though the present value of the productivity of employees equals to or be 
larger than the present value of wage expenses.  
   The Sankey diagram in Figure 1 summarizes the structural relationship between 
employee education and firm performance. In fact, this Sankey diagram based on the 
literature is also reflecting the theoretical model. For instance, the technology in the 
theoretical model can capture the cumulative tacit knowledge in the sense that employees 
can help to improve the operational or management process by using the tacit knowledge 
that they obtained from the daily work. The improvement in the operational or management 
process definitely enhances the productivity of the firm and can be seen as an improvement 
in technology.   
 
 
Figure 1 – A visualization of the structural relationship between education and firm 
performance. 
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1.3.3 Hypotheses to test 
   As demonstrated by the theoretical framework in section 3.1, a typical firm’s 
short-run profit is a function of price level of goods/services and unskilled labor wage level 
conditional on skilled labor input, physical capital, and technology level. Therefore, the 
measurement of profitability, namely ROA, is a function of goods/services and unskilled 
labor wage level conditional on skilled labor input, physical capital, and technology level. 
The first-order derivative of that function with respect to the skilled labor level equals the 
marginal effect from the human capital level of the firms on the firm’s economic 
profitability. When proxying the skilled labor level with the proportion of employees with 
bachelor’s degrees in a firm’s workforce, we will be able to test whether the skilled labor 
level, proxied by the proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees, has an impact on 
the firm’s profitability. This leads to the first testable hypothesis: 
H1:  An increase in the proportion of college graduates in a firm’s workforce 
improves a firm’s economic profitability, which is measured by the return of asset ratio 
(ROA). 
As indicated by Figure 1 and section 3.2, suggested by the analysis of Bierman and 
Gely (1995) on the relationship between a firm’s human capital and firm performance leads 
to this study’s second hypothesis: 
H2:  The effects of increasing the proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees 
on firm performance increases at a decreasing rate.  
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As implied by Figure 1, previous research suggests that the improvements in firm 
performance should be coming from the competitive advantage generated in its operational 
activities. Therefore, if the effects of the increase in employee human capital on operational 
income dominate the increases in operational expenses, then an increase in employee 
human capital generates competitive advantage for the firm. That gives the third testable 
hypothesis: 
H3:  Increases in a firm’s proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees improve 
firm performance due to the competitive advantages generated in its operational activities21.  
If increases in employee human capital lead to competitive advantages in 
operational activities, the competitive advantages likely come from the firm’s main 
business line, rather than auxiliary lines, where the high skill sets obtained from education 
are transformed into tacit knowledge D'Aveni (1996). That brings the fourth testable 
hypothesis in this paper: 
H4:  The source of competitive advantages and operational improvements due to 
increases in a firm’s proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees is the firm’s primary 
good/service product line. 
As identified by Autor et al. (2007) and Autor et al. (2013), firms have different 
needs for different input factors since the marginal productivities of the inputs vary across 
 
21 The competitive advantage in this paper follows the definition given by Hitt et al. (2001). It means the 
an advantage over competitors gained by offering consumers greater value, either by means of lower prices 
or by providing greater benefits and service that justifies higher prices. 
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firms. Therefore, the needs for different types of skills should vary across firms, which lead 
to the fifth hypothesis to test:  
H5: The impacts on different firms from the education level of employees are 
heterogeneous, and increasing the proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees is more 
likely to have different effects on different firms, especially in the pharmaceutical 
industries and IT industries.  
1.4 Data 
1.4.1 Firm characteristic and employee information data sources 
  The firm-level data set in this research is from RESSET database,22 which many 
researchers in finance and scholars from Chinese universities recognize as the most 
comprehensive and reliable source of information on Chinese public companies.  
1.4.2 Text mining for employee information data  
  Even though RESSET contains some information regarding the institutional 
structure of firm employees, a considerable amount of information is missing.23 However, 
many firms provide this information in their annual reports. In order to maximize the 
sample size and to obtain the maximum amount of information available, I adopted a data 
mining strategy to collect gain more information on employee education. Appendix B.1 
provides details of the data mining strategy.  
 
22 RESSET stands for 锐思数据库 (Ruiswe Database), which can be accessed to through http://www.resset.cn/ with 
registered/licensed accounts.   
23 Around 30% of the firms in the database don’t have the employee education information. 
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1.4.3 Screening and final sample 
   The sample covers the period from 1999 to 2016. All data are annual. The raw 
dataset contains 64,583 year-firm combinations. In the data cleaning process, I used several 
criteria: 1, if there is no data on the overall employee education level- the proportion of 
employees with bachelor’s degrees and the proportion of employees with graduate degrees 
– then I drop the observation. Since there is no reason to believe that missing annual report 
data on employee education levels are not random, eliminating these observations should 
not introduce any bias.24 Besides, by scrutinizing the dropped data point, there are no clear 
patterns associated with them: They do not concentrate in a specific industry or location. 
2, I drop an observation if the proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees or the 
proportion of employees with a graduate degree is greater than 1 as this cannot occur. 
Besides, values lower than 0.0001 are also likely to be miscoded given the prevalence and 
often a requirement of bachelor’s degrees for many managerial positions in public firms. 
25 Assuming these mistakes occur randomly, there is no expectation that dropping these 
will bias the results. After the screening, only 13699 year-firm combinations left.  
1.4.4 Firm performance measurements 
  Some researchers provide an empirical framework for research on firm 
performance. Stierwald (2009) estimates the impacts from a firm-specific factor on 
performance and provides a guideline of measurements for firm performances. In 
particular, Stierwald (2009) identifies the following performance metrics: return on assets 
 
24 See Allison, Paul D. Missing data. Vol. 136. Sage publications, 2001. 
25 The management positions defined here include department director, executive level managers, secretaries of the 
executive level managers, directors on board and general managers. The full details can be found in the news article 
which can be accessed through http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/jl/2015-03/13/content_19803508.htm 
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(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings before interest payment and tax (EBIT). 
Safarova, 2010). Villalonga (2004) also proposed that the firm-specific profits (measured 
by the time-weighted difference between industry ROA and firm ROA) as a measure of 
firm profitability and, therefore, firm performance. More recently, scholars in management 
science include market- to- book- value ratio (MBV) and the return on invested capital 
(ROIC). In general, many researchers (Neely (2002) and Murray (1989), Miller and Le 
Breton‐Miller (2006), Li, et al. (2008) and Giroud and Mueller (2010)) use ROA as a good 
measurement of profitability as well.  
To sum up, the most commonly used firm performance measurements are ROA, 
MBV ratio, Tobin’s Q, ROE, EBIT, and ROIC. Consistent with these researchers, I use 
ROA as the primary measure of firm performance, and in a series of robustness checks, I 
also use ROE and Tobin’s Q.  
Besides, based upon the structural model showing the relationship between short-
run profit function and the accounting measures of firm performance,26 ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin’s Q are functions of skilled labor whose proxy is the proportion of employees in the 
workforce that have at least bachelor’s degrees.  
1.4.5 Unbalanced panel data 
   In order to maximize the sample size, I keep those observations that have missing 
values on various firm control variables and use these to conduct robustness and sensitivity 
checks. After data cleaning and screening processes, the sample contains 3,464 firms and 
 
26 Please see Appendix A.7 for details.  
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15,480 firm-year observations. This is an unbalanced panel that creates two problems in 
estimations: First, there is a potential selection problem that reflects the dynamic 
mechanism of entry and exit. Firms choose whether to go public. To solve this problem, 
we have to control for the propensity of going public. Due to the absence of the data on 
non-public firms, estimating the propensity of going public is not possible, which requires 
alternative methods to handle a potential selection bias. We will have more discussion 
about this issue as a drawback of this paper in Section 1.9.  
1.4.6 Summary statistics and non-parametric analysis 
  Table 1 reports summary statistics along with a description of the key variables. 
Panel (a) in Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the entire sample. Table 1 (b) sums over 
time and provides summary statistics for the major industries in the example, and panel (c) 















Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Table1(a)27       
Summary Statistics      
       
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 
The return on asset ratio. 
Computed by net income/total 
asset (%) 13501 6.01 5.70 -3.44 59.81 
ROE 
The return on equity ratio. 
Computed by net income/total 
equity (%) 13481 11.40 13.94 -124.35 94.80 
Tobin's Q 
Tobin's Q ratio. Computed by 
market value of the total 
asset/book value of total asset. 11642 2.11 .2.26 0.002 108.26 
bachratio 
The proportion of employees 
that have bachelor’s degree. 
Computed by the number of 
employee with bachelor's 
degree/ total employee 
numbers 13501 0.24 0.18 0.002 0.9749 
emp Number of total employees  13501 5607.54 24335.6 6 548355 
AvgSalary 
Average wage. Computed by 
total salary expenses/number 
of employees (China Yuan) 13501 19866.1 74561.5 0.1 6020369 
age 
The number of years since 
establishment. Computed by 
using the observation year 
minus the establishing year. 13501 13.95 6.17 1 73 
exp 
The total expenditure of a 
specific fiscal year (Million 
China yuan) 13501 791 682 1.86 27800 
markup 
The price markup of a specific 
firm in a specific fiscal year. 
Computed by net income after 
depreciation, interest 
payments divided by total 
operating revenue. 13501 0.12948 0.1217 0.00002 0.97084 
asset 
The value of total assets 
(Million China yuan) 13501 3290 4820 4.727 210000 
QTY 
The total revenue of other 
firms in the same industry in 
the same year. (Million China 




       
 
27 Notes:  1, The markup stands for the average markup which is computed through total profit divided by total revenue. 
2, Data Sources: RESSET database：http://www.resset.cn/ 
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Table 1(b) 28 
Summary Statistics of firms by Industries  
   Pharmaceutical IT  Others    
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
ROA 7846 6.11 5.45 1193 9.74 8.42 
4462 4.83 4.69 
ROE 7835 10.93 11.24 1193 15.60 15.66 
4453 11.11 17.18 
Tobin's Q 6818 2.24 2.24 742 3.74 3.10 
4082 1.61 1.91 
bachratio 7846 0.19 0.13 1193 0.537 0.19 
4462 0.26 0.18 
emp 7846 4406.56 9737.72 1193 2443.91 12092.56 
4462 8565.2 39653.5 
AvgSalary 7846 14830.71 79710.93 1193 14022.68 17059.22 
4462 30282.81 73555.04 
age 7846 13.64 6.06 1193 12.03 5.27 
4462 15.07 6.36 
exp 7846 478 1950 1193 172 1110 
4462 1570 11700 
Markup 7846 0.1095 0.097 1193 0.16 0.12 
4462 0.16 0.15 
asset 7846 6770 207 1193 381 2590 
4462 868 8350 
Q 7846 425000 2200000 1193 19200 155000 

















28 Notes: 1, The markup stands for the average markup which is computed through total profit divided by total revenue. 
The key assumption for this markup is the firm sell different products in similar quantity, therefore ∑𝜋𝑗𝑞𝑗/∑𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗 =
 ∑𝜋𝑗𝑞/∑𝑝𝑗𝑞 = ∑𝜋𝑗/∑𝑝𝑗 = 𝑛π̅ /𝑛?̅? = π̅/?̅? = Average Markup.  




Summary Statistics by Time Periods 
 
   1999-2004  2005-2010 2011-2016 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
ROA 1168 4.98 4.20 2912 6.09 5.55 9421 6.11 5.90 
ROE 1167 9.70 8.80 2905 12.68 14.56 9409 11.22 11.23 
Tobin's Q 1124 2.02 1.54 2743 1.84 1.46 7775 2.22 2.55 
bachratio 1168 0.19 0.17 2912 0.22 0.18 9421 0.26 0.18 
emp 1168 3078.81 4556.49 2912 6307.16 27672.97 9421 5704.79 24668.8 
AvgSalary 1168 21443.39 195863.9 2912 20284.76 53238.24 9421 19541.19 48357.03 
age 1168 7.91 4.51 2912 11.82 4.92 9421 15.38 6.04 
exp 1168 191 405 2912 717 4830 9421 919 7820 
markup 1168 0.11 0.11 2912 0.13 0.13 9421 0.13 0.12 
asset 1168 411 1850 2912 3240 39800 9421 7820 53200 
QTY 1168 18300 18500 2912 90600 77700 9421 359000 257000 
 
  As indicated by Table1 (a), the mean proportion of employees that have bachelor 
degrees is 0.245, indicating that 25% of the employees in Chinese public firms have college 
degrees. Table 1(b) shows that the information technology (IT) industry has a much higher 
proportion of employees with bachelors’ degrees than the rest of the companies, which is 
53%. The pharmaceutical industry has the lowest proportion of employees with bachelors’ 
degrees, which is 19% while this industry takes the most significant portion of the public 
firms in China.  
  Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between key variables. Table 
1(c) implies that the proportion of employees with college degrees is increasing over time. 
This trend is aligned with the Chinese Educational Ministry’s policy of undergraduate 
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enrolment enlargement over the late 90s. Starting in 1998, the Chinese Educational 
Ministry encouraged colleges and Universities to admit more students. The colleges and 
universities did double the enrolment from 1999 to 2003, and the enlargement of enrolment 
continues since 2004. 29 Therefore, there were more and college graduates on the job market 
during the sample period and firms are taking more and more bachelors' degree holders on 
the job market. Also, the ROA has increased as well, which suggests a positive correlation 
between firm performance and the proportion of employees with college degrees. 
  Figure 2 provides a visualization of the geographical distribution of the 
companies. As indicated by  Figure 2, most of the public firms in the sample are from the 
south eastern coast of China30 and the capital city of China. More specifically, more than 
80% of the firms in the sample registered their firms in provinces on the south eastern coast 
or in the capital city of Beijing.  
 
29 More details can be found in Chen et al. (2004). They elaborate and analyze the transition of the Chinese college 
admission rate and undergrad enrolments. 
30 The geographical location discussed here refers to the providential location where the firm file its registration. In 
most cases, this location is the same with the location of the headquarter of the firm. However, in rare cases, they can 
be different. In china, most of the employees a firm hire will work in their headquarters. Branches are usually leveraged 
as sales and local operation centers. 
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Figure 2 – Visualization of the geographical distribution of firms 31 
  Another interesting feature in the sample is the distribution of industry sectors32. 
As shown in Figure 3, the majority of firms in the sample are in the pharmaceutical and 
Information Technology (IT) industrial sectors. The firms in those two sectors almost make 
up the whole sample. Some might question the representativeness of the sample due to the 
industry composition of the sample. However, the distribution of the industry is only telling 
us that in China, firms in those two industries are more likely to IPO. It does bring up the 
issue of selection:  The industry distribution of private firms in China is significantly 
different from the distribution of public firms in the sample. For instance, the 
 
31 An interactive version that contains details of each province can be reached through: 
https://hzhang440.github.io/ChinaMapCharlesZhang.github.io/   
32 The industry classification is based upon the classification guideline composed by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. The complete electronic guideline can be accessed at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/scb/ssgshyfljg/201304/W020130402550849843318.doc  
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pharmaceutical industry only accounts for around 7% of the GDP and accounts for around 
10% of the total number of registered firms in China, while in the sample used in this 
research, the pharmaceutical industry accounts for more than 1/3 of the firms in the 
sample.33  Therefore, the conclusion and findings obtained from this dataset should be 
interpreted with caution; They should not be generalized to all firms in China, and they can 
be only applied to Chinese public firms.  
 
Figure 3 – Industrial distribution of the firms in the sample 
  By looking at the scatter plots and the single-value fitting line in Figure 4, we can’t 
observe a clear linear relationship between the variable ROA and the variable bachratio 
for the data in the years 2007 and 2008. Additionally, taking the Pearson correlation 
 
33 The complete industry report for the pharmaceutical industry in China can be accessed through 
https://news.yaozh.com/archive/24765.html. 
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coefficient into account, though the data in the years 2015 and 2016 shows a seemingly 
linear pattern with positive slopes, I decide to use non-parametric estimation methods for 
the relationship between firm performance and its aggregate employee education level 
since not all the data is following a linear pattern. 
 
Figure 4 – Scatter plots and the fitted line between firms’ ROA and proportion of 
employees with bachelors’ degrees of year 2007 (upper left), year 2008 (upper right), 
year 2015 (lower left) and year 2016 (lower right). 
1.5 Empirical methodology 
This section summarizes the empirical methodology and model specification. 
Section 1.5.1 discusses a non-parametric functional form for the proportion of a firm’s 
workforce that has bachelor’s degrees, f (bachratio). The non-parametric form accounts for 
potential non-linearities.  
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Since the model has a large number of variables, there are concerns with potential 
multicollinearity which suggests a dimension reduction methodology. The technique I 
adopt is the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator(LASSO) estimation. Section 
1.5.2 discusses this technique; 
Section 1.5.3 provides a comparison between the linear functional form and the 
cubic spline functional form; 
Although the focus of this study is the impact of a firm’s proportion of employees 
with bachelor’s degrees on firm performance, a firm’s performance will also affect the 
number and proportion of college graduates in its workforce. If true and left uncorrected, 
this endogeneity will bias the estimators. Section 1.5.4 tests for endogeneity and a control 
function approach is adopted to minimize if not fully account for any endogeneity. The 
specific empirical specification and procedure for the control function approach are given 
at the end of section 1.5.4. 
  The key estimation methods in the analysis are pooled OLS, General Method of 
Moments (GMM) and fixed-effects estimation. However, the strongly unbalanced panel 
data for the analysis implies an efficiency problem 34 . For unbalanced panel data, 
econometric theory35 indicates that pooled OLS, Fixed-effects (FE) and Random- effects 
(RE) estimators are unbiased. However, Monte Carlo experiments (Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Judson and Owen (1999)) indicate that the efficiency is much lower. Judson 
 
34 The strongly unbalanced panel data here specifically refers to the panel data with data points that have different 
length on the time dimension. For instance, some firms in the dataset have only 1 year of length but some firms have all 
years of length. 
35 Details and proofs can be found in Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
MIT press, 2010. 
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and Owen (1999) also find that the most consistent and efficient estimator for short 
unbalanced panel data is a General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator,36 which doesn’t 
take the fixed effects of the firm into account. However, those fixed effects might be a 
source of endogeneity. To ensure the robustness of the results, the baseline results also 
report the results of a fixed-effects estimation with a control function. This paper doesn’t 
use the random effects (RE) estimator since the RE estimator imposes too many 
assumptions on the variance-covariance matrix of the error term, and actually, the RE 
estimator is a special case of General Least Square (GLS) estimator. The goal of GLS is to 
improve the efficiency of the estimator, which is the same as the goal of the 2-step GMM 
estimator.  
1.5.1 Empirical specification 
   Based on prior literature and the conceptual framework proposed, the empirical 
specification leverages the research of Murray (1989), Miller and Le Breton (2006), Li et 
al. (2008) and Giroud and Mueller (2010). The specification used in estimations is a semi-
parametric model 
      𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡) + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕 + ε𝑖𝑡                                                       (13) 
In equation (13),  𝑦𝑖𝑡  denotes the dependent variable defined as firm performance,  
𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  is the proportion of employees holding bachelor’s degrees. Since the 
relationship between 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 may not be linear, we adopt a non-parametric form for 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 in this model.  𝑿𝒊𝒕 is the vector of firm control variables, which include the size 
 
36 Judson and Owen (1999) define short panel data as T=20.  
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control, number of employees, and firm technology level control-- age. Other control 
variables based on the theoretical framework in Section 1.3 are:  
1, Total Assets to proxy for the physical capital used for production. As indicated 
in the theoretical model, physical capital used in production can always be modeled as a 
proportion of the total asset, and the ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q are always functions of 
physical capital.  
2, Average salary controls for the unskilled labor wage. 37  
3, Average markup. Assuming the firms are following monopolist competition 
industry structures and the consumers have CES preference over the good/services 
produced by the firms, when expenditure(cost) is controlled and markup is controlled, the 
aggregate price level of the firm is also controlled38.  
4, Age of firms. The age of firms can be used as a proxy for the technology level 
of the firm, as indicated by Giroud and Mueller (2010). 
5.  𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a vector of fixed effects including Province fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and industry fixed effects. Including fixed effects is important given that all 
determining factors of firm performance are not available: The providential fixed effects 
together with the year fixed effects are expected to capture consumer demographic and 
 
37  Based on Hamermesh and Grant (1979) and Jones (2014), skilled labor and unskilled labor are substitutable. 
Therefore, the number of skilled employee can be approximately transformed to a multiple of unskilled labor. That is 
𝑁𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 = 𝜗 ∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑. The average salary = 
Total salary expenses



















∗averaege salary of unskilled labor. 
38 Tirole (1988), for example, demonstrates that: the price is a linear function of markup and cost when consumers have 
CES preference in the monopolistically competitive 
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policy changes (e.g. production quota) that affect both the firm’s performance and the 
firm’s workforce education level. In addition, Provincial fixed effects will capture 
differences in education infrastructures across provinces. For instance, some provinces 
have more 985 universities39 than other provinces, and the firms in those provinces might 
have easier access to hire college degree holders.  
  Industry and time fixed effects capture firm-specific production and technology 
shocks in the sense that if there’s a production or technology shock in a specific industry, 
these effects should have similar impacts on the profitability of all firms in that industry. 
The industry fixed effect together with the province fixed effect will also capture the 
difference in accessibility to the labor market of a specific sector.  
1.5.2 Model selection and dimension reduction 
Among those indicator variables, many of them may be highly correlated since 
enterprises and firms in a specific geographic area may concentrate in a specific industry 
due to the comparative advantages that the area offers40. Therefore, the Province dummy 
variables can be highly correlated with a single or a linear combination of the industry 
dummies. Besides, the year fixed effects are modelled as year dummies in the model. 
Therefore, a multicollinearity problem may be raised.  
 
39 “985” and “211” universities are the universities that directly report to the Chinese Educational Ministry or the local 
Providential Educational Ministry. Those universities represent the highest level of higher education in China and they 
are the most selective universities in general. Therefore, the students who graduate from those universities are seen as 
the most skillful labors in the market.   
40 For instance, when putting the Beijing location dummy and the IT industry dummy into one regression, the IT 
industry dummy sometimes get omitted.  
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 In order to resolve that problem, we simply use the model selection technique from 
unsupervised machine learning: LASSO estimator that Tibshirani (1997) proposed 41. The 
intuition of this technique is to add a punishment for including duplicative or unnecessary 
variables into the estimation specification to prevent overfitting and being too specific to 
one observation. Then, the criteria function to minimize contains two parts: One is the 
residual sum of squares (RSS) and the second part is the punishment for including 
duplicative or unnecessary variables 42 . In order to minimize the criteria function, the 
estimator eliminates unnecessary or duplicative variables since inducing those variables 
will add a huge value as a punishment to the criteria function.  
We estimate the LASSO estimator on the basic model specification and the results 
show that most of the location dummies are removed. Briefly, only the dumour variables 
of the major provinces hosting more than 100 firms remain. The year dummies for only 
2000 – 2006, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014  remain. The LASSO estimator also removes industry 
dummies for the hotel industry, education industry, and environmental industry.  
1.5.3 Determine the functional form of education 
   As discussed, by looking at the plots using firm performance and aggregated 
education level as the coordinates, we can’t identify a clear linear pattern between these 
two. Additionally, we compare it by comparing the RSS generated from linear regression 
and a spline regression. More precisely, we did the following:  
 
41 Details and rigorous proofs can be found in Tibshiranwe (1997). 
42 In order to minimize the objective function, when the punishment coefficient gets large enough, the optimization 
solution will be partial to a smaller model, and the coefficients of the unnecessary terms will be suppressed and become 
0. In other words, when the coefficient of a term becomes 0, we know it’s unnecessary from LASSO. 
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  Since we are exploring the functional form of the relationship between firm 
performance and aggregated education level, we need to get rid of the effects of other 
possible factors43. More specifically, I did the following: 
1, Run an OLS with ROA on all control variables 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and dummy variables after 
model selection. That is to run OLS on 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕 + ϵ𝑖𝑡.  
2, We generate the predicted value 𝑦𝑖?̂?= ?̂? + ?̂?𝑿𝒊𝒕 + ?̂?𝑫𝒊𝒕.  
3, After we obtained 𝑦𝑖?̂?, I obtain 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖?̂? = ϵ𝑖𝑡. Where ϵ𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡) +
ε𝑖𝑡.   
4,  We start to compare the fittings of the linear form and non-linear form by doing 
the following: we run a simple OLS on ϵ̂𝑖𝑡 = β1𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 and get the RSS.44  
5, In the meanwhile, we run a spline regression45 on ϵ̂𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡) + ε𝑖𝑡 
and get the RSS. Then we simply compare the RSS of both regressions. The RSS values 
are plotted in Figure 5: 
 
43 Proofs can be found in Appendix C, which is based on Bhaumik., et al. (2012)  
44 At this stage, we are focusing on the functional form versus the coefficients. Therefore, the bias problem is not a 
consideration here.  




Figure 5 – Comparison of fitted values of the linear model and cubic smoothing 
spline.46 
  Implied by Figure 5, the spline regression provides a much better fit since it 
gives smaller RSS. Additionally, there are 25 knots in the spline regression and the 
optimal smoothing punishment is small, which implies that the relationship between firm 
performance and the proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees is not linear and 
spline functional form is better for modelling.  
   However, though a spline regression is good for predictions, it will sacrifice the 
interpretability and will cause a lot of computational problems when applied to multivariate 
analysis. Since we know that the smoothing spline function is essentially a cubic 
polynomial,47 the 𝑓(𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡) function can be modeled as a third-order polynomial of 
𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡. Then specification (1) becomes: 
 
46 Notes: 1, The left panel contains the fitted value of linear model against the actual value of the “net effect of aggregated 
education on ROA”. The right panel contains the fitted value of cubic smoothing spline model against the actual value 
of the “net effect of aggregated education on ROA”. 2, The RSS of the linear model is 234441.3(N=13319) and the RSS 
of the cubic smoothing spline is 195323.72344(N=13319). 
47Proofs of the equivalence between spline and cubic polynomial can be found in De Boor, Carl, et al. A practical guide 
to splines. Vol. 27. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1978. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕 +
 ε𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                    (14) 
1.5.4 Identification strategy 
1.5.4.1 Endogenous problem 
  As previously discussed, a firm’s workforce education level is expected to be 
endogenous. Firms that perform well will able to attract more educated workers with better 
skill sets because these firms can offer better career development, higher wages, and better 
benefits.   
A Hausman- Durbin- Wu test (Hausman, Durbin and Wu, 1987) to test for 
endogeneity. The test results confirm that the overall workforce education level 
measurement, namely the proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees is 










48 In the Hausman-Durbin-Wu test, the instrumental variables are borrowed from Hausman and Taylor (1981) and 
Hausman (2002). WE use the average proportion of employees with bachelor degrees of all other firms in the same 
provinces (identified by zipcode) and the average proportion of employees with graduate degrees of all other firms the 
same provinces. By building up a Chi-square statistics between the models using 2SLS and the OLS, the Hausman-
Durbin-Wu test will show if the two models are equivalent. If they are not equivalent, it means 2SLS is preferred and 
endogenous problem exists.  
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Table 2 (a) – Hausman-Durbin-Wu test on Endogeneity   
 Hausman-Durbin-Wu test 
  
H0: 
IV estimators and OLS estimators are 
equally consistent 
H1: 




1)](b-B)   
  
=     
2646.88    
Prob>chi2       0   
 
Therefore, if all levels of wages, benefits, incentives as well as other compensations 
paid to employees, and all levels of skills can be controlled, then the model shouldn’t suffer 
from the endogeneity. However, the data is aggregated on the firm level, and we can’t 
precisely control those factors. Instead, we control the average level of salary to mitigate 
the endogenous problem. Still, using the reduced form estimation, the coefficient of the 
education term may be biased. Besides the endogenous tests of the bachratio variable, other 
variables are tested as well. All other variables past the Hausman-Durbin-Wu tests, which 
means they are not endogenous and won’t bias the estimators.  
1.5.4.2 Identification strategies 
    The most common way to resolve the endogenous problem is to use get an 
instrumental variable (IV). Since we have quite a limited number of variables that can be 
arguably correlated with the firm’s employee educational level and be restricted from the 
firm performance, we construct a Hausman type IV: The instrumental variables are 
borrowed from Hausman and Taylor (1981), and Hausman (2002). I use the average 
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proportion of employees with bachelors’ degrees of all other firms in the same provinces 
(identified by province code in the data) in the same provinces49. Then, we perform a test 
regarding the linearity between the IV and the dependent variable by looking at the Pearson 
correlation coefficient.  
Table 2 (b) – Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
  As shown in Table 2(b), the Pearson correlation coefficient between the dependent 
variable (ROA) and the Hausman-Type instrumental variable (IV) is quite small in 
magnitude, which is 0.04, the relationship between these two can’t be concluded with a 
linear relationship. We also perform a test with the linear model against a polynomial 
model between the two, and the R-sq of the linear model is 0.0018 while the polynomial 
model’s R-sq is 0.0037. Those statistics are telling us that the relationship between the IV 
and the dependent variable is non-linear50. When the instrumental variable (IV) has a non-
linear relationship with the dependent variables in a linear model, the instrumental variable 
 
49 Details can be found in Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Hausman (2002). The rationale of this IV is that other firms’ 
choices might influence this firm’s choice of employees but other firms’ choices of hiring have nothing to do with this 
firm’s performance.   
50 The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.04 and the R-sq gets substantially higher if we use 3rd order polynomial 
regression versus linear regression. 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients                
(* denotes significant at confidence level of 0.95) 
 
 
  ROA bachratio size emp salary level age expenditure markup Q 
Hausman -Type 
IV 
ROA 1                  
bachratio 0.1703* 1                
asset -0.2776* -0.0732* 1              
emp -0.1867* -0.2994* 0.7915* 1            
salary level 0.0520* 0.1990* 0.2902* 0.0633* 1          
age -0.1658* -0.0082 0.3002* 0.1767* 0.1523* 1        
expenditure -0.2372* -0.1661* 0.8517* 0.7052* 0.2252* 0.2697* 1      
markup 0.5491* 0.2249* -0.1709* 0.0227* 0.1759* -0.017* -0.2538* 1    
Q -0.0086 -0.2084* 0.0879* 0.1611* 0.0146 0.1895* 0.1463* -0.1215* 1  
Hausman -Type 
IV 
0.043* 0.062* 0.1375* 0.086* 0.084* 0.2297* 0.1116* 0.0782* 0.2461* 
1 
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estimator can’t be used to identify the parameters 51 , which means biases might be 
introduced if we still use IV estimator or 2SLS procedure to identify the parameters of 
interests. 
  Because of that, we follow the control function approach for non-linear models 
proposed by Powell (2003). More precisely, we use the exogenous control variables along 
with the Hausman-type IV to predict the fitted value for the endogenous variable and then 
get the estimator of the error term. By adding the error term into specification (2), I get  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝜔𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 +
𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕 + e𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                   (15)52 
where 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the estimation of error term when regressing 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 on all other exogenous 
variables.53 
 Then, a GMM estimation on (15) or an OLS estimation on (3) will give unbiased 
estimators of all coefficients.54 After that, the real marginal effect of aggregated employee 
education level can be identified by looking at 𝛽1 , 𝛽2  and 𝛽3 , which is 𝛽1 + 2 ∗ 𝛽2 ∗




51 Proofs are attached in Appendix C. 
52 This is under the standard control function approach assumption: 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡] = 𝜔𝑣𝑖𝑡 
53There are several factors that differentiate specification (15) from the models used in previous literature:1, Most 
previous literature presume the independent variables and the dependent variables have linear relationship, which in most 
cases is not valid;2, Most previous literature either don’t pay attention to endogenous problem or simply use instrumental 
variables to solve the endogenous problem while this model adopts the control function approach. As shown in the proof 
attached in Appendix C, when the relationship between the instrumental variable and the dependent variable is not linear, 
IV estimator is no longer valid for identification while control function approach is not limited to this constrain. 3, 
Previous literature don’t take model size into consideration and add all dummy variables in to the model without selection. 
The dummy variables in speciation (3) are selected through LASSO. 
54 Proofs and details can be found in the control function approach section in Powell (2002). 
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As shown in Table 2(a), since the correlations between the endogenous variable 
and the exogenous variables are weak55. we can’t conclude a linear relationship between 
them. As mentioned in Woodridge’s NBER notes about the control function approach, a 
linear conditional expectation for the endogenous regressor is a substantive restriction on 
the conditional distribution of the endogenous regressor. Therefore, when non-linearity 
exists, the linear projection on endogenous regressor might give wrong estimates of the 
first stage residual and then might create biases56. Therefore, our first stage estimation 
follows the non-parametric method proposed by Blundell and Powell (2003)57. Unlike what 
Blundell and Powell (2003) and Woodridge’s NBER notes suggest, we don’t use the kernel 
regression method because it’s difficult to determine the best type of kernel distribution as 
well as the parameters of bandwidth. Therefore, we use the Multivariate Adaptive 
Regression Spline (MARS) method, 58 a non-parametric method, in the first stage to obtain 
𝑣 59 .  
 More precisely, we did the following: 
 1, Regress the proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees on all 
exogenous firm characteristic variables along with the Hausman-type instrumental variable 
 
55 As shown in the Pearson correlation coefficient in table 1, the coefficients are small(<0.3). 
56 Mathematical details can be accessed through: https://www.nber.org/WNE/lect_6_controlfuncs.pdf  
57 In Blundell and Powell (2003), they release the fact the assumption of linear functional form in the first stage. They 
propose a complete non-parametric method. They also show that as long as the basic assumption regarding the 
relationship between the first stage residual and the error term of the linear parametric control function approach holds, 
this method should generate more consistent results when nonlinearity exists. Mathematical details can be found in 
their paper. 
58 Mathematical proofs and details can be found in Friedman(1991). MARS generally search for knots of each variable 
and estimate the coefficients of the interaction terms between variables before and after the knot. Then all terms can be 
added by in a linear form to generate the predictions for the dependent variable. Though all terms in MARS are 
combined in the linear form, it’s still considered as a non-parametric method since the interpretation is difficult and 
meaningless. 
59 It’s possible to determine those by using cross validation. However, Aydin (2007) empirically shows that the spline 
regression is better than kernel regression by using different valuation metrics.   
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either by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or using Multivariate Adaptive Regression 
Spline (MARS). For the control function approach with MARS residual, we estimated 
specification (4) for the first stage estimation.   
 𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑆(𝑧𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                           (16) 
Where MARS(.) is the Multivariate Adaptive Regression Spline function.  
  2,  Compute the fitted value for the proportion of employees that have bachelor’s 
degrees and compute the error between the fitted value and the actual value. 
  3, Regress dependent variables on all variables and the error term obtained from 
step 2, as specified in equation (15). 
1.6 Baseline results 
  The estimated model of the baseline results presented in this section is 
specification (3). In the baseline result section, we also attach the results of estimations 
with a linear control function approach for the purpose of comparison. The main takeaways 
from the baseline results are 1, the marginal effects of increasing the proportion of 
employees with bachelor’s degrees are always larger than 0 but not always statistically 
significant; 2, the polynomial terms are all significant so simple linear models are not 
appropriate; 3, the MARS control function approach fits the data the best compared to 
others.  
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The baseline results are presented in Table 3 (a) & (b)60. 
Table 3(a) – Baseline results of regression analysis 
 Baseline Results  
  Dependent variable: 
  ROA 












































-23.03***    
(5.54) 
-22.60***    
(5.54) 
-22.60***    
(3.70) 







18.03***    
(5.17) 
17.73***    
(5.16) 
17.73***    
(3.13) 







-5.46***               
(0.44) 
-5.39***               
(0.08) 
-5.39***               
(0.51) 





0.46***               
(0.44) 
0.12                    
(0.11) 
0.12               
(0.29) 





0.12***               
(0.028) 
0.20***               
(0.04) 
0.20***               
(0.03) 







-0.043***                  
(0.005) 
-0.043***                  
(0.005) 
-0.043***                  
(0.005) 





4.67***   
(0.08) 
4.80***   
(0.09) 
4.80***   
(0.03) 





45.98***               
(0.65) 
47.14***               
(0.72) 
47.14***               
(0.46) 





0.12***                       
(0.15) 
0.05*                       
(0.03) 
0.05*                       
(0.03) 




























   (0.36) 
Adjusted R-
sq/Obj-function 
value 0.68 0.0000118 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.05   
N 13501 13501 13501 13501 13501 13501 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Province fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
 
60 For all tables in this thesis, the numbers in the parentheses are bootstrapping standard error unless otherwise 
specified.  
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Table 3(b) – Fixed-effects estimation results 
 Fixed-effects Model 
  Dependent variable: 
                         ROA 
 (1)     (2)                  (3)  
 
FE with linear 
control function 
approach           




FE with MARS 
control function 
approach             
bachratio 
16.59***    
(2.46)  






 (5.07)  
-12.93** 





(4.24)   
Log(asset) 
-4.84***                   
(0.08)  






0.56***                  
(0.13)  






-0.15**               
(0.04)  



















39.42***               
(0.51)  






-0.14***                       
(0.05)  












11.77***                
(1.62)  




R-sq 0.63  0.65 0.64  
N 13501  13501 13501  
Industry fixed 
effect No  No No  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes  
Province fixed 
effect No  No No  
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By looking at the coefficients of the term bachratio, we can easily see that no matter 
what kind of estimator we use to do the test, the polynomial terms of the proportion of 
employees with bachelor’s degrees variable always significant impacts on ROA. The key 
insights provided by this table include the following: 1, By looking at the estimators 
generated from different estimation procedures, we can confirm the existence of the 
endogeneity; 2, By looking at the OLS estimation with MARS control function approach 
and the OLS estimation with linear control function approach, we can also confirm the 
existence of bias due to the non-linear structure and; 3, Comparing the estimation results 
generated from OLS and GMM, we can see the GMM is slightly more efficient, which 
implies the existence of heteroscedasticity. However, that doesn’t change the results of the 
tests on the coefficients. A visualization of the marginal effect of the proportion of 
employees that have bachelor’s degrees is attached in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 – Visualization of marginal effects 61 
As indicated by the estimation results and the visualization, the marginal effect 
from the proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees is in quadratic form. If we 
look at the estimators generated from the OLS estimation with MARS control function, 
 
61 The method and proof for calculating the confidence interval for the marginal effect is attached in Appendix C. 
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42.3*bachratio+49.68*bachratio2]|𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜=𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡. At the average level of 
bachratio, which equals to 0.24, the marginal effect equals to 10.71, which means when 
the proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees increase by 1% for an average firm, 
the ROA is expected to increase by 0.107% in magnitude. By looking at the subgroups 
and calculating by using the same method, an average firm in the pharmaceutical industry 
is expected to gain an increase of 0.119% while an average firm in the IT industry is 
expected to gain 0.097% in the magnitude of ROA by increasing 1% in the proportion of 
employees with bachelor’s degrees.  However, this is not always statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. If we look at the right panel in Figure 3, we can see that only 
when bachratio is less than or equal to 0.1321,62 the marginal effect is statistically 
significantly different from 0.  That is being said, when the firm’s bachratio is less than or 
equal to 0.1321 and the firm increases 1% in the proportion of employees holding at least 
bachelor’s degree, the firm can experience an increase in ROA by [18.22 -
42.3*bachratio+49.68*bachratio2] ∗ 0.01|𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜=𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 percent in absolute 
magnitude. 
By looking at the middle left panel in Figure 6 combining with the estimators 
obtained from the OLS estimation with linear control function, the marginal effect is non-
linear, and equals to 
 
62 Another experiment shows that at the confidence level of 99%, only the firms that have a proportion of employees 





= [5.21 -45.3*bachratio+53.19*bachratio2]|𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜=𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡. However, 
this effect can become 0 or even become negative when 𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 increases. 
That is to say, the marginal effect is only significantly positive within a certain 
range. What we can conclude so far is that the impact of aggregate education level on firm 
profit can be significantly positive but not always significantly positive. The firms having 
lower the proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees  (lower than 13.21 %) will 
most likely gain a positive increase in their performances if they hire more laborers with 
bachelor’s degrees.  
The other interesting thing shown from estimation results is the coefficients of the 
term Log (Avg_Salary) are always significant and positive when no control function is 
implemented and when the linear control function is implemented. When MARS control 
function approach is implemented, this term becomes negative or insignificant. This 
finding also confirms the existence of a nonlinear relationship between the exogenous 
variables and the endogenous variables. By using the linear form, it will still introduce bias 
to the estimation. In addition, I used the kernel regression first stage estimation to compute 
the first-stage error as a part of the control function approach. As indicated in Table 3 
estimation (5), the estimators are larger in magnitudes than the estimators using the MARS 
first stage error when using the kernel regression for the first stage error computation. 
However, the R-sq is lower at the same time. That implies the kernel regression first-stage 
error might introduce more biases to the model and makes the fitting worse than the MARS 
first-stage error.  
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   One of the concerns of mine for the empirical model in this paper is that I don’t 
take the unobserved firm fixed effects into account, and I don’t control the firm fixed effect. 
I don’t control for the firm fixed effect is because there will be too many dummy variables 
to estimate. However, the unobserved firm fixed effect might also cause endogenous 
problems and biases. Thus, I also conduct a Fixed-effects estimation combining with the 
control function approach. The estimation results are shown in Table 3(b)63. Visualization 
is also attached in Figure 3 in Appendix B. 
   The linear fixed-effects estimators show that the marginal effect is supposed to 
be positive, which aligns with the estimation results by using the polynomial form. The 
other terms remain almost the same when getting rid of the polynomial terms, which 
indicates that the polynomial terms don’t incur the multicollinearity issue.  
   As suggested by the results and the visualization, the positive within effects are 
still robust for a portion of firms with lower proportions of employees who are college 
degree holders. The magnitudes of coefficients are not much different from the coefficients 
in the baseline results. This confirms the robustness of the baseline results even though 
when conducting baseline estimations, no firm fixed effects are controlled.  
These findings can’t confirm our hypothesis H1 that the marginal effect from the 
proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees on firm performance and profitability 
is always positive. However, we can conclude that the firms with a lower proportion of 
employees that have college degrees (<13%, as indicated in Figure 6) still can benefit from 
 
63 Please note that in Appendix B Table 4 the province fixed effect and industry fixed effect are not controlled since 
they are time-invariant and can’t be identified in the fixed effect estimation. Though they can be recovered by the 
Hausman-Taylor method, it’s not necessary and out of the cope of this paper. 
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hiring more employees with higher education degrees. However, this kind of benefit will 
decrease and become insignificant when they start hiring more and more new employees 
with bachelor’s degrees. This finding, to a certain extent, justifies the Chinese 
government’s policy of increasing enrolment quota for Chinses colleges: For the firms with 
few employees that graduated from college, they are anticipated to employ more laborers 
with college degrees. So, the supply needs to be guaranteed with the increasing enrolment.  
Another interesting finding is the firm’s wage level. The linear control function 
approach OLS results are telling that offering higher average salaries can increase the 
profitability and the performance of the firm. This aggregate-level finding basically aligns 
with the previous human capital research results. Murphy (1985), Leonard (1990) and other 
labor economics researchers find out that executive pay has a positive correlation with a 
firm’s performance in terms of profits, return on assets, and market values. Possible reasons 
may be because the firm can attract more productive laborers by offering high salaries. 
Those laborers can create more values than the salaries that they are paid. Offering higher 
salaries can possibly guarantee the labor quality and attract more productive labors, and 
hence the firm’s performance and profitability will be increased. However, this result is 
not robust: when conducting the same regression analysis with the MARS control function, 
this finding is overturned. Therefore, it can be inferred that the positive marginal effect is 
coming from the bias introduced by the non-linear problem.  Consequently, we can’t draw 
any conclusion on the role of the wage level in firm performance. Further inquiries must 
be conducted before concluding. 
To a certain extent, this paper confirms some previous findings: It shows that more 
employees with college degrees can be beneficial and help improve the performance of the 
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firm has a low proportion of employees with college degrees. However, cautions will be 
needed when interpreting this finding since the marginal effect of adding more employees 
with college degrees is not always statistically significant and positive, especially for the 
firms that already have a high proportion of employees who have college degrees.  
1.7 The Mechanism behind the Scene  
1.7.1 Revenue vs. Expenses 
The baseline results above only give us a big picture of what kind of effect may the 
proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees has on the firm’s performance. 
Briefly, the previous section confirms the positive and significant impact on firms with a 
lower proportion of employees with college degrees. The last section shows that the cut-
off value is 13.12% at the 95% confidence interval. However, it doesn’t address the 
question of how. In this section, I will do an empirical test on hypothesis H3 to see whether 
the increase in the proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees can generate 
comparative advantage in operating activities. 
   The specification for regression in this section is still specification (3). Since we 
can only conclude that firms having less than 13.12% of employees who graduate from 
college will benefit from hiring more college degree holders, I abstract a subsample for this 
section. The subsample is made up of all firm-year observations with bachratio<=0.1312.  
To test how employees with college degrees can influence the revenue and expenses of the 
firms, I run regressions on both dependent variables. The results are attached in Table 4 
below: 
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Table 4 – Revenue increase or expenditure decrease 
Revenue v.s. Expenditure  
 Dependent variable: 
 Log(exp) Log(rev) 
 (1) (2)                 (3) (4) 
 
OLS with linear 
control function 
approach 
OLS with MARS control 
function approach 




OLS with MARS control 
function approach 
bachratio 









-41.43    
(44.30) 




-115.96**    
(54.77) 
bachratio-cubic 
94.88    
(197.50) 







0.33***                   
(0.01) 




0.66***               
(0.01) 
Log(Emp) 
1.08***                  
(0.02) 
0.40***                    
(0.02) 
1.08*** 
    (0.02) 
0.40***                    
(0.02) 
Log(Avg_Salary) 
-0.14***               
(0.01) 
0.09***               
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
    (0.01) 
0.09***               
(0.01) 
age 
-0.003***                  
(0.001) 
-0.005***                  
(0.001) 
-0.003***                  
(0.001) 
-0.005***                  
(0.001) 
markup 
-5.08***               
(0.07) 
-3.33***               
(0.08) 
-3.69*** 
  (0.08) 
-1.94***               
(0.08) 
Log(Q) 
0.20***                       
(0.04) 
0.04***                       
(0.003) 
0.19***                       
(0.03) 




















Adjusted R-sq 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.69 
N 4318 4318 4318 4318 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
   Based on the estimation results in Table 4, the higher the overall education level 
is, the higher the total expenses it will incur for those firms. In the meanwhile, the total 
revenue goes up as well. Since the linear control function OLS has a much higher R-sq, it 
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means the linear approach model fits the data better. By looking at the coefficients, the 
marginal effect from the employee education level is generally higher on revenue than on 
expenses. Therefore, it’s legit to infer that the channel for the positive impact from the 
overall education level of employees is the increase in revenue, and the rise in the 
proportion of employees that have bachelor’s degrees does bring competitive advantage to 
the firm when conducting operational activities.  
 Something is interesting regarding the econometric model that we use, the adjusted 
R-sq of the models are all above 0.8 and even close to 1. That means this model provides 
exceptionally strong explanatory power to the variations in revenue and expenditure of 
Chinese firms. This model should contribute the empirical corporate finance and empirical 
I/O research in the sense that so far, this model provides the most explanatory power to 
variations in Chinese firms’ revenues and expenditures compared to previous literature. 
1.7.2 Operating income vs. non-operating income 
   Revenue is a vast concept and can be decomposed into non-operating revenue 
and operating revenue64. The former mainly refers to the income incurred through value 
changes of assets, arbitrages obtained from trading liquid assets, and other incomes coming 
from investment behaviours. The latter mainly refers to the revenue gained by providing 
products and services to customers within the range of the main business. Though we have 
learned that the positive effect from overall education level on firm performance is 
delivered through the increase of revenue, we still don’t know whether the effect is coming 
 
64 Under both current IFRS and current GAAP standards, incomes can be decomposed into operational income and 
non-operational income. 
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from the increase in non-operational income or the increase in operating income. In order 
to address this confusion, I run regressions on non-operational income and operational 
income separately to test hypothesis H4. 
In this part, since both types of incomes are subsets of revenue, I use the model 
from the previous section that is used to regress on the revenue. For the non-operational 
revenue part, I run regressions on both the log transform of non-operational revenue and 
value change income for the sake of robustness. For the operational revenue part, I run 
regressions on the log transform of operational revenue. Results are demonstrated in Table 












Table 5 – Decomposition of the increase in revenue 
Operational Income v.s. Non-operational Income  
 Dependent variable: 
         OPI/Profit 
                           
NOPI/Profit 
               
ValueCh/Profit 




































-45489.90    
(35906.39) 









170371.2    
(160055.6) 
200887.1    
(160930) 
-89658.91    
(106491.1) 





-68.36***               
(9.53) 
-29.01***               
(8.58) 
33.02***               
(6.33) 





130.63***               
(14.55) 
49;42***                    
(10.22) 
-70.42***               
(9.67) 





-14.00***               
(6.33) 
13.64***               
(5.05) 







-3.30***                  
(0.69) 
-3.52***                  
(0.89) 
0.97 *                  
(0.59) 





316.35***               
(53.84) 
524.59***               
(53.25) 
-166.51***               
(40.44) 





20.53***                       
(4.14) 
2.05                      
(2.75) 
-4.76*                       
(2.51) 























29.96109***                
(86.96) 
266.31*** 
   (66.99) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04   
N 4317 4317 4317 4317 4317 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The implications of Table 5 are straightforward. The coefficients are supporting the 
story of increasing operational income: When regressing the non-operational revenue-to-
profit ratio on bachratio, the coefficient is negative also not statistically significant. When 
regressing the operational revenue-to-profit ratio on bachratio, the coefficient is positive 
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and significant65. That means the effect from the overall education level on operating 
income is positive, which implies that when more employees are holding college degrees, 
the non-operational income will get lower while the operational income will get higher. 
The estimators obtained from the regression on value change income/loss confirms this.  
The findings stay aligned with the argument made by previous literature saying 
human capital may also help firms improve quality of service and hence, increase the firm 
performance. The empirical results in this section show that firms with more employees 
who have received higher education will be more focused on their primary business line 
and gain more income from their main business line and then experience an increase in 
operating income. Though this is an interesting finding, with the limited data I have, it’s 
hard to test further what the reason is. Following the previous literature (e.g. Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998, and Ton, 2009), a possible explanation is that firms with more employees 
who receive college education have better service quality in their primary business line, 
and get reputation and customer satisfaction, which creates stable business relationships 
with their customers.  
1.7.3 Different effects for different firms 
Based on the previous literature examining the labor market like Autor et al. (2007) 
and Autor et al. (2013), the needs for different types of skills vary across firms. Therefore, 
the importance of employee education should also vary across firms.  
 
65 At the confidence level of 90%. 
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 To test H5 is true or not, we use the random coefficient model to do an estimation. 
The rationale behind the random coefficient model is that it assumes the marginal effects 
to be made up of two parts: the common effect shared by all individual firms and the 
variations among individuals(𝛽1𝑖 = ?̅?1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡). In order to simply the model and make it 
estimable, the following assumptions are made: 
1, The variation 𝑽𝒊 is uncorrelated with the endogenous variable 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡. 
2, 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝑣𝑖𝑡] = 𝜔𝑣𝑖𝑡 
3, 𝐸[𝑉𝑖𝑡|𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑉𝑖𝑡|𝑣𝑖𝑡] = 𝜌𝑣𝑖𝑡 
4, I also assume even though the magnitude of the marginal effects may vary across 
firms, the curvature of the marginal effect remains the same for all firms. Therefore, the 
coefficients of the squared term and the cubic term will not have random components.  
5, 𝐸[𝑉𝑖𝑡|𝑒𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑉𝑖𝑡] so that there’s no need to construct the variance-covariance 
between them in a specific form.  
Then specification (15) would become  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝜔𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 +
𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕 + e𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                        (16) 
The results of the estimation on specification (16) are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Random Coefficient Model66 
 
66 The variable bachratio is the aggregated education level of employees measured by the proportion of proportion of 
employees holding at bachelor’s degree or above. Log(exp) is the natural log transformation of expenditure. Log(rev) is 
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Random Coefficient Model 
 Dependent variable: 
 ROA ROA 
 (1)  
































-5.23***                   
(0.06)  
-5.44***                   
(0.06)  
Log(emp) 
0.53***                  
(0.11)  
0.88***                   
(0.06)  
Log(Avg_Salary) 
0.07**               
(0.035)  
-0.003              
(0.027)  
age 
-0.042***                  
(0.01)  








43.53***               
(0.45)  
43.49***                
(0.31)  
Log(Q) 
0.003***                       
(0.03)  













21.07***                
(0.95)  
20.13***                 
(0.92)  
Log-likelihood -31787.49  -31679.42  
N 13199  13199  
 
 
the  ?̂?  is the residual generated by using the control function approach. ∑  denotes the variance-covariance matrix of 
the random coefficients. 
 58 
Some firms can enjoy a marginal effect of up to 0.37% increase in ROA when they 
increase the proportion of employees with college degrees by 1%.67 Therefore, the results 
confirm the argument proposed in Autor et al. (2007) and Autor et al. (2013): The needs 
for different types of skills vary across firms, and the importance of employee education 
also varies across firms. The marginal effects brought by employees with higher education 
differ from one firm to firm. 
1.8 Robustness checks 
1.8.1 Measurement of firm performance 
The measurement of firm performance has always been an issue in corporate 
finance research. As mentioned earlier, the mainstream scholars in the field of corporate 
finance now agree that ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q are commonly used measurements of 
firm performance. This section is following the idea of the robustness check in Giroud and 
Mueller (2010). As emphasized, ROA usually accounts for profitability, and profitability 
is the most important feature of a firm since the ultimate goal of a firm is to maximize the 
profit so we choose ROA as the dependent variable for the baseline regression. Therefore, 
the robustness checks will be performed on ROE and ROIC. The ROE ratio is another 
measurement that is widely accepted as the performance measurements of firms. The ROA 
usually doesn’t take the financial leverage into account while the ROE ratio usually can 
measure how well the firm is generating income on the equity when financial leverage is 
taken into account.  Another commonly used measurement is Tobin’s Q, which measures 
 
67 As indicated by Figure 4, the maximum of the marginal effect is the firms with 2 standard deviations above the mean 
level. When the proportion of employees with college degree approach to 1, they have a maximum marginal effect, 
which is about 37 in magnitude.  
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whether the investors appreciate the firm and whether its value is appraising. The 
robustness check results are attached in Appendix A Table 2. Since in the baseline results 
section, it’s shown that the MARS control function approach has a better fit for the data, 
and corrects the bias on both the coefficient of employee education and the coefficient of 
wage level, robustness checks are conducted only by using the OLS with MARS control 
function approach in this section. As shown from the estimation results and the 
visualization, our conclusion remains true: The marginal effects on firm performance from 
the employees holding college degrees are non-linear, and also not for all firms the effect 
is significantly positive. Only those firms with a relatively lower proportion of employees 
holding college degrees can experience significant positive effects. 
1.8.2 Stock performance 
   As mentioned previously, the measurements of firm performance commonly used 
in the field of corporate finance and empirical I/O are all accounting measurements. Some 
may be concerned that these accounting measurements can be manipulated by playing with 
the accounting criteria and managing the balance sheets or income statements. Thus, some 
scholars (such as Giroud and Mueller, 2010) also look at the cumulative abnormal returns 
of the stocks of the firms to see whether the findings are robust or not. Here I also use this 
method to test hypothesis H6 to ensure the robustness of our conclusions. I use the classical 
CAPM model68 to estimate the predicted return. Then I compute the cumulative abnormal 
returns by deducting the predicted return from the realized return. Then I test whether the 
 
68 The CAPM model is a classic model that tries to find the correlation between return and risks. The original CAPM 
model only contains the pricing load of risk. However, recently the three factors model, four factors model and five 
factors model also propose that the momentum, firm size, market-to-book ratio should also be factors that provide 
essential explanatory power to the variation in asset price. Pástor et al. (2000) proves that in reality, these three models 
make no difference when investors are making investments by looking at the abnormal returns.  
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CAR of the portfolio which contains the stocks of the firms with different overall education 
levels are the same or not. The first set of test results shows that the portfolio made up of 
firms with high overall education levels (bachratio>=0.24) 69 has a higher mean of CAR 
than the portfolio made up of firms with low overall education levels (bachratio<0.24). The 
student-t test results show that the difference is significant. To sum up, this is confirming 
the findings of previous sections. The test results are shown in Table 5.  
   However, since the firms might have different characteristics that may drive their 
stock prices to be different, dividing the firms into the two groups by using the mean is not 
adequate because there might be other factors that may influence the CARs70. Therefore, 
we use the clustering technique from unsupervised learning to cluster them into groups. 
The essential spirit of clustering is to make the comparable data points all into the same 
group and match with each other. We chose the Multinomial Normal Mixture (MNM) 
model for clustering since we don’t have to decide the number of clusters. Instead, it will 
determine the cluster number by maximizing the log-likelihood71. We use the subsample 
of the year 2016 to perform this clustering since the clustering requires the same time 
dimension. The clustering results are shown in Figure 2 in Appendix A. 
   As indicated in the results in Table 3 Panel A in Appendix A, interestingly, the 
firms with an above-average proportion of employees with bachelor’s degrees have 
significantly higher CARs than the firms with a below-average proportion of employees 
with bachelor’s degrees. By looking at the test results on the clustering groups, those results 
 
69 The mean of the bachratio of all firms is 0.24. 
70 Because the time dimension of the data is year and the stock price reported Is the price of the adjusted close price of 
last trading day in the year, the time dimension of the CAR here is the CAR of a specific year assuming the abnormal 
return of the last trading day of the previous year is 0.  
71 Details and mathematic proofs can be found in Vermunt and Magidson (2000). 
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essentially confirms the findings in the baseline result in the sense that both of them shows 
firms with proportion of employees with college degrees larger than 0.131272 are likely to 
have lower CARs than the shows firms with percentage of employees with bachelor’s 
degrees smaller than 0.1312. That also confirms our findings: 1, For firms having 
proportions of employees with bachelor’s degrees larger than 0.1312, the marginal benefits 
for them to hire more college degree holders will be statistically indifferent from 0 while 
firms proportions of employees with bachelor’s degrees smaller than 0.1312 can 
experience significantly positive benefits with such hiring; 2, The marginal effects from 
hiring college degree holders vary across firms even though the firms have similar 
characteristics. 
1.9 Management and policy implications 
   As discussed, the key findings of this paper provide management and policy 
implications, and those implications include the following:  
   1, Not all Chinese public firms will gain performance improvement by hiring 
more college graduates. If the firm currently has a low proportion of employees with 
bachelor’s degrees, more precisely lower than 13%, then hiring more college grads might 
benefit the firm. More specifically, according to the data, firms in the retail industry and 
hotel & traveling services industry should expect to gain significant improvements by 
hiring more college graduates.  
 
72 The critical value 0.1312 is determined by the baseline estimation results: For firms have a proportion of employees 
with college degrees larger than 0.1312, the marginal benefits for them to hire more college degree holders will be 
statistically indifferent from 0.  
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   2, The firms with a low proportion of employees with bachelor's degrees should 
gain more operating income through hiring more college grads. Hiring more employees 
with bachelor’s degrees can improve the income gained from the firm’s primary 
product/service line. 
   3, The policy of enlargement of college enrolment in China can be beneficial for 
Chinese firms in the sense that currently, many public firms still have low proportions of 
employees with bachelor’s degrees. Those firms, more precisely, the firms in the retail 
industry and hotel & traveling services industry, can benefit from hiring more college 
graduates, which creates a higher demand for college graduates in the labour market. 
1.10 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigate a long-argued issue about whether hiring people with 
college degrees will improve the performance of a firm. On the one hand, some economist 
argues that hiring people with higher education levels leads to higher wage costs. On the 
other hand, some managers and economists say that people with higher education can 
increase the overall productivity of the firm. The data analysis based on the data of Chinese 
public firms supports the hypothesis that hiring people with higher education levels, 
especially with bachelor’s degrees will improve the performance. However, that’s only true 
for the firms with a relatively low proportion of employees who are college degree holders. 
For the firms with a relatively high proportion of employees who have college degrees, the 
effect is not significant and can be negative at some points. Therefore, no general 
conclusion can be made for all firms.  
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This paper also tries to explore where these impacts are from and how they are 
delivered. Therefore, I also test whether these effects are coming from the reduction of 
costs or the increments in income.  It turns out that the improvement in firm performance 
is coming from the increase in operational income, which implies that the employees who 
have received higher education are more likely to make the firm more focused on its main 
business line and obtain more income from the main business line. In addition, the mixed-
effect model confirms that the effect varies across firms and it’s not unified.  
The robustness checks confirm the baseline findings in this paper. The findings in 
this paper contribute to the literature of human resources management and labor economics 
in the sense that this paper provides a brand-new perspective on how the education of 
employees can influence the firm’s performance. This paper may also contribute to the 
econometrics literature because the non-linear approach combined with machine learning 
techniques contributes to the empirical literature applying machine learning to managerial 
and policy-relevant issues.  
In the meanwhile, there are some issues that this paper that can’t be or wasn’t 
addressed: Due to the limitation of the data, we can’t control the propensity to IPO, which 
may create the selection biases for the estimators based on the data of public firms and the 
conclusion probably can’t be generalized to the non-public firms. Because of the lack of 
individual-level data, there is no way for me to do structural estimation by considering the 
simultaneous decisions of firms and individual laborers. Besides, the industry distribution 
of public firms in the sample is significantly different from the industry distribution of all 
firms in China. Therefore, although providing important insights on the relationship 
between firm performance and a college-educated workforce, without a more 
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representative sample of firms, one must be cautious in generalizing the conclusions in this 
















CHAPTER 2. AN INVESTIGATION ON THE DEMAND IN THE 
LOAN MARKET: A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF CUSTOMER 
CHOICE 
2.1 Introduction 
  This paper explores the key determinants that definite the market shares of banks 
within the loan market, and what kind of impacts there will be on the market structure if 
the Federal Reserve Bank changes the base interest rate. More precisely, this paper tries to 
provide answers to the following questions; 1, What are the key factors that determine the 
demand for a loan from a commercial bank? 2, Is interest rate a key factor in the 
competition? 3, If the answer to the previous question is yes, then does the monetary policy 
that changes interest rates reshape the loan market structure, and how will the monetary 
policy have impacts on the market structure?  
  The findings of my analysis include the following:  
  1) I find out that the ease of access to service, the service quality, and the interest 
rates are the key factors that determine the choice of customers. Based on the BLP73 
estimations and the 2SLS estimations for the demand curve, the ease of access to service 
bank, which is measured by intangible assets per employee and staff expenses per 
employee and number of employees has significant positive impacts on the share/demand 
of the loans offered by a bank. The service quality of a bank, which is measured by staff 
 
73 The BLP estimation refers to the estimation algorithm proposed by Berry et al. (1995). 
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expenses per employee, has significant positive impacts on the share/demand of the loans 
offered by a bank as well. The interest rate has an economically and statistically negative 
impact on the share/demand for loans provided by a bank.  
  2) the counterfactual experiment on interest rate changes shows that the small 
banks are more sensitive to the interest rate adjustments, and increases in interest rate can 
squeeze out the small banks from the loan market. The experiment shows that largest banks 
always have lower own--interest rate elasticities than smallest banks and that when the Fed 
increases one base point of the base interest rate, 4 out of 5 largest banks in the sample will 
lose less than 0.015% of the share while 4 out of 5 smaller banks in the sample will lose 
more than 0.015% of the share. This is the first analysis that empirically explains why that 
smaller banks are losing more than larger banks and hence, smaller banks tend to use more 
derivatives to hedge the interest rate risks as indicated by Fraser (2002).   
  3) banks with higher market power intend to be risk-averse. The analysis shows 
that the banks with a higher market power, measured by both HHI and own-interest rate 
elasticity, tend to have lower loan loss ratio and subordinated debt asset to total asset ratio. 
The positive correlation between the elasticity and the loan loss ratio and the positive 
correlation between the elasticity and the subordinated debt asset to total asset ratio are 
significant. This conclusion is perfectly aligning with the conclusion in Salas and Saurina 
(2003) though the dataset that they use is the Spanish bank dataset. 
  These results are crucial for two reasons: 1, The U.S. banking industry has been a 
key component in the economic system. Based on the data from The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the direct contribution from financial institutions on the whole economy 
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is about 7 percent in 201874. Understanding the factors that can shape the market structure 
of the lending market can provide policy implications to the monetary policymakers and 
enhance the efficacy of the polices made: Monetary policymakers can anticipate and 
quantify the impacts from an adjustment on interest rates with the loan market demand 
parameters, and can also predict the market structure changes with those parameters and 
evaluate the adjustments on interest rates accordingly, which may help policymakers avoid 
the undesired structural changes within the financial market effectively. 2, Consumer 
behaviors have also been discussed a lot75, and it’s always the center of industry study 
because the preference and demand of the customers are the foundations for industry 
analysis in terms of profit margin, return on equity, and market value estimation 76 . 
Therefore, knowing customers’ preferences over banks will enhance the understanding of 
the competition within the banking industry, and will provide marketing or even strategic 
level insights for the bank managers.  
  During the last forty years, econometricians and macroeconomists developed 
methodologies to estimate consumer’s demands conditioned on preferences. By leveraging 
these tools, the analysis for consumer choices over banks becomes possible77. This paper 
contributes to that literature by showing the micro-econometric techniques, namely the 
BLP demand estimation, can be applied to financial markets. Another contribution of this 
 
74 Based on the Gross Domestic Product by Industry: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2018 published by BEA on April 
19th, 2019. The full report can be assessed through https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-04/gdpind418_0.pdf. This 
number is measured by using output (GDP) contribution.  
75 In past 30 years, numerous researchers conduct consumer behavior research using either structural estimation or 
reduce-form methods to explore the consumer preferences in different good/service markets. Section II will review 
some closely related works. 
76 For instance, Nevo (2001) estimates the consumer preference parameters and conducted counterfactual experiments 
to evaluate the market share and possible revenue changes of the cereal manufacturers. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes  
(1995) also estimates the consumer preference parameters over cars and conducted experiment to estimate the changes 
of profit margins of the automobile manufacturers.  
77 Appendix B gives a detailed review of the techniques.  
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paper is the confirmation that the price factor, the loan interest rate, and the service quality 
are factors that determine the market share. This research also uses counterfactual 
experiments to show that monetary policies that adjust the interest rates may have 
unexpected impacts on the structure of the commercial banking industry. Increasing 
interest rates may squeeze out the small banks from the loan market. 
 In addition to the above contributions, this paper also contributes to two sets of 
literature: 1, this paper confirms the finding of the survey conducted by Boyd et al. (1994) 
that reputation and interest rate are the most important elements to the U.S. customers when 
they are making choices over banks. 2, this paper contributes to the financial institution 
literature in the sense that it examines the loan market from a micro-econometric 
perspective though previous researchers, like Kim et al. (2003), Shy (2002) and Ho (2015) 
only explore the depositary sectors78.   
2.1.1 Institutional background 
2.1.1.1 Banks in the U.S. 
   The U.S. banking industry has been a critical component in the economic system 
of the U.S. for centuries though some researchers argue that the importance of commercial 
banks is diminishing over time 79  (Kaufmann, 1993).  Nowadays, banks are not only 
providing basic depository or lending services but also offer other kinds of financing 
 
78 Details can be found in the literature review section regarding the research of the depositary markets.  
79 Berger et al (1995) summarizes the transformation and transition history of the banking industry in the united states. 
By looking at the development and economic contribution of banks, they assert that “the banking industry is an integral 
part of U.S. Economy”. Though Kaufmann (1993) argues that other intermediate financial institutions are stealing 
market shares in the loan market from commercial banks, the data shows that commercial banks still hold more than 
70% of the loan outstanding nationwide.  
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services, like portfolio management and financial advisory, that outreach almost every 
facet of the economic life of an individual. The banking industry also acts as a practitioner 
of macroeconomic policies in the sense that it executes monetary policies made by the 
central banks. Therefore, the banking industry has frequently been the target of policy 
regulations80. Though banks are more diverse in the financing services that they provide, 
the most critical functions of commercial banks are still to provide loans and help 
individual or enterprises to finance their needs81.  
2.1.1.2 Overview of the banking industry and the loan market 
 Based on the FDIC report, the total industry assets of the banking industry hit 
$18.09 trillion by March 2019 82 . According to Reuter’s business news published on 
Tuesday, Feb. 17th, 2017, the net income after tax and interest expenses of the banking 
industry is $171 billion in 2016, an all-time high. 83 Compared to the data of the year 2015, 
there is a 4.9% increase in net income for the whole industry, which is almost equivalent 
to the GDP value of Vermont State in 2016. 84 There are currently 19,821 active financial 
institutions with depositary and loaning businesses having a business operating on the U.S. 
 
80 The development and functional transformation of banks are elaborated in Berger et al (1995). After the deregulation 
of banks over the late 1980s and early 1990s, banks became more diverse of business lines. Those new business lines 
include investment banking businesses, off-balance-sheet businesses  (i.e. derivatives), insurance and risk management 
businesses, asset management and financial advisory businesses and other businesses that outreach almost all edges of 
economy. More details can be found in Berger et al (1995). Berger et al (1995) also list some others numerous capital 
regulations. 
81 See Kaufmann (1993). Commercial banks hold more than 70% of the outstanding loan in the U.S. Also, commercial 
banks have the highest proportion of loans in total assets (on average about 10%) compared to other intermediate 
financial institutions.   
82 FDIC Quarterly report of industry trend which can be accessed through: 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2019mar/industry.pdf 
83 The numbers in the article are obtained from the FDIC report which Can be accessed through: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-banks-fdic-idUSKBN1671V7. Their news report is based on the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp figures, which are not inflation-adjusted. 
84 Based on the data collected by The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. The by- industry GDP data can be 
accessed though: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-industry. 
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domain. 85 There are roughly thirteen types of specialization among those financial 
institutions, including Specialized governmental credit institutions, Bank holdings & 
Holding companies, Commercial banks, Real Estate & Mortgage banks, Investment banks, 
Finance companies, Securities firms, Investment & Trust corporations, Clearing & 
Custody institutions, Cooperative banks, Private banking/Asset management companies, 
Savings banks, and Central banks. Among those institutions, commercial banks and bank 
holding companies make up the 75% percent and other sorts of financial institutions 
altogether make up the 25% percent 86 . Figure 7 (a) shows the distribution of bank 
specifications. 
 
Figure 7 (a) – Specialization distribution of the financial institution87  
As indicated by Figure 7 (b), the banking industry has been through a downfall 
during the financial crisis over the 2008-2011 period. During those years, the total net 
income dropped drastically. As shown in Figure 7 (b), the return on asset (ROA) and return 
 
85 Based on the data obtained from Bankscope Database. More details about this databased and dataset will be 
discussed in the data section.  
86 This information is generated based on the specification category in Bank Scope Database. More details about this 
databased and dataset will be discussed in the data section.  






















on equity (ROE) ratios have dropped tremendously. The ROE ratio drops from well above 
10% to nearly 0% during 2008. During 2009 and 2010, both ratios increased drastically 
because of the macroeconomic policies and the interference of FDIC. Since the year 2012, 
the industrial ROA and ROE ratios both have been increasing steadily, and the ROE ratio 
remains on the level of close to 10%. 
 
Figure 7 (b) – ROA and ROE of commercial banks from 2005 to 201588  
   Based on the data published by The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the 
direct contribution from financial institutions on the whole economy is about 7 percent in 
201889. Unfortunately, there’s no objective way to measure the indirect contribution, but 
 
88 Data obtained from FDIC quarterly reports from year 2005 Q4 to 2015 Q4. All reports can be accessed through 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/ 
89 Based on the Gross Domestic Product by Industry: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2018 published by BEA on April 
19th, 2019. The full report can be assessed through https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-04/gdpind418_0.pdf. This 
number is measured by using output (GDP) contribution.  
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some economists argue that the total contribution from this sector should count for 8% or 
more of the economic growth.90  
    The loan market is enormous and diverse: Based on the FDIC annual report, the 
total outstanding loan value of individual loans for education (student loans), auto loans 
have reached a book value of 152 billion dollars in the U.S. On average, every U.S. resident 
has a balance of around 780 dollars of loan to pay and this number is net of real estate 
mortgage, commercial/business loans91. Reflecting its overall scale, the loan market attracts 
more than 1000 foreign commercial banks92 to offer loan services in the U.S. territory. 
  Berger et al. (2004) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find out that after the 
deregulation in the early 1990s, the bank industry became more diverse in terms of business 
as well as more locally concentrated. Though Shaffer (1989) previously found that the 
banking industry was trending perfectly competitive before the deregulation. As mentioned 
by Berger et al. (2004), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) and Berger et al. (1995), after 
deregulation in the banking industry, banks were more concentrated and tried to make their 
services more differentiated to get higher concentration and market power, 93 and the whole 
market structure is moving towards a monopolist competition. Thereby, the BLP 
framework and the discrete choice framework should be the appropriate models that can 
provide answers to the question of what factors determine the demand for loans. The 
reasons for the adoption of the BLP framework in this paper include the following: 1, The 
 
90 There is a discussion about his issue: What is the contribution of the banking sector to the GDP? It can be accessed 
through https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-contribution-of-the-banking-sector-to-the-GDP.  
91 FDIC Quarterly report of industry trend which can be accessed through: 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2019mar/industry.pdf 
92 Based on the data provided by Bankscope database. Details of this database will be elaborated in the section 3. 
93 For instance, Capital One is try to make their services more advanced by introducing more high level technologies 
which can facilitate their customer service. Details can be obtained from the official website of Capital One regarding 
their technological advances: https://www.capitalone.com/tech. 
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lack of individual choice data; 2, The non-linear price endogeneity problem in the demand 
estimation; 3, The BLP framework relaxes the unrealistic assumption of symmetric cross-
price elasticities in standard discrete choice models. More details regarding the BLP 
framework will be discussed in section 2.2 and section 2.4.  
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Brief view of related literature 
  This paper mainly draws literature from three streams of works: 1, works in the 
field of industrial organization using structural models (e.g. the BLP framework) to 
estimate the demand for other industries; 2, determinants of customers’ 
choices/preferences over bank; and 3, works using structural models to estimate customers’ 
choices/preferences over the bank services.  
2.2.2 Structural models and demand estimation for other industries 
     The first stream of literature that I refer to include the empirical industrial 
organization works that use structural models to estimate demand in other sectors. 
Hausman et al. (1994) estimate the bear market demand by using the structural model. He 
follows the basic discrete choice framework to do a structural estimation. He estimates the 
elasticity of price and the impacts from other factors, such as weather, on demands. David 
(2006) uses the structural estimation method to estimate the demand in the theater industry. 
He not only estimates the price elasticity and the impacts from schedules of shows, but he 
also conducts a scenario analysis on the revenue of each theater based on the estimated 
preference parameters. Bresnahan et al. (1996) use the structural model to estimate the 
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demand in the PC market for different brands. They particularly leveraged the nested 
structural model and relax the Independence and Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) assumption 
in the primitive multinomial logit model.  Sudhir (2001) uses the standard BLP-type model 
to estimate the price elasticities and profit margins of the manufacturers in the yogurt and 
peanut butter market. Xu et al. (2016) use the structural estimation method, precisely the 
BLP, and Nevo methods, to estimate the impact of the online review on the demand of 
healthcare provided by each doctor. They conduct a sentimental analysis and text mining 
of the review. By using that information and the structural estimation method, they find 
out that the online review has significant impacts on the bookings of the doctors. There’s 
also a substitution effect between the price and the review based on their counterfactual 
experiments. This set of literature provides insights on how to apply the BLP and Nevo’s 
frameworks to a specific product/service market. However, only a few researchers look 
into the financial service market with these methodologies.  
2.2.3 Determinants of customers’ choices over banks. 
   I also investigated the management and marketing literature regarding the 
determinants of customers’ choices over banks. Boyd et al. (1994) firstly investigate the 
preferences of the consumers in the U.S. over financial services. They find out that 
reputation, helpfulness of staff, the efficiency of the service, interest rate and service 
charges, and depositary interests are the most important elements to the U.S. customers 
when choosing a financial institution regardless of age, marital status, income level, and 
household components. Zineldin (1996) has investigated the preference of customers of 
banks by using questionnaires. Based on his sample of Swedish customers of Swedish 
banks, he calculates the importance of the characteristics of banks and lists the most 
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important factors that customers consider when choosing over banks. He finds out that the 
price and cost, helpfulness of the staff, service efficiency, and availability are the key 
elements that lead to a decision. Kennington (1996) also conducts similar research by using 
the Poland sample, he finds out that most of the respondents consider service quality, 
accessibility, and costs. His findings mostly align with Zineldin (1996). Phuong Ta et al. 
(2000) also conduct a hierarchical analysis by using the sample of Singapore. Their 
findings mostly concord to Kennington (1996) and Zineldin (1996). In addition, they find 
out that the overall reputation of the firm is also a key element in decision making.  Kaynak 
et al. (1992) also got similar results by looking at the preference of Hong Kong residents 
over banks and find reliability, and risk is a factor that customers consider. Almossawi 
(2001) conducts an investigation regarding the preferences of college students over banks 
in Bahrain. He finds out that technology and reputation are the most important determents 
when the students are choosing a bank. He also finds out that convenience and service 
quality are also key elements. The customer choice factors utilized in the structural 
estimation model in this paper are selected based upon the results or findings from this 
literature. 
2.2.4 Deposit markets and loan markets 
The number of previous research on loan markets is quite limited in both the 
industrial organization field and the field of finance. The most cited paper is Kim et al. 
(2003)’s paper. That paper focuses on the role played by switching costs in the consumer 
choices and market shares of banks in the Norwegian loan market. They derived a structural 
model to capture the oligopolistic structure of the Norwegian loan market and discuss how 
switching costs can affect the market share of the banks. Though this paper provides an 
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estimation framework for the banking industry, due to the difference between the structure 
of the U.S banking industry and the Norwegian banking industry, the framework that they 
propose can’t be applied to the U.S. banking industry: The American banks are fairly 
diverse in terms of service quality, size, IT research and adoption. The number of banks in 
the U.S is large. There are more than 18000 financial institutions and around 6000 
commercial banks actively operating in the U.S. Due to the huge differences of 
characteristics between banks and the differentiation among banks, the loan services sector 
is no longer a homogenous-good market. Thereby, the U.S. banking industry and the loan 
service market is more like a monopolist competition structure, and this paper’s framework 
doesn’t apply to the U.S. loan market.  
   Several other papers look at the competition and market share problems in the 
banking industry. Shy (2002) and Ho (2015) both looked at the relationship between 
switching costs and the deposit market share of banks. Both of them leveraged the 
structural model that they derived by themselves. The key difference between their works 
is that Shy (2002) models the deposit as homogenous good while Ho (2015) models the 
deposit as a differentiated and durable good. The estimation procedure that is used by Ho 
(2015) is quite similar to a standard BLP, and hence fairly identical to the one in this paper. 
Besides, Ho (2015) provides some customer preference variables that may also be relevant 
to the choice of loans. However, Ho (2015) doesn’t look at the borrowing side of the 
business— the loan market. In this paper, the framework that is specifically for the demand 
estimation in the market of loan. 
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2.3 Conceptual framework  
2.3.1 Random utility and consumer choice 
   I follow the standard random coefficient choice model framework. I observe T 
markets (T=1, 2, 3, 4….), each with hypothetically I94 consumers and j (j=𝐽𝑇) banks that 
vary by market. Furthermore, I assume each bank is captured by K characteristics. In 
typical choice models, a market is defined as a “city-time" combination (e.g. Berry et al., 
1995, Nevo, 2001, and Ghose et al., 2012).  
   The utility of customer i from choosing bank j in market t, is denoted as 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗, 
which is a function of observed and unobserved (by the econometrician) bank 
characteristics, 
𝑥𝑗𝑡 and 𝜗𝑗𝑡, respectively; and the market-specific characteristic, 𝑧𝑡. In my model, 
the market-specific characteristic is also important since it captures the systematic changes 
in market demand over time. As discussed in Section 1, the bank industry experienced 
fluctuations during my sample period. Computing the elasticities without controlling for 
the time fixed effect will lead to biased estimation because the unobserved year fixed effect 
may be correlated with bank characteristics. Traditional BLP-type models tend to focus 
more on product characteristics. Thus, the utility for consumer i from choosing bank j in 
market t can be represented as the following model:  
 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖𝑥1𝑡𝑗 + 𝛾𝑥2𝑡𝑗 + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                             (1) 
 
94 In order to improve the efficiency of the estimation, Halton draw numbers usually is set at 1000. 
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where 𝑥1𝑗𝑡  denotes the observed bank characteristics that customers value but the 
evaluations depend on the individual perspectives, for instance, the reputation of the bank 
𝑥2𝑗𝑡  denotes the characteristics that the customers universally consider regardless of 
individual views, for instance, the service quality.  
   Next, I also consider how consumer preferences vary as a function of individual 
characteristics. My approach here mainly follows Nevo (2001). The intuition behind the 
simulation is to capture the heterogeneous utility gain obtained by customers due to the 
heterogeneity in their preferences. Assuming normal distribution over of the customer 
preference, we have 
𝛽 = ?̅? + ∑𝑣𝑖  , 𝑣𝑖~𝑃  (,)                                                                                                           (2)
95 
where 𝑃𝑣(,)  is a multivariate normal distribution of the demographic characteristics 
with mean vector of  and variance-covariance matrix of . 
Thus, combing (1) and (2) we will get                                                           
𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛿(𝑥1𝑗𝑡 , 𝑥2𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑡, 𝜗𝑗𝑡; 𝛽,̅ 𝛾, 𝜌) + 𝜇 (𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑣𝑖; ∑) + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                            (3) 
where 𝛿𝑗𝑡 = ?̅?𝑥1𝑗𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥2𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑡  is the mean utility and 𝜇 = [𝑥1𝑗𝑡]
′
∗
∑𝑣𝑖 , represents the deviation from the mean, 
∑ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛. Customers are choosing the banks which 
 
95 In Berry et al. (1995), the distribution used is the pdf of income distribution. P(.) means the the distribution is a 
function of some parameters, for instance the income. This notation is following BLP (1995). 
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give them the highest utility, which defines the choice set of unobserved variables that lead 
to the choice of bank j:  
𝐴𝑗𝑡 = {(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑖𝑗𝑡)|𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗 > 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑙 , ∀𝑙 = 0,1,2… . 𝐽}                                                                      (4) 
  Additionally, assuming ties occur with zero probability, the market share of the j-
th bank as a function of the mean utility levels of all the 𝐽𝑡 + 1 choices (including outside 
good96), given the parameters, is 
S (𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑥2𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑡 , 𝜗𝑗𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖; 𝛽,̅ 𝛾, 𝜌, ∑)=∫ 𝑑
 
𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑃 (𝑣𝑖)𝑃 (  )                                           (5) 
  As proposed by Berry et al (1995), given the computation of derivatives of shares, 
and to allow for interactions between individual consumer and specific characteristics, 
specification (2) is nested into a Cobb-Douglas form random utility function in 
expenditures on other goods and services and characteristics of the goods/services 
purchased.  
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑗 = (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡)
𝑎
𝐺 (𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑥2𝑗𝑡 , 𝜗𝑗𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡, 𝑣𝑖)𝑒
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (6) 
Where G (.) is a function articulating 𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑥2𝑗𝑡, 𝜗𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑡 ,  𝑣𝑖  with multiplications of 
exponentials. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the income, and 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the price of alternative j at time t, which is a part 
of the characteristics 𝑥1𝑗𝑡 that consumers have different preferences.  
 
96 The outside good generally referes to the alternatives not in the sample. Based on Berry et al. (1995), the outside 
good is an aggregation of all other alternatives available in the market but not included in the sample. More 
specifically, in the context of this paper, it refers to all outside lenders of loans that are not in the sample. In the U.S., 
insurance companies (e.g. State Farm) can also make lendings in the form of loans to borrowers. Many small lenders 
(e.g. credit unions) that are not included in the sample are aggregated into the outside good.    
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  By taking the logarithm of equation (6) and allowing for individual consumers 
interacting with both the inside good and the outside goods/services, the utility system 
becomes  
𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗=𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡) + ?̅?𝑥1 (≠𝑝)𝑗𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥2𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑡 + [𝑥1 (≠𝑝)𝑗𝑡]
′
∗
∑𝑣𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡  , 
𝑢𝑖𝑡0=𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗0𝑡 + [𝑥10𝑡]
′ ∗ ∑𝑣𝑖0 + 𝑖0𝑡,                                     (7) 
As pointed out by Xu et al. (2016), customers won’t necessarily have a unified 
preference on price. Therefore, by following Xu et al. (2016), I also allow interaction 
between price term and individual customers, which turns the utility system into 
𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗=𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡) + ?̅?𝑥1𝑗𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥2𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑡 + [𝑥1𝑗𝑡]
′
∗ ∑𝑣𝑖+ 𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 
𝑢𝑖𝑡0=𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗0𝑡 + [𝑥10𝑡]
′ ∗ ∑𝑣𝑖0  + 𝑖0𝑡,                                   (8) 
According to Berry (1994), the reason why the utility function of the outside 
goods is different is that the characteristics of the outside goods that customers have the 
homogenous preferences on are unobserved and don’t influence the estimation on the 
inside goods under the BLP framework. 
System (8) denotes the baseline utility speciation used in the BLP estimation in this 
paper. As derived by Berry et al. (1995)., if the customers have unified preferences on the 
set of characteristics 𝑥1𝑗𝑡 , and hence there’s an interaction between characteristics and 
individual customer, the utility system can be turned into a Logit model since all 𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑖0 
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become 0. Assuming 𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝑖0𝑡  both follow Weibull Distribution function, since 
[𝑥10𝑡]
′ ∗ ∑𝑣𝑖0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 [𝑥1𝑗𝑡]
′
∗ ∑𝑣𝑖  both become 0, the whole system becomes  
𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑗=𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡) + ?̅?𝑥1𝑗𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥2𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑡+ 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
𝑢𝑖𝑡0=𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗0𝑡 + 𝑖0𝑡                                                               (9) 
The market share functions are  












                                         (10) 
Based on McFadden (1973), specification (10) also implies 
          𝛿𝑗𝑡 =ln(𝑠𝑗𝑡) − ln  (𝑠0𝑡)  
=  𝑎 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡) + ?̅?𝑥1𝑗𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥2𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑧𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗𝑡                                      (11) 
Specification (11) can be directly estimated by using least square estimation 
procedures and are used as robustness checks in this paper.  
When the interactions between the characteristics and the individual customers are 
allowed,  [𝑥10𝑡]
′ ∗ ∑𝑣𝑖0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 [𝑥1𝑗𝑡]
′
∗ ∑𝑣𝑖  are no longer 0s, and the share functions 
become: 


















                                (12) 
The BPL estimation procedure is based on the share functions in the specification 
(12), which captures the reality that in the monopolists’ competitive market, the market 
shares of banks are dependent on the heterogenous customer preferences as well as some 
homogenous preferences shared across different customer groups who obtain loans. 
2.3.2 Hypotheses   
   According literature regarding the research of preference of consumers over 
financial institutions mentioned above including Boyd et al. (1994), Zineldin (1996), 
Phuong Ta et al. (2000), Almossawi (2001),  several characteristics of banks have impacts 
on the consumers choices over banks: 1, Reputation 2, Technology and convenience; 3, 
Services quality and efficiency; 4, Charges and interest costs (Price) 97; 5, Loan availability. 
That implies customers seeking financial services will make make a utility maximization 
depending on their preferences over those characteristics. By putting all those factors into 
the discrete choice framework proposed by McFadden (1980) and Train (2003), all those 
factors will account for the choice of an individual. When the individual level choice is 
unobservable, the individual choice can be aggregated as the share of a specific 
product/service provided by a bank according to the structural estimation model proposed 
by Berry (1994). Then by using the log-transformation, as indicated by Berry (1994) and 
Berry (1995), the log-transformed share of the products/services is a linear function of all 
 
97 Generally, the charges and the interest costs are the expenses to the customers. Therefore, they can be interpreted as 
the price of a loan service offered by a bank. 
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the factors that determine the choices. By leveraging the estimation techniques proposed 
by Berry et al. (1995), Berry and Pakes (2007), and Nevo (2001), the price elasticity can 
be computed. By identifying the price elasticity, the impacts from interest rate changes can 
be simulated and evaluated.  
Generally, the paper is concerned about whether the decision factors proposed by 
Boyd et al. (1994), Zineldin (1996), Phuong Ta et al. (2000) Almossawi (2001) are also 
the factors that determine the choices of the borrowers in the U.S.  Therefore, the first set 
of hypotheses to test include 
H1 (a): Reputation of the bank, measured by goodwill to total asset ratio, is a factor 
that positively influences the choice of borrowers and increases the market share of the 
bank. 
H1 (b): Technology level of the bank and the convenience to customers, measured 
by the intangible asset per employee and number of employees, are factors that positively 
influence the choice of borrowers and increases the market share of the bank. 
H1 (c): Services quality and efficiency, measured by average staff expenses and 
the number of employees, is a factor that positively influences the choice of borrowers and 
increases the market share of the bank. 
H1 (d): Interest cost, measured by the average loan interest rate offered by the bank, 
is a factor that negatively influences the choice of borrowers and decreases the market share 
of the bank. 
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H1 (e): Loan availability, measured by total asset value and liquid assets to total 
asset ratio is a factor that positively influences the choice of borrowers and increases the 
market share of the bank.  
Based on the heterogeneous preference assumption adopted by McFadden (1980), 
Train (2003), and Berry et al. (1995), the borrowers might have different preferences over 
the price factor. Therefore, the second hypothesis to test is  
H2: Borrowers have different preferences over interest rates, and hence the impacts 
from interest rates on the demands of loans vary across individuals which implies random 
parameters on interest rate. 
Based on the traditional microeconomics theory and industrial organization theory 
regarding the relationship between demand and price for a normal good98, the price factor 
may cause changes in the demand. Taking this into the structural demand estimation 
framework, the changes in interest rates should cause changes in the shares of the banks in 
the loan market. That should reshape the market structure as well. Xu et al. (2016) show 
this phenomenon in their research about the medical service market. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis to test is  
H3: The interest rate adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank will lead to 
asymmetric99 structural changes in the loan market.  
 
98 Details can be found in Tirole, Jean. The theory of industrial organization. MIT press, 1988. The demand is usually a 
function of price and when the price of a normal good increases, the demands will go down. When the price of a 
normal good decreases, the demands will go up. 
99 The word “asymmetric” here refers that the effects of an increase in interest rates on a bank’s loan demand is 
different from the effects of a decrease in interest rates on a bank’s loan demand in terms of magnitudes. 
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The price elasticity itself can measure the sensitivity of the bank when the price 
changes. In the sense of that, price elasticity can be another measurement of market power: 
If the entity has a higher price elasticity, it’s more easily influenced by the price 
competition and it’s more fragile, which means less market power. The earliest research 
conducted on the issue of the relationship between market power and risk preference of 
banks is done by Bresnahan (1982). In this most primitive research, the author uses the 
banks' data and concludes that firms in monopolistic markets are more risk- averse than 
firms in competitive markets, indicating a desire for the 'quiet life'. That implies the banks 
with higher market power should be risk-averse. In order to test whether this is true or not, 
I use the interest rate elasticity as a proxy for the market power to test the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Banks with lower own interest elasticities are more likely to be risk-averse. 
Back to the end of the last century, Phillips (1995) finds out that the capital structure 
of firms is highly correlated with industry output. They also find that the price in the final 
good market will be significantly changed once the major firms in those industries change 
their financial leverages. That implies the financial structural decisions of firms should be 
correlated with their market power. To test whether this is true or not for the banks in the 
U.S., I  test  the following hypothesis: 
H5: Banks with lower interest elasticities are more likely to have higher financial 
leverages. 100  
 
 
100 Generally, the financial leverage refers to the debt equity ratio. I follow the general definition in this paper. 
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2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Data sources and raw data 
   The data that I am going to use is the yearly data obtained from the Bank Scope 
database, which is a private database that collects the data by combining the responses to 
the questionnaires from the banks and the annual report published by the banks. This 
comprehensive database is explicitly focusing on the data of banks and can provide precise 
firm-level information. My data set could be constructed as a two-dimension panel data, 
namely year and individual bank, of demand and service characteristics for different banks. 
The raw data contains 24997 banks over the 4-year period from 2013 to 2016. Given the 
fact that the general BLP model proposed by Berry et al. (1995) is static, the data during 
this period will be a good fit for the model because, during this period of time, the whole 
banking industry is going through steady growth and restoration.101  That means there are 
no substantial structural changes during this period in the industry. If there is no discernible 
demand shock or income shock during that period, it can be safely inferred that there were 
no huge changes in the customers’ preferences.102 In that sense, the data of this time period 
should fit the settings of the BLP-type model well.  
The raw data contains all specialties in the banking industry in the United States.103 
Since the focus of this paper is to investigate the demand for the loan, I only keep the banks 
 
101 From Figure 2, we can see that the ROA ratios and ROE ratios keep steady during that period, which means there 
shouldn’t be huge supply shock or demand shock in that period for the industry. 
102 Based on the classic microeconomics theory on consumer preference and demand, i.e. Varian’s Microeconomic 
Analysis (2016), chapter 6 & 7, when preference parameters remain the same, income factor remain the same, then 
demand should remain the same as well.  
103 Based on the data from Bankscope, the specialties in the U.S. of banks include investment banks, bank holding 
companies, commercial banks, credit unions and policy banks. 
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that have a specialty in commercial banking and exclude the banks/firms with other 
specialties. The commercial banks are the major financial institutions that give out 
consumer and commercial/industrial loans in the U.S. Based on the data provided by 
Bankscope, the total loan given out by commercial banks accounts for about 91% of the 
total loan value in the U.S.104  
The data source of the loan market size information is obtained from the FDIC 
quarterly/annual report.105 Typically, I follow the tradition of using the total book value of 
loans in the U.S. as the total market demand and I use the loan share as the market shares 
of the banks.  
A data screening is performed on the raw dataset by following several criteria: 1, I 
dropped the banks that are no longer operating since 2012 because most of them have a 
huge portion of data missing 2, I dropped the observations that have missing data in total 
asset, number of employees, total value of domestic deposits (including time deposit, 
consumer deposit, and demand deposit), total value of domestic loans (including loans to 
government and consumers plus commercial/industrial loans), total revenue of interests on 
loans, total cost of interests on deposits, intangible asset, goodwill.106 The missing data 
points don’t present a specific pattern. Therefore, they should be randomly missing.  
After the data screening, I was left with 6289 bank-year observations with 1879 
banks represented in the dataset. Due to the complexity of the BLP estimation procedure, 
 
104 Computed by using the book value of outstanding loan owned by the commercial banks divided by the total book 
value of outstanding loans owned by all banks regardless of specialty.   
105 The detailed information is attached in Appendix A Table 1.  
106 Generally, from the perspective of corporate finance, goodwill is a balance sheet item under the category of asset. It 
refers to the accumulation of intangible asset and capital due to the good reputation, fame and good enterprise images.  
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107 It will be difficult or even impossible for a computer to do the simulation and contraction 
mapping for each observation, and then the optimization, especially with interpreted 
languages such as Matlab, R, or even Python.  To overcome this computational problem, I 
picked the top 30 with the largest asset value and bottom 30 with the smallest asset value 
from each market and form a new sample. After the sample size is reduced to a manageable 
level, the computational difficulty gets resolved. Since I also control for the asset value as 
an exogenous variable in the specification, this shouldn’t generate any selection bias. 
Besides, the BLP framework takes care of the unobserved choices well by introducing the 
outside good share, and hence, the banks that are not selected into the estimation sample 
are modelled as the outside goods and shouldn’t affect the estimation results. As a 
robustness check, I also randomly selected 30 small banks.  
2.4.2 Definition of a market  
     As previously mentioned in section 2, in typical choice models, a market is 
defined as a “city-time" combination. However, since there is no available data showing 
which area(s) the banks are serving and from which region the customers of the banks are 
coming, there’s no feasible way to model a geographic region as a market. Besides, here 
specifically in the loan market, there’s a particular property of the banking industry: 
Generally, all banks are available to serve the customers across the country due to the usage 
of the Internet and other transmitting technology though many of them put a focus on 
 
107 Since the BLP estimation procedure is adopting a nested loop structure, the big-O of this estimation procedure is O 
(n2). This is already the best scenario given by using matrix operations as much as possible. Even under this best 
scenario, it will end up with 6289*6289 computations. It will take 1.2542 years to finish one estimation. The big-O 
notation is a notation used to show the complexity (computing time and memory) of an algorithm. The previous 
research (e.g. David, 2006) using BLP framework contain no more than 1000 alternatives due to the consideration of 
computational complexity.  
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nearby areas.108  Thus, I don’t use the “city-time” combination as the market segmentation. 
Instead, I use the time period as the market segmentation in this paper, and I treat the whole 
country’s financial need in one period (specifically a year in this paper) as the demand in 
each market.  
     This definition of the market is somewhat problematic since some small banks 
they only focus on the customers that are geographically nearby instead of trying to attract 
loan borrowers nationwide. At the same time, even the smallest bank in the sample have at 
least one branch outside of the state where its headquarters are located, suggesting that the 
market definition may not be unreasonable. 109 
2.4.3 Definition of market shares 
Based on the previous research regarding market structures of banks (e.g., Gilbert, 
1984), there are several measurements of market shares of banks that are commonly used. 
In this paper, I calculate the market share by using the share of total loan book value in a 
specific market by taking the book value of outstanding loan of each bank divided by the 
total book value of the outstanding loans in that year across the whole U.S. Based on that 
previous literature, the banking industry follows a monopolist competition structure. Thus, 
I follow Xu et al. (2016) and define the loan product of each bank to be an alternative for 
customers.110 I compute the market share for each bank by using its book value of loans 
 
108 Based on the information obtained from www.branchspot.com, even the smallest bank in the sample has at least one 
branches outside of the state where its headquarter is in, which implies the fact that nowadays the banks don’t limit 
their operations in a specific area any more. Web services provided by loan lender search engines, such as 
www.lendinghome.com, make getting a loan from other regions/areas much easier.  
109 This implies, based on the information from www.branchspot.com, that the banks don’t limit their operations in a 
specific area any more. Web services provided by loan lender search engines, such as www.lendinghome.com, make 
getting a loan from other regions/areas much easier.  
110 In Xu et.al  (2016), banks are modeled as alternatives since the services provided by each bank are associated with 
the differentiated characteristics of the bank. Approximately, a service alternative can be represented by a bank.   
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divided by the total book value of loans in each market which is defined as a year in this 
paper. For instance, the book value of JP Morgan Chase in the year 2013 was 6.325 billion 
USD and the total book value of loans in the U.S. was 84.52 billion dollars. Then JP 
Morgan Chase’s loan market share in the 2013 market was roughly 7%. 
2.4.4 Variables of interests and indicators 
   The variables of interest in this paper include the characteristics of banks which 
are the determinants of consumers’ choices over banks. Based on the previous literature 
regarding the preference of consumers over financial institutions (Boyd et al, 1994, 
Zineldin, 1996, Phuong Ta et al, 2000, Almossawi, 2001), there are several characteristics 
of banks that have impacts on the consumers choices over banks: 1, Reputation; 2, 
Technology and convenience; 2, Services quality and efficiency; 3, Charges and interests 
costs; 4, Loan availability. The key independent variables which proxy for the loan service 
characteristics include: 1, The loan interest rates which is computed by using the total 
interest revenue on loans divided by the total book value of loans; 2, The service quality 
which can be indicated by the personnel expenses on each employee and asset value per 
employee since these reflects how well the employees are paid, how well the employees 
are trained and how many resources that each employee can leverage as indicated by Ho 
(2015); 3, the loan availability can be measured by the liquid asset to total asset ratio sine 
the liquid asset to total asset ratio reflects how much liquid asset the bank is holding and 
banks are lending money by giving out its liquid assets (in most cases cash); 4, The 
reputation can also proxied by the total asset value since it shows how much asset the bank 
has and how powerful the bank can be; 5, The reputation can also be indicated by good 
will to total asset ratio in the sense that goodwill reflects the value of a company’s brand 
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name, solid customer base, good customer relations, good employee relations, and any 
patents or proprietary technology.111  If the ratio between goodwill to total asset is huge it 
means the firm’s reputation carries a huge weight as an asset and it means the firm has 
good reputations, good technological level and good customer relations overall; 6, Aside 
from the goodwill, the technology level can be indicated by the intangible asset values per 
employee. Since the data don’t contain the information of R&D expenses in its income 
statement and that is also not a standard item on the income statements of financial 
institutions, I can’t calculate the R&D intensity, which has been commonly used as one of 
the technology level indicators. However, from the standing point of accounting, the R&D 
expenses will finally be converted into patents or copyright, which are usually included in 
the intangible assets; 7, the accessibility level can be indicated by the number of employees. 
2.4.5 Summary statistics  
   In the final sample, the banks/firms that have specialty other than commercial 
banks are excluded. The banks that have missing information in the variables of interest 
are also excluded from the final sample, as explained in the data screening section above. 
The final sample covers a time period of 4 years from 2013 to 2016. There are 1375 
observations in the 2013 market, 1500 observations in the 2014 market, 1592 observations 
in the 2015 market and 1822 observations in the 2016 market. The summary statistics are 
shown in Table 7.  
 
 
111 Definition of item goodwill on balance sheets: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/goodwill.asp#ixzz53M2tScI1  
 92 
Table 7 – Summary statistics of the data112 
    Whole Sample Subsample   
Variable 
Unit 
















$1000 6,289 5714.02 14571.66 240 8784.3 27109.21 
Number of 
Employees 





$ 1000 6,289 0.02 0.10 240 0.03 0.03 
Total Asset $ 1,000,000 6,289 10.50 927.00 240 181.00 406.00 
Liquid asset 
to total asset 
ratio 
1 6,289 7.93 9.11 240 12.97 12.07 
Loan 
interest rate 
1 6,289 0.05 0.02 240 0.05 0.02 
  As mentioned above, due to the computational difficulty, I have to select the banks 
with the largest assets and smallest assets to form a new sample to keep the sample size 
manageable. If we compare the summary statistics, the mean of most of the variables of 
interest in the two samples is close to each other except for the number of employees. The 
mean of the loan interest rates is almost completely the same between the two samples. 
 
112 Data sources: Bank Scope database. Computed by the author. 
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Besides, in the estimation, the size is controlled. Therefore, the smaller sample should be 
enough to identify the true parameters.  
2.5 Empirical methodologies 
   To overcome the non-linear price endogeneity problem raised by Berry (1994), 
the details of my random coefficients-based structural model, including the setup, 
assumptions and identification strategies, will be elaborated in this section. More precisely, 
the estimation has to deal with three issues: (i) the lack of consumer individual-level choice 
and demographical information, (ii) the heterogeneity of tastes of customers, and (iii) the 
endogeneity problems caused by the correlation between service characteristics and 
unobserved banking demand shocks. I also capture the intense non-price competition in the 
banking industry that is caused by various characteristics.113   
  In terms of the first problem, the BLP framework was proposed to resolve the 
unobserved individual choices in the demand estimation problems: the BLP framework 
only requires the aggregated demand data for estimation. As for the issue of lacking in 
demographical information, based on the literature regarding the customers’ choice over 
loan services mentioned in section 2.2 (e.g. Boyd et al., 1994), the most important 
determinants on choices of bank services are commonly shared by different types of 
consumers regardless of marital status, age, income or household members. Thus, it will 
be unnecessary to use the demographic distribution information to do the simulation. On 
the other hand, based upon the random utility framework, a different individual might have 
a different perspective on a specific characteristic, and I will do a simulation to relax the 
 
113 In this context, it refers to the competition caused by determinants other than interest rates offered and charged. 
 94 
“same-taste” or so-called “same-preference” assumption as proposed by Nevo (2005). The 
elaboration on this approach is in section 2.5.1. 
  As for the endogenous problem, the endogeneity issue needs some particular 
identification strategies to resolve. The identification strategy with details is discussed in 
section 2.5.2. 
2.5.1 Estimation techniques 
   Based on the traditional BLP- type model, my goal is to estimate the mean utility 
function. In order to conduct the estimation, I still follow the classical method of Berry et 
al. (1995) and Nevo (2001). I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
with optimized instrumental variables. The contraction mapping algorithm is strictly 
following the algorithm in Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001).114 The critical intuition and 
purpose behind the contraction mapping are 1, Ensure the convergence of optimization of 
the GMM estimation procedure; 2, Making sure the market share after the simulation of an 
alternative still matches the true market share. By making the share function become 
conditional only on characteristics, we have  
S (𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑥2𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑡 , 𝜗𝑗𝑡; 𝛽,̅ 𝛾, 𝜌) = ∫ 𝑓  (𝑣𝑖,  𝛿𝑗𝑡)𝑃 (𝑑𝑣)                                                         (13) 
where,  𝑓 (𝑣𝑖, 𝛿𝑗𝑡) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑗𝑡 . 
 
114 Please note that the key difference between this model and BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001) is that their model is a 
dynamic one and Xu et al. (2016). Therefore, by following Xu et al. (2016), the simulation step is a combined with all 
markets and the different markets (over different years) are compiled into one when doing contraction mapping and 
simulations. This is specified in the notations.  
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As pointed out by Berry et al (1995)., specification (13) doesn’t have a closed-form 
solution. In order to overcome this issue, based on the contraction mapping method 
proposed by Berry et al (1995)., the operator T which maps between share, parameters, and 
the simulations can be written as  
𝑇 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + ln(𝑠𝑗𝑡) − ln  (s𝑗(𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑥2𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑡 , 𝜗𝑗𝑡; 𝛽,̅ 𝛾, 𝜌))                                                (14) 
By the time of convergence of 𝛿𝑗𝑡 , combing with the simulation on the interaction 
term and assuming 𝑣𝑖  follow a specific (normal or uniform) distribution, the share 
conditional only on parameters characteristics can be written as  
S (𝑥1𝑗𝑡, 𝑥2𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑡 , 𝜗𝑗𝑡; 𝛽,̅ 𝛾, 𝜌) =
1
𝑛𝑠𝑡
∗ ∑ 𝑓 (𝑣𝑖
𝑛𝑠𝑡
1 , 𝛿𝑗𝑡
∗)                                                          (15) 
Where  𝛿𝑗𝑡
∗
 denotes the convergence value of  𝛿𝑗𝑡 after contraction mapping.  
   Then, by plugging in the shares in each iteration and the parameters in each 
iteration into the optional instrumental GMM objective function proposed in Berry et al. 
(1995) and then minimize the objective function will give the optimal GMM estimation of 
parameters 𝛽,̅ 𝛾, 𝜌.115  
2.5.2 Identification strategy 
   Due to the existence of the unobserved characteristics, one of the key issues in 
the estimation is the endogeneity of the loan interest rates since the unobserved 
characteristics can influence the interest rate of loans and the share simultaneously. For 
 
115 The minimization method in Berry et al. (1995) uses the Nelder-Mead algorithm for minimum search. More details 
of this algorithm can be found in Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001). 
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instance, the advertising and marketing costs can be the factors that determine the interest 
rates charged on loans and the market share simultaneously. However, those costs are not 
in the data. In order to resolve this issue, I introduce a type of instrumental variables (IVs). 
By following Berry et al. (1995), I use the Hausman-type IVs: the average of characteristics 
of other banks in the same market (T=t). Since the major operating costs of the banks are 
the interests paid to the people who make deposits and who lend money to the banks, by 
following Berry (1994), I also use the cost shifters of the banks: the deposit interest rates.  
To avoid the simultaneity issue, I use the average of the deposit interest rates of other banks 
in the same market (T=t). Though this Hausman-type IV has been widely used (e.g. Berry 
et al., 1995), there’s still some notable restriction specifically for this dataset; The variation 
seems to be small across the IV vector, which might cause problems in estimation.  
To sum up, the instrumental variables used in the estimation include 1, the average 
of the asset per employee of other banks in the same market, 2, the average of the goodwill 
to total asset ratio of other banks in the same market, 3, the intangible asset of other banks 
in the same market, 4, the average of staff expenses per employee of other banks in the 
same market and the average of the interest rates on deposits of other banks in the same 
market, and 5, the average of the deposit interest rate of other banks in the same market.116  
  The underlying identification assumption is that the characteristic of suppliers in 
the same market will have impacts on the pricing strategy of each other, while those 
characteristics will not have direct impacts on the market share of each other. Also, I 
assume the characteristics of other banks will not directly influence the share of a specific 
 
116 The deposit interest rate of each bank is computed by using the total deposit interest expenses on the income 
statement divided by the total book value of deposit on the balance sheet of that year.  
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bank in the current period, but they will have some impacts on the pricing strategy of that 
bank in the current period. These assumptions are mostly following the rationale of Berry 
et al. (1995). Thereby, the characteristics of other banks in the same market will be 
correlated with the loan interest rates and service charges but will not be correlated with 
the market share directly. If the discrete choice framework and the BLP-type choice model 
correctly captures the underlying data generating process, the estimators should indicate 
the actual marginal effect from banks’ characteristics on market share. 
2.6 Empirical results and implications 
2.6.1 Results from the basic model  
  In this subsection, the structural estimation results are given as well as the reduced 
form regression. The reduced form estimator should serve as a robustness check since it’s 
simply assuming in the random utility of each customer, the preferences of customers over 
the price factor are homogeneous. The reduced form estimator imposes an additional 
assumption that all customers have the same preferences over the bank characteristics. This 
assumption may induce some slight biases but should not influence the significance too 
much if the model did capture the underlying structure of the data generating process.117 
Thus, the reduced form model should serve as a robustness check for the significance of 
the estimators obtained from the structural estimation are significant factors that determine 
the choice of borrowers.   
 
117 Based on the rationale of asymptotic theory, all unbiased estimators should converge to the same value as indicated 
by the law of large numbers. Andersen (1970) proves the asymptotic property of the MLE estimators, which include the 
logit model estimator, and hence the BLP estimators should also has this asymptotic property. 
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    Table 8 shows the results of the BLP estimation results and Table 9 shows the 
two-stage least square results.  
Table 8 – BLP estimation results118 
BLP Estimation 
 Dependent variable: 
  log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) 
                  (1)                    (2) 
 BLP estimation          ∑   
BLP 
estimation            ∑   
Loan interest rate -73.55***          
 (20.86) 
0.32       
 (361.49) 
-75.32**             
(34.08) 
 6.75       
(46.11) 
Number of employees 0.000063***   
(0.000018) 
 0.000041***   
(5.19e-06) 
 




0.88    
 (504.48)  
  
Intangible asset per 
employee 
 21.37***   
 (8.03) 
7.89e-06   
(367.9399) 
 24.27**   
(11.95) 
 0.08  
(2005.00) 
Liquid asset to total asset 
ratio 
-0.063***        
 (0.019) 
 -0.07***            
(0.02) 
 
Asset per employee -8.86e-07         
(0.000014) 
   
Average staff expenses 0.03***    
 (0.01) 
 0.02***    
 (0.01) 
 
Total asset -0.273          
 (0.21)   
 
constant -6.98***   
 (1.58)   
-5.91***    
 (1.78) 
  
N 240   240  
Markets 4  4  
Halton draws 1000  1000  
f (p) ojective function 
value 
110.23455   163.1526 
 
     
 
 
118 The numbers in the parentheses are GMM standard errors. The estimation procedure strictly follows the simulation 
and GMM estimation procedure proposed by Berry et al. (1995). ∑  𝑑enotes the variance of the coefficient. The numbers 
in the parenthesis are the standard error of the estimators. The whole sample estimation means that the estimation is based 
on the 6289 observations without any selection. The subsample means that the estimation is based on the sample which 
contains the 30 largest and the 30 smallest banks. 
Data sources: Bank Scope database. Computed by the author. 
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Table 9 – 2SLS estimation results119 
 
119 The numbers in the parentheses are the 2SLS standard errors. The model estimated on is the reduced form specification 
proposed by Berry et al. (1995). The key difference between this estimation and the BLP estimation is that the 2SLS 
estimation doesn’t assume the customers have different preferences over the product characteristics. The whole sample 
estimation means that the estimation is based on the 6289 observations without any selection. The subsample means that 
the estimation is based on the sample which contains the 30 largest and the 30 smallest banks. 
 Data sources: Bank Scope database. Computed by the author. 
Subsample v.s. Whole Sample 
 Dependent variable: 
 log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) 
 (1) (2) (3)  
2SLS estimation with 
sub- sample (selected 
by size) 
2SLS estimation with 
sub- sample (selected 
by size) 


































0.15                 
(0.70) 
liquid asset 













0.0001**    
(4.84e-06 ) 
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-0.0003           
(0.0006) 
Total asset -0.273 
(0.21) 
























0.00002           
(0.00005) 




6.44***        
(0.30) 















-43.61***    
(14.94) 
N 240 240 6289 
F (8,N-9) 99999 47.29 265.94 
1st stage R-sq 0.3925 0.3659 0.3474 
R-sq 0.4659 0.4625 0.2303 
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As presented by Table 8 and Table 9, the loan customers of the banks do consider 
the interest rate of loans, as expected. Additionally, they consider the accessibility, 
convenience and service quality: the estimated coefficients of the number of employees, 
intangible asset per employee and average staff expenses are all positively significant in 
both models. Most of them are significant at the confidence level of 99%. However, the 
estimated coefficient of the term goodwill to asset ratio is not significant in the BLP 
estimation model but significant in the multinomial-logit model which is estimated by 
2SLS though the magnitudes of the estimators of both models are fairly close to each other. 
Surprisingly, the estimated coefficients of liquid assets to a total asset in all models are 
negatively significant, which means the loan borrowers are more likely to choose the banks 
with less sufficient funds available for loans. This finding is, to a certain extent, 
counterintuitive, and the reasons for this are not clear. A possible interpretation of this can 
be that there are omitted variable(s) (e.g. minimum deposits, other bank requirements) 
positively correlated with liqassets/totassets but negatively correlated with choices that 
biased the estimators. This finding may also suggest that smaller banks may be preferable 
on some margins like the quality of service, despite their sizes.  
 As expected, the sign of the coefficient of the loan interest rate is negative. The 
magnitudes of all models are fairly close to each other if we look at the estimation results 
by using the small samples. The coefficient ranges from -72 to -75. Essentially, this number 
means on average, a bank will experience a decrease of approximately 0.72% to 0.75% in 
the odds of its original share in the loan market relative to the share of the outside lenders 
if its loan interest rate increases by 0.01 in magnitude. The sign of the number of 
employees, intangible assets per employee, and average staff expenses are all positive as 
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expected. The magnitude of the coefficient of term intangible asset per employee is 
unexpectedly large, which implies that customers do consider the technology and the 
degree of service convenience a lot. Based on the coefficients of this term in the BLP 
model, we can anticipate that, on average, a bank will gain around a 21% increase in the 
odds of its original share relative to the share of outside lenders if its average intangible 
asset per employee goes up by $1000.  If we look at the service quality side, we can see 
that the loan customers also consider the service quality a lot. The magnitude of the 
coefficient of the term staff expenses per employ is around 0.026, which implies that on 
average, the odds between the loan market share of a bank relative to the share of outside 
lenders will go up by 0.026% if the average staff expenses go up by $1000 dollars. To sum 
up, the reputation of the bank, the technology level of the bank and the convenience to 
customers, services quality and efficiency, charges and interest costs are significant factors 
that determine the choice of the borrower while the loan availability is not. 
  It’s a little surprising that the amount of assets that a bank has doesn’t have impacts 
on the share of that bank in the loan market. This result is different from the findings in Ho 
(2015) regarding the Chinese deposit market. However, one interesting finding is that when 
the asset term interacts with the price term, the interaction term becomes significant. That 
is to say, the asset values/size itself is not a determinant of demands but it becomes a 
determinant through price effects. 120  Though the findings are different, they are not 
necessarily contradictory in the sense that Ho (2015) is looking at the deposit market and I 
 
120 Details can be found in the robustness check section 2.7.2. 
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am looking at the loan market. Besides, the difference between the preference of Chinese 
customers can be quite different from the preference of U.S. customers. 
   There’s one thing that is worth attention in the estimation results: The standard 
deviations of the characteristics variables are not significant and the magnitude of them is 
fairly small. That is saying, the opinions and perceptions of customers on those 
characteristics are not quite different and hence, the random coefficient logit utility model 
should be the same with a simple multinomial logit utility model essentially. That is to say, 
H2 is rejected. 
  Based on Berry (1994), since the standard deviation estimators in the random 
coefficient utility model is not significant, then the coefficients can be safely estimated by 
simply using the 2SLS estimation procedure and treat the choice and utility from the 
choices of consumers as multinomial logit utility system. Then, I also perform another 
estimation for the complete sample. As shown in Table 2, many coefficients are very close 
to the corresponsive ones in the BLP estimation. The coefficients of loan interest rates are 
slightly different and the whole sample gives a number with an even higher magnitude. 
However, the estimator from the whole sample is still in the 95% confidence interval of 
the BLP estimator. Therefore, we shouldn’t think the estimation results from the smaller 
sample is biased by the sample selection procedure.  
2.6.2 Counterfactual experiments with monetary policies 
The estimation results above make scenario analysis possible providing the loan 
interest rate elasticity. It’s possible to test how the market share will change if the interest 
rate changes. By calculating the BLP elasticity for loan interest rates, predictions for shares 
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changes of all banks in the industry will be doable. For the elasticity computation, we can 
either use the BLP elasticity or the standard logit elasticity based on the baseline results in 
Table 8 and Table 9. In this section, we use the BLP elasticity in these counterfactual 
experiments. For the sake of simplicity, I only choose the 30 largest banks that have the 
largest share and 30 smallest banks that have the smallest share in the sample to explore 
the effects of interest rate shocks and to show the patterns. To obtain the most up-to-date 
information, this section only focuses on the 2016 market.  
The computation of the cross-elasticities and own-elasticities are following the 









∫𝑎𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑖)  𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑘
𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝑆𝑗𝑡
∫𝑎𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑖)  𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
 
Where 𝑝𝑗𝑡 denotes the interest rate on loans of bank j in market t in this paper. 𝑆𝑗𝑡 
is the actual loan market share of bank j at time t. 𝑎𝑖 is the coefficient of the loan interest 
rate estimated for individual i based on the simulation. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the probability of choosing 
j by individual i at time t according to simulation. 𝐹(𝑣𝑖) is the distribution of the deviation 
from mean utility 𝑣𝑖.  
In order to explore the impacts of the monetary policies on the structure of the loan 
market in the U.S., I only display the 5 biggest banks and 5 smallest banks here in the 
elasticity table. The elasticities computed are shown below in Table 10. In Table 10, the 
cross and own-interest rate elasticities of the largest 5 banks and the smallest 5 banks are 
presented.  
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Table 10 – Cross and Own-interest Rate Elasticities121 
 
As indicated by the table, by looking at the own-loan interest rate elasticities, the 
larger banks are less sensitive to the loan interest rate changes. For instance, JP Morgan 
Chase, the largest bank in the U.S. has an own loan interest rate elasticity is much lower 
than that of the smallest bank in the sample, FirstBank of Nebraska. Generally, larger banks 
are much less sensitive to loan interest rate changes. If we go back and look at the sample 
for the BLP regression, the 30 biggest banks (by asset) have an average of own-interest 
rate  elasticities of -3.20 and the 30 smallest banks (by asset) have an average of own-
interest rate  elasticities of -3.89. If we only look at the top 5 and the bottom 5, the 
difference is even larger: The average of own-interest rate  elasticities of the largest five 
 
121 Table 10 shows the cross and own-interest rate elasticities among the subsample which consists of the largest 5 banks 
and smallest 5 banks in terms of total asset value. The elasticities are computed with simulations of random effects. The 
dot line separates the results by size. This computation is based on the BLP estimation and simulation results with the 30 
largest and 30 smallest banks. Sources: Computed by the author. 
 
 


























JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
NA 
-2.22018 0.350886 0.312454 0.329714 0.138106 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
Wells Fargo Bank, NA 0.243653 -2.62847 0.312454 0.329715 0.138106 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
Bank of America, 
National Association 
0.243649 0.350881 -2.50317 0.329706 0.138105 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
Citibank NA 0.243653 0.350887 0.31245 -4.11448 0.138105 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
Wachovia Bank, 
National Association 
0.243652 0.350885 0.312456 0.329713 -3.15588 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
The Harvard State 
Bank 
0.243653 0.350886 0.312452 0.329717 0.138105 -3.72196 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
The Reedsburg Bank 0.24364 0.350869 0.312484 0.32969 0.138105 5.83E-05 -5.61885 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
The First National 
Bank of Athens 
0.243653 0.350887 0.312449 0.329719 0.138105 5.83E-05 0.000114 -4.46533 3.98E-05 6.07E-05 
Teton Banks 0.243651 0.350883 0.31246 0.32971 0.138105 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 -2.83525 6.07E-05 
FirstBank of Nebrska 0.243653 0.350887 0.312449 0.329719 0.138105 5.83E-05 0.000114 5.4E-05 3.98E-05 -4.0752 
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banks is -2.92, and the average of own-interest rate elasticities of smallest five banks is -
4.14. The own-interest rate elasticities of the largest 30 banks and the smallest 30 banks 
are presented in Figure 4. The boxplots of the own-interest rate elasticities of the largest 30 
banks and the smallest 30 by years are shown in Figure 8.  
  
  Figure 8 – Own interest rate elasticity.122 
 
122 Notes: 1, The large group, denoted by blue dots, consists of the 30 largest banks of year 2016 in sample, and the small 
group, denoted by red dots, consists of the 30 smallest banks of year 2016 in the sample. The size of the bank is measured 
by total asset value. 2, The elasticity presented in the graphs is the absolute value. 3, The bubble size is weighted by the 
elasticity. Sources: Computed by the author. 
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  Figure 9 – Own interest rate elasticity over time boxplots 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 indicate that small banks are generally more sensitive to 
interest rates and small banks can lose more market share in the loan market than the large 
banks if the central bank, namely the FED, changes the base interest rate.  
As for the outside good elasticity, I also compute the cross elasticities of how the 
interest rate of loans of outside lenders can change the loan market share of the banks in 
the sample. By following Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001), the elasticities of the outside 
goods are computed by doing simulations on  e𝑗0𝑡 = −
𝑝0𝑡
𝑆𝑗𝑡
∫𝑎𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑆0𝑡𝑑𝐹(𝑣𝑖)  where 𝑝0𝑡 
is computed by using the average loan interest rates of all the banks in the U.S. at time t. 
The cross-interest rate elasticities for the biggest 5 and smallest 5 banks with outside 
lenders are shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11 – Scenario Analysis 123 
Panel (a) Cross interest rate elasticity with outside lender                                           
Bankname 
Cross interest rate 
elasticities with outside 
lenders 
Market gain from 
outside lender if the 
interest rate of loans 
from outside lenders 
goes up by 0.01 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA 0.55959 0.00560 
Wells Fargo Bank, NA 0.67667 0.00677 
Bank of America, National 
Association 
0.63949 0.00639 
Citibank NA 1.00937 0.01009 
Wachovia Bank, National 
Association 
0.82495 0.00825 
The Harvard State Bank 0.84535 0.00845 
The Reedsburg Bank 1.27619 0.01276 
The First National Bank of Athens 1.01419 0.01014 
Teton Banks 0.64395 0.00644 













123 Table 11 panel (a) shows the cross-elasticity of the 5 largest banks and the 5 smallest banks with the outside lenders. 
That panel also indicates how those banks obtain market shares within the loan market if the outside lenders increase the 
interest rates. Table 11 panel (b) and panel (c) shows the scenario analysis about how the market shares of the largest 
banks and the smallest banks can be influenced by the Federal Reserve’s decision of adjusting interest rates. The 
calculation is based upon the own-elasticity, the cross-elasticity by all other firms and the cross-elasticity by outside 




Table 11 – Scenario Analysis (continued) 
 
Panel (b) Market Share Changes after a 0.01 (100 base points) Increase on Loan 
Interest Rates 
Bankname 
Market share loss if the interest rate of loans 
goes up by 0.01 nationally (%) 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA -0.00529 
Wells Fargo Bank, NA -0.00928 
Bank of America, National 
Association 
-0.00801 
Citibank NA -0.02060 
Wachovia Bank, National 
Association 
-0.01094 
The Harvard State Bank -0.01502 
The Reedsburg Bank -0.02968 
The First National Bank of Athens -0.02076 
Teton Banks -0.00816 
FirstBank of Nebrska -0.01775 
 
Panel (c) Market Share Changes after a 0.005 (50 base points) Decrease on 
Loan Interest Rates                                         
Bankname 
Market share loss if the interest rate of loans 
goes down by 0.005 nationally (%) 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA 0.00265 
Wells Fargo Bank, NA 0.00464 
Bank of America, National 
Association 
0.00401 
Citibank NA 0.01030 
Wachovia Bank, National 
Association 
0.00585 
The Harvard State Bank 0.00751 
The Reedsburg Bank 0.01484 
The First National Bank of Athens 0.01038 
Teton Banks 0.00408 
FirstBank of Nebrska 0.00887 
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Based on Table 11 panel (a), the largest banks will gain more market shares if the 
outside lenders increase their loan interest rates by 0.01 than the smallest banks do. This 
finding shows that small banks are more sensitive to the interest rate changes by the outside 
lenders.  
In order to elaborate on the effects of changes in interest rate imposed by monetary 
policies, I simulate three different scenarios here: 
Scenario 1: A monetary policy sets the basic loan interest rate 100 basis points 
higher  
In this scenario analysis, I only pick out the largest and smallest 5 banks in the 
sample, and I especially focus on JPMorgan Chase Bank and FirstBank of Nebraska to 
illustrate the impacts. If all banks follow this monetary policy by increasing 1% in loan 
interest rates for all loans issued and holding everything else constant, then by calculating 
the cross-loan interest rates and own loan interest rate elasticities, market share changes 
can be computed under that monetary policy. 
    From the computed results presented in Table 11 penal (b), JP Morgan Chase 
will lose 0.0053% of its share in the loan market while the smallest bank in the 2016 sample 
FirstBank of Nebraska will lose 0.01775% of its market share. This is saying, the monetary 
policy that raises the loan interest rate will make the largest bank lose less market share 
while making the smallest banks losing more customers and market share. That is to say, 
the monetary policy of increasing interest rates may lead to a more unbalanced market 
structure for the loan market and even the commercial banking industry. It will squeeze out 
the smallest banks and have trivial impacts on the largest banks. 
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Scenario 2: A monetary policy sets the basic interest rate 50 basis points lower 
In this scenario analysis, I only pick out the largest and smallest 5 banks in the 
sample, and I especially focus on JPMorgan Chase Bank and FirstBank of Nebraska to 
illustrate the impacts. If all banks follow this monetary policy by decreasing 0.5% in loan 
interest rates for all loans issued and holding everything else constant, then by calculating 
the cross loan interest rates and own loan interest rate elasticities, we can see the market 
share changes under that monetary policy in Table 11 panel (c).  
Interestingly, from the calculation results, we can see that JP Morgan Chase will be 
gaining 0.0026% more market share while the smallest bank FirstBank of Nebraska will 
be gaining 0.00887%, which is 4 times the increase of JP Morgan Chase will experience. 
By doing this calculation, we can see that monetary policy that decreases the loan interest 
rate even a little bit, will give the small banks a decent growth in the market share. If the 
interest rate decrease is large, 200 base points (2%) for instance, then the smallest banks 
will gain more market share in the loan market. 
Up to this point, based on the experiment results presented above, we fail to reject 
H3. Based on these experiments, when the Federal Reserve Bank changes the base interest 
rate, the smallest banks might face survival challenges due to the “squeezing effects” from 





2.7 Robustness check 
2.7.1 BLP framework with the control function approach 
As noted in the identification strategy section, the BLP framework is using 
instrumental variables combined with GMM to implement the estimation procedure. Based 
on Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001), the reason for using the IV-GMM estimation is 
that the endogeneity entered in a non-linear way. To identify the coefficient consistently, 
the IV-GMM method requires that there exists a linear relationship between the IV, and 
that the endogenous variable, and that there also exists a linear relationship between the IV 
and the dependent variable as well. However, the control function approach can relax these 
requirements and gives more consistent estimators when the linear assumptions about the 
IV do not hold. Following the procedure proposed by Petrin and Train (2010),  since the 
BLP estimation with the IV-GMM method has proved the homogeneity of the preference 
over the price factor, namely the loan interest rate, the control function approach here 
follows the standard control function approach.  
Due to the homogeneity of customers’ preferences over the price factor implied by 
the estimation on the BLP model, there’s no need to include the random effect term in the 
model. By imposing the standard assumption of Control function approach: 
1, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝒁𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜃 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
2, 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[ 𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝑣𝑖𝑡] = 𝜔𝑣𝑖𝑡 
estimations will be conducted on the following equation: 
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 y𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕′𝜗 + 𝜔𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
Where y𝑖𝑡  denotes the dependent variable which is computed through  
log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) based on the BLP structure, Priceit denotes the price factor 
which is the loan interest rate, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 denotes the vectors of other determinants that might 
influence the market share, vit denotes the control of the endogeneity of the price124, and 
eit is the new random error term.  
The estimation results are shown in Table 1 in Appendix B. As indicated, the 
coefficient of the price factor obtained from the control function approach estimation is not 
significantly different from the 2SLS estimation results and the BLP estimation results: 
The magnitudes are quite similar. Therefore, the estimators of the interest rate elasticity 
should be robust.  
2.7.2 Interaction term with size and loan interest rate 
As a part of the key findings and contributions of this paper, I show that the impacts 
from changes on interest rate have different effects on banks with different sizes. In order 
to ensure the robustness of this finding, I also test the effects of the interaction term between 
the size and loan interest rate. 
The estimations will be conducted on the following equation: 
 y𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜗 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
124 Mathematical details regarding the control function implementation procedure can be found in Woodridge’s NBER 
notes, which can be obtained from https://www.nber.org/WNE/lect_6_controlfuncs.pdf 
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The results are reported in Table 2 of Appendix B. 
As indicated in Table 2 of Appendix B, I tried two types of interaction terms. The 
first type of interaction is to interact with the loan interest rate with the asset value. The 
other type of interaction is to interact the loan interest rate with the size dummy. I generate 
the size dummy by comparing the assets of the bank to the mean value of assets: If the 
asset value of the bank is higher than the average asset value at time t, the size dummy 
equals to 1. Otherwise, it equals to 0.  
Demonstrated by Table 2 of Appendix B, the interaction terms are always 
statistically significant. Besides, the estimations confirm our conclusion: when the asset 
values get larger or the size dummy equals to 1, the interest rate elasticities will get smaller. 
This aligns with the baseline results regarding interest rate elasticities in this paper. 
2.7.3 Random sampling the small bank 
In the data section, I discussed that due to the computational complexity of the BLP 
algorithm, I had to select the largest 30 and smallest 30 banks to build up a smaller 
subsample that the computer can handle in the estimation. Even though the BLP algorithm 
will treat the observations not selected as outside goods, and that controlling the size in the 
estimation should address the selection bias issue, in order to ensure the robustness of the 
results and the conclusions, I also random sample the banks that fall into the bucket of 
small banks.  
More precisely, I did the following: 
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1, Determine the quintile cut-off of the size, which is measured by the total book 
value of assets; 
2, Keep the banks that fall into the 0-25% quintile in each year; 
3, Use a uniform distribution to sample 30 banks from the list of banks obtained 
from step 2 randomly;  
4, Merge the records of the banks selected from step 3 with the 30 largest banks of 
each year; 
5, Conduct a BLP estimation on the sample obtained from step 4.  
The reason why I only randomly sample the small banks is that the data show the 
lists of the largest banks, measured by using the total value of assets, don’t change much 
from year to year since the number of the large banks is relatively small. Therefore, the 30 
largest banks selected in the subsample used to generate the baseline results should be 
enough to represent the population of the large banks. However, since there are so many 
small banks in the United States, the 30 smallest banks might not be enough to represent 
the small banks. The BLP estimation results are attached in Table 3(a) in Appendix B.   
As indicated by the results in Table 3(a) in Appendix B, the estimators are not 
significantly different from the baseline results.125 The elasticities computed based on the 
estimators in Table 3(a) in Appendix B are still indicating that the smaller banks in this 
 
125 Since the BLP algorithm decomposed the variance-covariance matrix, there’s no feasible way to test whether the 
two estimators are statistically different. However, if we look at the numbers in Table 10 and Table 2, the coefficient of 
the loan interest rate term in Table 2 is less than 2 standard deviations away from the estimator of the coefficient of the 
loan interest rate term  in Table 10. Therefore, they should not be seen as statistically different. 
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randomly selected sample are more sensitive to interest rate adjustments than the large 
banks, which confirms the robustness of the conclusions.  
Besides, in order to confirm the conclusion that the large banks are less sensitive 
than the small banks in terms of interest rates, I also conduct a t-test on the own-interest 
rate elasticities computed on this sample. The results are attached in Table 3(b) in Appendix 
B. 
From the test results, it can be concluded that large banks have significantly lower 
own-interest rate elasticities than the small banks. This conclusion still holds when using 
random samples.  
2.8 Market power and firm strategies 
2.8.1 Market power and risk preference 
There exists a few previous research showing that the market power of a firm is 
highly correlated with managerial slack. The earliest research conducted on the issue of the 
relationship between market power and risk preference of banks is done by Bresnahan 
(1982). In this research, the author uses the banks' data and concludes that firms in 
monopolistic markets are more risk-averse than firms in competitive markets, indicating a 
desire for the 'quiet life'. That implies the banks with higher market power are more risk-
averse. The most influential paper is Keeley (1990). In Keeley (1990), the author finds out 
that the market power of a bank is highly correlated with its risk preference in the sense 
that the banks who have more market power, as reflected in larger market-to-book asset 
ratios, hold more capital relative to assets (on a market-value basis) and they have a lower 
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default risk as reflected in lower risk premiums on large, uninsured CD's. Another paper 
that tries to explore how risk preference is correlated with market power is Salas and 
Saurina (2003). They find that lower market power which is indicated by low economic 
profits reduces the incentives of banks to own--restrain from taking risks raises important 
regulatory issues in a period of liberalization and expectations of increases in competition 
among European banks.  
In order to test if the American banks also follow the rule that banks with higher 
market power also are more risk-averse and prefer a quiet life, I use the empirical 
framework developed by Salas and Saurina (2003). I use the elasticity of loan interest rates 
as the measurement of market power. The measurement of risk exposure is borrowed from 
Salas and Saurina (2003) and Keeley (1990). In addition to the loan loss ratio used by Salas 
and Saurina (2003), I also looked at the tier 1 asset ratio and the subordinated debt asset to 
total asset ratio as the measurement of risks.  
For the estimation in this part, since we have confirmed that the preference of the 
customers over the interest rate is not drastically different and the deviation from the mean 
utility is not significant, we can compute the own elasticities for all banks in the complete 
sample by using the simple multinomial logit elasticity without getting simulations 
involved. The elasticity calculation is based on Berry (1994). 
More specifically, an estimation of the following equation is conducted: 
y𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿
′
𝒊𝒕𝛾 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                      (7) 
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Where y𝑖𝑡 denotes the dependent variables which measure the risk preference of 
the bank, 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 denotes the market power which is measured either by HHI or Own- Interest 
rate elasticity, 𝑿′𝒊𝒕 is the vector (s) of control variables including year fixed effect and asset 
value, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error.  
The regression results are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12 – Market power and risk exposure126 
 
Loan interest rate elasticity and risk exposure 
 Dependent variable: 
                      Loan loss ratio 
Subordinated debt asset to 
total asset 
  (1)      (2)      (3)           (4) 
 
Pooled OLS with 
elasticity   
Pooled OLS with 
HHI  
Pooled OLS with 
elasticity   Pooled OLS with HHI  
Own elesticity 
of loan interest 
rate 
0.16***    
 (0.02)  
0.00027***   
(0.000071)  
HHI  -0.0084***   
(0.0033) 
 -0.00039***   
(0.00012) 
Asset value 
3.87e-10***   
(6.44e-11) 
 5.50e-10***   
(1.83e-10) 
8.98e-12***   
(1.65e-12)  
2.41e-11***   
 (6.21e-12) 
Year2013 
0.052*   
 (0.029) 
0.13***   
(0.03) 
-0.0006***   
(0.0002) 
-0.0005***    
 (0.0002) 
Year2014 
0.02    
 (0.03)  
0.05*    
 (0.03) 
-0.0003*   
(0.0002) 
-0.0003*    
 (0.0002)  
Year2015 
0.016    
 (0.027) 
0.014    
(0.029)  
-0.0003   
(0.00018) 
-0.0003**    
 (0.0002)  
constant 
0.45***    
 (0.09) 
1.31***    
(0.02)  
-0.0002   
(0.0004) 
0.001***    
 (0.0001) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.127 0.0057 0.043 0.0577 
N 6429 6429 6429 6429 
F (5,6429) 37.35 8.132 17.73 13.52 
 
126 Table 12 shows the results of the estimation regarding the relationship between loan interest rate elasticity and risk 
exposure. More specifically, the statistics are the results of Ordinary Least Square estimation on specification (7). The 
numbers in the parentheses are the robust standard errors. Data sources: Bank Scope Database. Computed by the author. 
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   As shown in the estimation result above, since I am using the absolute value of 
elasticities, if the own interest rate elasticity is high, then it means the market power of this 
bank is low and vice versa. I have done two separate regressions by using the HHI and the 
elasticity as market share measurement. The results of both are substantially aligning with 
each other: When the market power of a bank goes up, the risk exposure of that bank will 
go down. This conclusion is perfectly aligning with the conclusion in Salas and Saurina 
(2003) though the dataset that they use is the Spanish bank dataset. That is to say, banks 
with larger market power are more risk- averse. However, this doesn’t explain the rationale: 
Does being risk-averse make them more discreet and therefore have better performance? 
Or it’s vice-versa? More research must be conducted before these questions can be 
answered.  
Based on the results of the tests here using both the elasticity and HHI as the 
measurement of market power, we fail to reject H4. 
2.8.2 Market power and financial structure 
During the last two decades, many researchers have noticed the mutual relationship 
between the firm strategy for labor and the good market and their strategy of financing. 
Phillips (1995) finds that the capital structure of firms is highly correlated with industry 
output. They also find that the price in the final good market will be significantly changed 
once the major firms in those industries change their financial leverages. This paper 
essentially points out that the firm’s financial strategy can indirectly make impacts on the 
good/services market and that there exists a strong connection between the goods/services 
market and the capital market. Chevalier (1995) uses the supermarket industry data to do 
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empirical research and finds out that the announcement of a leveraged buy-out (LBO) 
increases the expected future profits of a firm's product-market rivals and that the presence 
of LBO firms encourages local entry and expansion by rivals. Bifid???, this paper is saying 
a firm’s strategy has certain relationships with industrial structures. Later on, MacKay and 
Phillips (2005) have shown that the firm’s financial strategies also highly rely on its 
position in the industry, and that is especially true for the competitive industries. They use 
the capital-labor ratio as a measure of the position of the firm in the market, and they find 
out that firms with capital-labor ratios close to the industry median (high natural hedge) 
useless financial leverage than firms that depart from the industry median capital-labor 
ratio (low natural hedge), as predicted by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991). 
Based on the literature mentioned above, it’s clear that a firm’s financial strategy, 
including financial leverage, is highly dependent on the industry structure and its position 
in the industry. Therefore, I use the elasticity of the loan interest rate as the measurement 
of the firm’s market power and the position in the industry. By using the empirical 
framework developed by Phillips (2005), I test whether the financial leverage adopted by 
a firm in the banking industry also has a correlation with the firm’s position in the industry, 
which is measured by the market power. According to the traditional management theory 
and applied game theory literature (e.g., Aumann and Hart, 1992, Wagner, 1988), the firms 
which have largermarket power should have more bargaining power with their supplier 
and customer. Therefore, the firms that have lower elasticity of loan interest rates, which 
implied that largermarket power in the loan market, will likely to be able to borrow money 
at a lower interest rate from the money suppliers and I expect that the financial leverage is 
negatively correlated with the elasticity of loan interest rate.  
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An estimation of the following equation is conducted: 
y𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿
′
𝒊𝒕𝛾 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                            (8) 
Where y𝑖𝑡 denotes the dependent variable which denotes the measurement of the 
financial structure of the bank, namely the financial leverage, 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡  denotes the market 
power which is measured either by HHI or Own- Interest rate elasticity, 𝑿′𝒊𝒕 is the vector 
(s) of control variables including year fixed effect and asset value, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error.  
The estimation follows a simple reduced-form regression and the framework is the 












Table 13 – Market power and financing structure127 
 
Loan interest rate elasticity and financial leverage 
 Dependent variable: 
 Financial leverage 
  (1)   (2)  
 Pooled OLS with elasticity   Pooled OLS with HHI  
Own elesticity 
of loan interest 
rate 
0.35   
 (0.28)  
HHI  0.08***    
 (0.02) 
Asset value 
-1.07e-09**    
 (4.47e-10)  
-4.15e-09            
 (1.16e-09)  
Year2013 
0.77**    
 (0.32)  
0.94***   
 (0.25)  
Year2014 
0.55*   
 (0.30) 
0.64**    
 (0.27)  
Year2015 
0.17   
 (0.19) 
0.19    
 (0.19)  
constant 
11.16***   
 (1.41)  
13.03    
 (0.14)   
N 6429 6429 
R-sq 0.0104 0.0038 
F (5,6429) 8.35 5.85 
As we can see from the table above, for the leverage story, the HHI and the elasticity 
are telling different stories. In this analysis, financial leverage is defined by the equity 
value/ total asset. If we look at the estimation results by using HHI as the measurement of 
market power, it’s saying that the banks with larger market power are having more equity 
 
127 Table 13 shows the results of the estimation regarding the relationship between loan interest rate elasticity and 
financial leverage. More specifically, the statistics are the results of Ordinary Least Square estimation on specification 




financing. However, in the regression of using the elasticity as the measurement of market 
power, the results are saying that there do not exist significant differences between the 
banks with bigger market power and the banks with smaller market power. Even if the 
estimator was significant, it’s also telling us that the banks with more market power intend 
to finance more with debt. The estimation results given by the regression of using the 
elasticity as the measurement of market power is closer to our intuition. 
With the limited information and data here, I can’t figure out which version is better 
between the HHI story and the elasticity story. However, this might be another interesting 
topic for future research. 
2.9 Management and policy implications 
As discussed, the key findings of this paper provide management implications to 
the managers in banks and policy implications to the monetary policymakers, and those 
implications include the following: 
1, Interest rates are still the most significant factor when customers are considering 
a loan. However, there are other factors that customers take into account. Customers also 
take the efficiency and helpfulness of employees into account. Therefore, banks can avoid 
price competition through improvements in service quality.  
2, Larger banks are less sensitive to monetary policies that adjust the interest rates 
but small banks are much more sensitive. Because of that, managers in small banks should 
leverage the interest rate derivatives to hedge this kind of interest rate risk.  
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3, The Federal Reserve should consider the unexpected squeezing effects that the 
monetary policies may incur. The adjustments in interest rates might flush the small banks 
out and make the large banks more concentrated.  
2.10 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I follow Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000) to build up a structural 
model to estimate the loan demands of commercial banks in the U.S. I present the overall 
information and the importance of the banking industry and the American loan market at 
the beginning. Then, I build up the choice model based on the previous literature regarding 
structural models and bank customers’ reference. I also propose the instrumental variables 
to solve the endogenous problem of loan interest rates. After getting the estimators, I 
compute the loan interest rate elasticities, based on which, I discuss the possible impacts 
from the monetary policy on the structure of the commercial banking industry by looking 
at the possible share changes of the largest bank and the smallest bank. 
The key findings of this paper include the following: 1, the Interest rate of the loan 
is the key element in the demand system. Larger banks seem to have a smaller interest rate 
elasticity and smaller banks seem to have a larger interest rate elasticity. 2, Other than the 
interest rates, efficiency and helpfulness of staff are also factors that enter the customers’ 
minds when choosing banks. 3, Monetary policies may have unexpected impacts on the 
structure of the commercial banking industry. 4, Banks with larger market power have less 
risk exposure. However, for the financial leverage hypothesis, the elasticity story is 
supporting the classic hypothesis that firms with higher market power are more likely to 
finance more by using liability while the HHI story is supporting the opposite.  
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There are several limitations to this paper. First, this paper strictly follows the BLP- 
type model and incorporates all the drawbacks of the BLP-type model. Secondly, there 
might exist a measurement error problem in the sense that the indicators and proxies are 
not the perfect indicators/proxies. For instance, using goodwill as the measurement for 
reputation might not be sufficient. However, due to the limited information that the banks 
disclose and the limited information that our dataset contains, goodwill might be the best 
proxy at this point in time. Thirdly, when doing GMM estimations, the objective function 
value is somewhat huge. This may indicate the model setup, and fitting is not good enough. 
This could be overcome by adding more variables or changing the optimization methods 
but might need much more computational power, which my devices don’t have. Last but 
not least, the BLP estimation is using a small sample to avoid computational complications 
and downfalls. Though, as justified above, this shouldn’t introduce any bias, this is still a 
limitation of this paper. However, this should not be seen as a flaw of this paper since it’s 
a technical problem of the BLP model (the algorithm can be improved, and then the 
convergence property can be enhanced for large samples), and it’s a hardware problem of 
the computer128. 
Due to the existence of the shortcomings mentioned, there are more that can be 
done in the future. Additionally, I noticed that the bank’s stock price return is somewhat 
correlated with the own-interest rate elasticity. This may be an interesting inspiration for 
future asset pricing research.  
 
 
128 The processors are not fast enough and the RAM is not huge enough for simulation storage. 
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CHAPTER 3. WHAT ARE THE DETERMINANTS THAT MAKE 
CHINESE FIRMS GO PUBLIC OVERSEAS: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Institutional backgrounds of Chinese IPO 
The term Initial public offering (IPO) refers to a type of public offering in which 
shares of a company are sold to institutional investors that, in turn, sell to the general public, 
on a securities exchange, for the first time. The first modern IPO occurred in March 1602 
when the Dutch East India Company offered shares of the company to the public in order 
to raise capital129.  Initial Public Offering (IPO) has always been a focus in the finance field 
since then. Relative to liability financing, the expenses of equity financing are  lower in 
most cases. 130 Equity financing has tons of benefits in addition to the relative 
inexpensiveness: It provides bargaining power for firms with banks131. It also increases the 
liquidity of the firms132 and it enlarges the set of potential investors of the firms, which 
may enhance the corporate governance of the firms. 133   Therefore, at present, many 
Chinese firms go public and some of them go public overseas. 
 
129 Ammendola.(2000) “Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation”, Chapter 1:"This Bubble 
World": The Origins of Financial Speculation. 
130 Gaud et al. (2007) uses the European firms’ data to show that the firms are not willing to borrow debts if they have 
other alternatives of financing. They imply that the cost of debt financing is higher than the cost of other financing 
alternatives. 
131 Rajan (1992) shows that IPO is more likely for companies paying higher rates and after IPO those firms experience 
decrease in borrowing rates 
132 Zingales (1998) shows that liquidity of a firm increases after IPO. 
133 Merton (1987) shows that after IPO diffuses stock ownership of firms. 
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   Until the end of 2012, there are 2494 Chinese firms that are publicly traded 
domestically134 , and there are 261 firms that  are publicly traded in the U.S at either the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ. 135 Those numbers show that the 
portion of Chinese public-traded firms willing to be cross-listed in the U.S is not small. In 
fact, the Chinese local equity markets unusually offer a huge premium when the firms IPO 
locally. However, there is still a relatively large portion of Chinese firms that IPO in the 
U.S. in spite of the high premium offered by Chinese domestic investors. 136  This 
phenomenon has been documented by many scholars (e.g. Chan et.al, 2008). Up to this 
point, there exist very few theoretical or empirical research providing satisfactory answers 
to this puzzle.  
3.1.2 Key findings and contributions 
  In this paper, I explore the external and internal determinants that make Chinese 
firms go public overseas or domestically in spite of the premium offered by the local capital 
market. The key methodology of this paper is to use cross-sectional discrete choice models 
to test the hypotheses regarding this issue. Also, the ex-post analysis will provide 
robustness checks for the ex-ante analysis results. This paper finds that huge structural 
changes have been observed in Chinese firms’ preferences over IPO locations. Generally, 
small firms with higher growth and facing the borrowing constraints are more willing to 
IPO overseas. The firm information disclosure and firm transparency level after IPO are 
 
134 Based on the data provided by Sina Finance: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/worldmac/indicator_CM.MKT.LDOM.NO.shtml 
135 Based on the data provided by NYSE and NASDAQ official website. The number refers to the total number of firms 
that are participating in all level ADR programs. 
136 The premium here refers to the higher willingness to pay for a stock by the investors due to the positive 
perspectives. 
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key and robust determinants when firms making IPO choices: the firms that have 
inadequate information disclosure and shareholder protection are more likely to IPO 
overseas. 
This paper, in spite of the limitation of data, provides a good framework for the 
analysis of the cross-listing behaviors of Chinese firms. Besides, the conclusions obtained 
from the analysis in this paper answers the question of why Chinese firms are willing to 
give up the premium offered by local investors for the sake of IPO overseas to a great 
extent.  
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1  Literature on cross-listing 
   Under the background of globalization, cross-listed stocks have become much 
more prevailing. Cross-listing issue has been a focus in the international finance area 
because cross-listing stocks provide many cases in which the law of one price doesn’t hold 
(e.g Eun et al., 1988), especially in the situation where the local market trading time 
overlaps with the cross-listing markets. Thus, many scholars focus on pricing and price 
movements. For instance, Werner et al. (1996) analyze the volume, spread, and volatility 
of cross-listed stocks and find that during the overlap trading time period, the cross-listed 
stocks have significantly higher trading volatility and law of one price doesn’t hold. 
Following that methodology, Pascual et al. (2006) analyze the price discovery process of 
securities that trade at multiple markets with trading sessions that totally or partially 
overlap. They find that the NYSE in the price discovery process of the Spanish cross-listed 
and find that the SSE (Spanish Stock Exchange) trade-related shocks account for a large 
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portion of the long-run variance of the Spanish cross-listed stocks, which can influence the 
risk premiums for these stocks. Chan and et al. (2008) investigates the relation between 
cross-listing in the United States and the information environment of non-U.S. firms. They 
find that firms that cross-list their stocks on the U.S. exchanges have greater analyst 
coverage and increased forecast accuracy than firms that are not cross-listed, and that firms 
that have more analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracies have higher market values. 
Aside from the empirical work, theoretical work has been done regarding the asset pricing 
issue of cross-listed stocks. Eun et al. (1987) derive an asset pricing model showing that 
the value of the stock is not only correlated with the local market but also correlated with 
the foreign markets where  the stock is cross-listed . By following this theoretical 
framework, Eun et al. (1988)  perform an empirical test in which they find that the 
international listing of security should, in general, accompany a reduction in its expected 
return.  
3.2.2  Literature on IPO and cross-listing behaviors 
   A set of works have been done in a more focused way that they concentrate on 
why firms would like to IPO or be cross-listed overseas. Chan and et al. (2008)’s finds that 
cross-listing can increase the analysts’ coverage and hence, increase the value of the firm. 
Thus, the increase in analysts’ coverage and increase in value will be two possible reasons 
for cross-listing overseas.  Baker et al. (2002) also investigate what cross-listing brings to 
firms. They find that cross-listing firms in NYSE and LSE experience decreases in the cost 
of equity capital. Amir (2003) proposes that from the perspective of capital market 
regulation, cross-listing should incentivize more self-disclosures by firms and can improve 
corporate governance. Some firms actually become cross-listed for the purpose of 
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shareholder protection. Another empirical work that comprehensively examines the reason 
for cross-listing by Sarkissian et al. (2004). They find that the cultural effects, disclosure 
level of information and tax, the degrees of correlation and integration between the home 
market and the cross-listing foreign market, and legal environments are the key 
determinants making firms choose to be cross-listed in other countries. Doidge (2009) has 
discovered that the private benefits of control do have an impact on the decision of cross-
listing or IPO overseas from a purely empirical perspective. 
   Unfortunately, the literature on why companies IPO in foreign markets is quite 
limited. Blass et al. (2001) adopt the methodology of combining ex-ante and ex-post 
analysis and find out that on firm-level, R&D intensity, the firm size, revenue, and industry 
categories have significant impact on the probability of local companies IPO in the U.S. 
On the other hand, also very few research put their focus on the Chinese firms’ behaviors 
regarding going public in other countries. Sami et al. (2008) leverage the data of Chinese 
firms and find out that information asymmetry risk will decrease, and firm disclosure level 
will increase after IPO overseas or cross-listing.  
3.2.3 Literature regarding impacts from the government on IPO behaviours 
    Another steam of works that I have looked at includes the literature about the 
impacts of government and market information asymmetry on international trade and 
finance. Doidge et al. (2004) find that eliminating the information asymmetry makes the 
value of the stocks increase. Also, the government that has a higher regulatory standards 
for its financial market can help add values to the stocks listed in its financial market. 
Levchenko (2007) suggests that in international trade, the quality of the government has 
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an impact on the trade flows in the good market. Similar research has been done by 
Berkowitz et al (2006) which find that the trade flow in good markets between countries is 
influenced by the quality of law and regulations made by the governments on both sides. 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
3.3.1  Theoretical framework 
   As pointed out in the literature review section, most of the previous research 
related to oversea IPO is empirical. Until now, we don’t have a complete and well-
developed theoretical framework to explain the reasons why many firms choose to make 
IPOs in other countries or regions, giving up the premium offered by the local investor. In 
order to provide solid theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, I follow a classic 
theoretical framework from an industrial organization developed by Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1991) which develops a theoretical framework for binary choice of entry and exit by firms 
that is quite similar to the binary choice of IPO locally and IPO overseas in the sense that 
the firms are choosing the optimal strategy to maximize the prospective profit. In addition 
to Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), I also use the framework developed by Aslan and Kumar 
(2017), which explains the rationales behind individual decisions of entrepreneurship 
under the context of increasing import exposure. 
   In the binary choice setting, the firms are trying to compare the prospective utility 
from each alternative, which can be measured by economic benefits that they can obtain 
from each alternative. Let the prospective utility be a function of two parts of economic 
values – the economic value that it can obtain by going public and the economic value 
added by the destination market.  
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   Blass et al. (2001) talk about the benefits of IPO for firms in his ex-post analysis 
which identifies the reason for firms to go public. Essentially, the firms have quite similar 
benefits when going public. They all experience an increase in ROA, increased revenue, 
and higher growth rate. However, those effects are not homogeneous, and it varies across 
industries and firms. As for the benefits of IPO overseas, as pointed out by the previous 
literature review , the main determinants of the benefits for IPO overseas include the 
benefits and costs of information disclosure, the market premium, institutional and 
government protection and the firm-specific effects which are determined by firm 
characteristics. Therefore, we can model the choice behavior as the following: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑢𝐼𝑃𝑂(𝑋𝑖) + 𝑢𝑗(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)                                         (1) 
where 𝑈𝑖𝑗 stands for the total indirect utility that can be obtained from IPO choice j by firm 
i. 𝑢𝐼𝑃𝑂(𝑋𝑖) denotes a non-stochastic function of benefits of going public given the firm 
characteristics 𝑋𝑖 of firm i. 𝑢𝑗(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) is the non-stochastic function 
of benefits of going public in the j market by firm i given its information disclosure level 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, Institutional and government protection that they are seeking 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 and the market 
premium it’s going to get 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 and firm-specific effects which are determined by 
the firm characteristics 𝑋𝑖.   
   The prospective indirect utility of IPO locally is  
              𝑈𝑖0 = 𝑢𝐼𝑃𝑂(𝑋𝑖) + 𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)                                             (2) 
and the prospective indirect utility of IPO overseas is 
             𝑈𝑖1 = 𝑢𝐼𝑃𝑂(𝑋𝑖) + 𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)                                              (3) 
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   From the perspective of the firms, when making decisions over these two choices, 
they are comparing 𝑈𝑖0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑖1. For specific firm i, since 𝑋𝑖 is the same for both indirect 
utility function, the utility from going public is the same for both choices. Then, comparing 
𝑈𝑖0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑈𝑖1  would simply become a comparison between 
𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) and 𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖).  
    For the firms that have the IPO overseas, 𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) −
𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) > 0, which implies 𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) >
𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) . Therefore, the set of the firms that choose to IPO 
overseas will be the set of 
𝐼 ̅ = {𝑖|𝑈𝑖1 > 𝑈𝑖0}, which is also equivalent to 𝐼 ̅ = {𝑖|𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) >
𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)}                                                                                  (4) 
  As suggested by Fernald and John (2002) and Ammendola (2000), due to the lack 
of alternative of investment in China, the premium offered by the local market is huge if a 
firm IPO locally. On the contrary, since other markets don’t have this problem and due to 
the equity home bias (Bernile et al, 2015), if a Chinese firm IPO in the markets other than 
the Chinese market, they are not likely to receive any premium. Assuming the premium 
money and the utility of the firm has a 1-to-1 relationship, and that the premium value has 
a linear relationship with other parts of the indirect utility, the set of the firms that choose 
to IPO overseas will become 
      𝐼 ̅ = {𝑖|𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) > 𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖) + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖}.                     (5) 
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By looking at this set, for the firms which IPO overseas, the difference in the net 
information gain/loss plus the difference in the institutional and government protection 
plus the difference between the firm-specific gains between the two choices must 
overweight the premium offered by the local market. 
   In the equilibrium, the condition for firms to IPO overseas is  
          𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖) ≥ 𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖                                             (6) 
And can be transformed into an equivalent condition 
         𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖) − 𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) ≥ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖                                              (7) 
   In other words, firms and their controls (usually the boards) are trying to maximize 
their utility between the two IPO options by looking at the difference in informational cost 
and gains, the institutional and governmental protection that they are seeking and the firm-
specific gain or loss between these two options. They are always trying to see whether 
those differences can overweight the premium: If yes, they will choose to IPO oversea, if 
no they will choose IPO locally. 
    Therefore, in order to compare 𝑢1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢0(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐷𝑖, 𝐼𝐺𝑃𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) +
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖  estimating the random utility model can help to infer whether those 
determinants outweigh the premium. 
3.3.2 Hypotheses to test 
    Based on the theoretical framework in the previous section, the key hypotheses to 
test include the following: 
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    H1: The information cost/gain, measured by tax-to-revenue ratio, is a factor that 
dominates the premium offered by the local market and makes firms IPO overseas 
    H2: The institutional and governmental protection in the oversea markets is one of 
the key factors that dominate the premium offered by the local market. With good 
governmental protection, firms are more willing to IPO in that market.  
3.3.3 Empirical methodology  
3.3.3.1 Random utility framework 
As mentioned in the literature review, my methodology of analysis mostly follows 
McFadden’s (1973) framework for discrete choice estimation, assuming the IPO decisions 
are made by the manager, board (if there is one) and shareholders of a firm. For simplicity, 
we assume they have the same preference and the same indirect utilities from different IPO 
alternatives. When they are deciding if they are going to IPO overseas or not, they are 
making the decision as a whole and have the utility function as 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                                                                             (8) 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝛽 is the utility from generated based on the observed characteristics of 
firm i and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is the unobserved utility generated by another alternative or case-specific 
characteristics when choosing alternative j.  When the firms are going to determine if they 
want to IPO overseas or not, the alternative set of j can be denoted as S={Overseas, 
Locally}. When they are determining in which market to do the IPO, their alternatives set 
becomes S’={U.S., Hongkong, Germany, U.K., Singapore, China mainland} 
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    Thus, a rational decision-maker will choose between j by comparing 𝑈𝑖𝑗. Assuming 
the probability of equal utilities equal to 0, the probability of choosing alternative j should 
equal to Pr(𝐽 = 𝑗) = Pr (𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘)  where k≠ 𝑗 . Then the probability of choosing 
alternative J depends on the difference between 𝑈𝑖𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝑖𝑘. By following the classical 
literature of discrete choice model (e.g. McFadden(1973)), when firms are making 
decisions about if they want to IPO overseas, the 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is following a type-1 extreme value with 
distribution function F(ϵ) = exp (−exp(−ϵ))  , the difference between 𝑈𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝑖𝑘 will follow 
a standard logistic distribution. When difference between 𝑈𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝑖𝑘 follows a normal 
distribution, then we will have a probit choice model. Overall speaking, the logit models 
have a better fit for the data137. 
3.3.3.2 Possible determinants and estimation framework 
    Though a few firms in our sample become cross-listed in China mainland or 
Hongkong, the information effects of cross-listing suggested by Werner et al (1996) and 
others should not be considered as the determinants that determine the IPO location of the 
firm. The reasons are the following: 1, the purpose of this paper is to see what the 
determinants are that drive the Chinese firms' IPO and raise capital in other countries. The 
focus of this paper is to explore the determinants that influence the IPO decisions of the 
firms instead of cross-listing decisions; 2, the effects of information capitalization and 
analyst coverage are proved to be more related to cross-listing versus IPO since newly IPO 
stocks usually can’t be traded in two synchronized markets. At least there are no such 
 
137 Details and tests will be shown in the robustness check part. 
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stocks in my sample. Therefore, the analyst coverage and information coverage will not be 
assumed to have an impact on the IPO decisions of the Chinese firms.   
   Based on the theoretical framework and empirical results of Blass et al (2001), Sami 
et al (2008) and Sarkissian et al (2004), on the firm level, there are several key factors that 
may have impact on the firms’ decisions to IPO overseas including R&D intensity, firm 
size, revenue, industry categories, firm information disclosure level, culture, location are 
the firm-level determinants for firms to cross-listing and IPO in other countries. 
      Aside from those factors proposed by previous scholars, three additional factors are 
supposed to have an impact on the choice of IPO. One is financial structure, the second 
variable is growth and the other one is capital expenditure. The reason why these factors 
should be included is that they are reflecting the borrowing constraints of the firms, as 
indicated by Pagano (1998). When different firms are confronting with different borrowing 
constraints, they may make different decisions regarding where to IPO since for some 
firms. IPO overseas may possibly help overcome the borrowing constraints they have. 
Also, the growth rate is a factor showing the status of a firm. Intuitively, the status of 
development will definitely influence the firm’s IPO decision and choice since its strategy 
is based on the current status of development.  
    Based on previous researches mentioned in the literature review section regarding 
information asymmetry and government quality on international trade and finance, the 
government quality and information asymmetry in the market will create different effects 
on different firms and thus, different firms will make different IPO decisions because of 
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that. I add in two alternative-firm determinants that may have an impact on the IPO 
decisions.    
    The first alternative-firm determinant is the firm transparency in the destination 
market. The information undisclosed can generate asymmetry by firms. However, on the 
other hand, if the information dispersing channel in that market is bad, then no matter how 
much information a firm discloses, there still might be huge information asymmetry for 
investors and the firms still be non-transparent. Therefore, the firm transparency in the 
destination market in the destination market should not be unified for all the firms. The 
firm transparency in the destination market is determined by the information disclosure by 
firms and the efficiency of the information dispersing channels simultaneously. Therefore, 
I interact these two variables obtain a new individual-specific variable.    
The second alternative-firm determinant is the government's quality effect on firms. 
When firms IPO in other countries, basically they are “exporting” stocks, a financial good, 
to other countries. Legally speaking, the procedure of selling stocks and the terms of the 
shares will be subject to the law, regulation and government ruling of the destination 
market. However, this effect shouldn’t be uniform either since the size of the stocks that 
firms sell to foreign markets is different. In that sense, this effect is depending on the size 
of stocks issued to foreign investors when IPO, and I interact these two variables to make 
a new variable which is individual-specific. 
3.3.3.3 The empirical model and specification 
To sum up, possible determinants for firms to IPO abroad include R&D intensity, firm 
size, revenue, industry categories, firm information disclosure level, culture, location, 
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regulations of financial markets, correlations and integration degrees and exchange rates. 
Theoretically, it can be implied by the theoretical model: 
Pr(y𝑖 = J| R&D intensity… ) = f(R&D intensity𝑖+ firm size𝑖 +industry categories𝑖+ 
firm information disclosure level𝑖+ culture𝑖+ location𝑖+financial leverage𝑖 
+growth rate𝑖 + 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗)               (9) 
3.3.3.4    Proxies for independent variables 
Since all the databases that are available to me do not contain any information 
regarding R&D intensity for locally IPO firms,138 it won’t be able to let me test whether 
R&D intensity has an impact on the decision of IPO. As for firm size, I use the total asset 
value as the proxy for firm size. This proxy is used by Blass et al (2001) and has been 
proved to be robust by Dang et al (2015). I will use the revenue of the previous year of the 
firm I because usually, an IPO is planned 2 years before the final IPO. Firms are not looking 
at their current revenue to make decisions. Thus, the revenue of the previous year instead 
of the revenue of the year of IPO is the consideration taken into account when making IPO 
decisions. For industry, I use a dummy to show if it’s in IT industry since Blass et al (2001) 
shows that firms in the IT industry are more propended to IPO in the U.S.  
It’s extremely hard to measure the firm’s information disclosure level, especially 
when I don’t have complete corporate governance data before they IPO. A good and simple 
proxy is a firm’s income tax according to Pagano (1998). Pagano (1998) uses it as a 
 
138 The data set doesn’t have R&D expenses or patten information for most firms in the sample. 
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measure of loss of confidentiality and provides a solid argument for that. Thus, I believe 
this variable should be a good proxy for information disclosure. However, the absolute 
values of income taxes are not comparable between firms. In order to solve this problem, I 
compute the tax/revenue ratio to proxy for firm information disclosure level . 
Additionally, I think this is not enough for controlling the information disclosure since the 
low tax/revenue rate might also indicate high costs, thus I also control for the margin to 
control for the cost difference. The margin is computed by using net income before tax 
divided by total revenue. As for culture and location, I will use a dummy variable to 
distinguish between the firms that are on the coastal area or in the inner land area of China. 
The province defined as the coastal area is shown by the map in Appendix A. The reason 
for such division is that firms that are on the coastal area usually have a long history 
because they started earlier due to the policy of reformation and opening. They are more 
affected by foreign cultures and technologies relative to the inner land areas. So this 
dummy should be able to capture the culture and location effects.  Financial leverage will 
be computed through total equity divided by total liability, which is the definition of a 
financial leverage ratio. Based on Pagano (1998), the growth rate will be indicated by the 
percentage change of revenue from the previous year to the IPO year.  
As for the alternative– specific determinants, I use the internet user rate in each 
country of the year right before IPO to proxy for the information dispersion efficiency. I 
also calculate the income tax/ revenue ratio139 and use the interaction term between these 
two to proxy for the firm transparency. I use the equal-weighted average of the index of 
 
139  I compute this ratio in order to avoid the multicollinearity issue. If I interact the margin and tax/revenue ratio 
separately with the internet user ratio, there will be a multicollinearity problem in the logit model. 
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the governance indicators of the destination country to proxy for the government quality. 
Since I don’t have the data for the size of IPO issuance, I use the equity size as the issuance 
size. This should be a reasonable proxy because usually, the IPO issuance size is 
proportional to the equity size. 
The reason why I use the data of the year right before IPO is that these kinds of data 
are the only pre-IPO data I can obtain for Chinese firms. Many Chinese firms don’t publish 
quarterly data before they go public. Firms are usually planning IPO two years ahead of 
their actual IPO data on average140. Once they plan IPO, they will try to adjust their 
financial indicators in order to fit their IPO plan. Thus, the data of the year right before the 
IPO year should be reflecting the latest information before IPO and this information should 
be enough to reveal their primary choice of alternatives.  
Based on the requirement of GAAP(Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) 
and IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards)141, I convert the assets, capital 
expenditures into Chinese currency based on the exchange rate of the last trading day of 
the year before IPO.  
Then, what I am going to estimate will be  
 Pr(𝑦𝑖 = J| ASSET… ) = f( 𝛽1ASSET𝑖 +𝛽2D1𝑖+ 𝛽3Tax/Rev𝑖+ 𝛽4D2𝑖+𝛽5LEVERAGE𝑖 
+𝛽6GROWTH𝑖 + 𝛽7CAPEX𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑗)                                                                                                 
(10) 
 
140 Chi, Jing, and Carol Padgett(2005) points out that the average cycle for Chinese firms to IPO is in the range of 1-3 
years and the average is about 2 years. 
141 Though there are some difference between GAPP and IFRS, they are not difference when it comes to balance sheet 
item conversion and cash flow conversion. 
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ASSET𝑖: The total asset of the year before IPO of firm i 
 D1𝑖: The dummy variable showing if the firm is in the IT industry or not. If yes, it equals 
to 1, otherwise, it equals to 0. 
 Tax/Rev𝑖: Income tax/ revenue ratio of the year before the IPO of firm i.  
D2𝑖 : The dummy variable showing if the firm is in a province defined as the coastal 
area. If yes, it equals to 1, otherwise, it equals to 0. 
LEVERAGE𝑖: The financial leverage ratio of the year before IPO firm i. 
GROWTH𝑖: The revenue percentages change from revenue of the previous year to the 
IPO year of firm i. 
CAPEX𝑖: The capital expenditure of the year before IPO of firm i 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖:.The net income of the year before IPO before tax divided by total revenue of 
firm i. 
𝐼𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖: Income tax/ net income of the year before the IPO of firm i. 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑗: Internet user rate of the year before IPO in country j 
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖: The equity value of the year before IPO of the firm i, 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑗: Internet user rate of the year before IPO in country j 
3.3.4  Estimation strategies 
3.3.4.1 Binary response model 
According to the framework built up to explore the determinants that make Chinese 
firms go public overseas, binary logit and probit regression will be ideal for estimations. 
Both results of binary logit regression and probit regression will be reported  so that they 
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can serve as robustness checks for each other. Probit and logit regression are well defined 
and frequently used models for binary response data and have been used a lot by famous 
researchers like Pagano (1998). 
3.3.4.2 Multinomial model 
   Based on the framework of the analysis proposed above, multinomial logistic 
(MNL) regression will be a good fit for my analysis. However, when we use the 
multinomial logit regression is used to model choices, which is exactly what I am going to 
do, it relies on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Thus, it will 
be necessary to test if the IIA property by using the method proposed by Hausman and 
McFadden (1984). The reason why I think testing the IIA property for these two 
alternatives is necessary is that the market correlation between China mainland and 
Hongkong is very high, which indicates that these two markets may be highly integrated. 
We are not testing all the alternatives on the IIA property because the rest alternatives are 
distinct in terms of geographic location, local political environment, and information 
transparency, as indicated by the data. Therefore, the rest alternatives shouldn’t become 
substitution of each other and hence, shouldn’t violate the IIA property in general.  
   In case the IIA property doesn’t hold, the nested logit model will be used in place 
of the multinomial logistic model. The nested logit model can relax the IIA assumption and 




3.4 Data and variables 
3.4.1 Samples and time periods  
   The data sources of the dataset used in this paper include CSMAR database and 
RESSET database, which is the most comprehensive database of Chinese public-traded 
firms. Our case-specific variables data of Chinese firms, including the asset value, financial 
leverage, income tax of the previous year, the revenue of the previous years, capital 
expenses of the previous year, industry category and headquarter location are mainly 
obtained from CSMAR and RESET database.  
Compustat database is also leveraged to calibrate the data of foreign IPO firms. 
Also, it’s used as a complementary database for the firms that have missing information 
from RESET database. 
As for the alternative specific variables, the internet user data comes from the 
World Bank database used by Kaufmann et al. (2010). Government quality data is obtained 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database. It mainly contains 6 indicators, 
which are Voice and Accountability indicator, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism indicator, Government Effectiveness indicator, Regulatory Quality 
indicator, and Rule of Law Control of Corruption indicator.   
     Before getting to the reasons for the time period selection, I need to make the goal 
of my research clear. In this paper, I am particularly concerned with the reasons that make 
the Chinese firms IPO overseas. Many firms choose to IPO at one location and then choose 
to cross-list their stocks at another location. For those firms, I only looked at their initial 
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offering behaviors and I don’t really take their cross-listing behaviors into account. For 
example, a firm originally IPO in the U.S and then cross-list their stocks in Hongkong, I 
only look at their data when they are preparing for IPO in the U.S. The CSMAR database 
and RESSET database have complete information about time when the stocks of a firm 
firstly become available, which allow me to know the IPO date of the firm and classify it 
into the corresponding year category. 
   Secondly, I am particularly interested in the IPO behaviors of the firms who choose 
to IPO in the U.S. Thus, I particularly care about the sample size of firms choosing this 
alternative. The behaviors of these firms are particularly interesting since U.S. has a more 
rigorous information disclosure requirement than China, which means it may incur more 
information costs if they choose to IPO in the U.S. Given the fact firms IPO in other 
countries have already given up the high premium offered by the local investors, it will be 
interesting to see what the internal factors are that drive them to incur more costs.  
 
Figure 10(a) – It shows the number of Chinese firms that become cross-listed or IPO 



















Figure 10(b) – It shows the numbers of Chinese firms that become cross-listed or IPO 




Figure 11(a) – It shows the numbers of Chinese firms that IPO in other countries or 

























































Figure 11(b) – It shows the numbers of Chinese firms that IPO in the U.S. in a specific 
year or period.  
 
Figure 12(a) –  It shows the shares of Chinese firms that IPO in other countries or 






























Figure 12(b) –  It shows the shares of Chinese firms that IPO in the U.S. of a specific 
year or period. 
 
   Based on the summary of CSMAR database, most of the Chinese firms decide to 
be cross-listed or IPO in other countries or areas in 2007 and 2010, as shown in Figure 
10(a). Also, most of the firms that IPO in the U.S. in the year 2007 and the year 2010 as 
suggested in Figure 11(b). The database doesn’t contain the details showing which 
American depositary receipt (ADR) level the firms are, by looking at the NYSE website 
and, we still can identify the cross-listing firms. However, since in this paper, our concern 
is not the cross-listing location choices made by the Chinese firms. Instead, our focus is on 
the IPO choices and IPO behaviors made by Chinese firms. Then, I need to figure out in 
what years there are most firms IPO in other countries. Suggested by Figure 11(a) and 
Figure 12(A), the year 2007 and the year 2010 have the most firms that IPO overseas. Also, 







the U.S during 2010 and 2007. Around 30% of the ADR level 3 program participants IPO 
in 2010. In the meanwhile, there are also a  number of firms IPO domestically.  
    Therefore based on the purpose of this paper, the best sample period will be the 
data of the year 2010 and the year 2007. Another reason for choosing 2010 and 2007 as the 
sample period is that between 2007 and 2010, there was a severe global financial crisis. By 
making comparisons between those two years, we may identify the changes in the IPO 
behaviors before the crisis and after the crisis, which may bring up some policy 
implications.  
    The reasons why I am not using the panel data that covers the whole period include 
the following: Firstly, many of the pre-IPO data of the firms that IPO in the U.S before 
2004 are largely missing.  Secondly, some firms become delisted soon after the IPO. Later 
on, some of those firms which become delisted become listed in another market or the same 
market again. In that sense, if I use panel data to do the analysis, we have the duplication 
issue, which might create biases.     
3.4.2 Data screening 
       First, I delete the firms that do not have complete information regarding the key 
variables that we are concerned about. If any case-specific variable or the alternative-
specific variable that we are concerned is missing from CSMAR database, RESSET 
database, and Compustat database for the years 2010 and 2007, this firm will be deleted 
from the sample since they are censored data. Deleting these firms will not generate any 
selection bias as long as the process generating missing data is random. Also, according to 
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McFadden (1981), endogenous sampling under the multinomial logit framework is not an 
issue if we are not concerned about the constant terms.  
    Second, I delete the outliers. The criteria for being an outlier is to have an asset 
value larger than 1 trillion CNY. The reason why I remove these firms from the sample is 
that some of the firms with such huge assets are government-owned enterprises. The 
decision of IPO for these firms will involve extremely complicated political considerations, 
which are very difficult to control. Other firms with a total asset value exceeding 1 trillion 
CNY are obviously outliers or data mistakes since the total asset value of all publicly traded 
firms in the real estate industry is 347 billion CNY by the end of 2013. Still, I assuming 
the process creating outliers/ data mistakes is exogenous, and then no bias will be 
introduced into the estimation due to the elimination of outliers. 
3.4.3 Final sample 
A statistical summary is given below regarding the final sample in Table 14. The 
final sample of the year 2010 contains 350 firms that IPO in China, 39 firms that IPO in 
the U.S, 10 firms that IPO in Hongkong and 6 firms that IPO in Singapore and only one 
firm that IPO in Germany. Unfortunately, the data level of the firms that IPO in the U.K. 
is not complete and many key variables are missing. Thus, it’s not possible to include the 
one and only firm that IPO in the U.K. in 2010. I believe this will not cause serious bias 
since there was only one Chinese firm that IPO in the U.K. in 2010. Compared to the 




Table 14(a) – Summary statistics of the year 2007 
Year 2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IPO overseas 
leverage 44 2.247136 3.938785 0.046192 21.22859 
asset 44 21617.81 107475.8 56.73 704513 
equity 44 19728.44 102652.7 30.37 672819 
growth rate 44 0.820571 1.850948 -0.56838 11.94016 
margin 44 0.248499 0.188957 0.022394 1.001837 
tax/revenue 44 0.039953 0.04782 -0.0117 0.202738 
capital expenditure 44 279.9556 822.3316 0.25 5206 
retain earnings 44 537.7094 1284.097 -665.923 7001 
culture 44 0.863636 0.347142 0 1 
industry 44 0.136364 0.347142 0 1 
IPO locally 
leverage 120 1.237636 1.352518 0.04717 9.80275 
asset 120 19239.27 102297.5 15.0712 815144 
equity 120 7138.626 53236.22 7.550529 567595 
growthrate 120 0.408653 0.562251 -0.30901 4.081981 
margin 120 0.141111 0.094122 0.014554 0.441227 
taxpropo 120 0.025011 0.025033 -0.01053 0.124848 
capex 120 450.2857 2397.209 0.049548 23935 
retain2 120 715.2697 4319.881 -84.8247 43092 
culture 120 0.775 0.419333 0 1 









Table 14(b) – Summary statistics of the year 2010 
Year 2010 
Variable obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IPO overseas 
leverage 56 2.702842 2.403061 0.085675 9.334857 
asset 56 3336.223 5859.878 225.31 40933.3 
equity 56 1601.515 1857.656 37.40055 10530.39 
growth rate 56 2.020054 9.546223 -0.49197 71.69666 
margin 56 0.055956 0.551496 -3.70081 0.504815 
tax/revenue 56 0.01764 0.083334 -0.55524 0.124704 
capital 
expenditure 56 319.7188 1172.53 0.17 8140.76 
retain earnings 56 2098.064 11309.83 -490.135 81348.6 
culture 56 0.839286 0.370591 0 1 
industry 56 0.160714 0.370591 0 1 
IPO locally 
leverage 353 1.816017 2.476086 0.040157 36.33209 
asset 353 30117.87 476817.5 13.42975 8882588 
equity 353 1694.266 18445.32 7.091014 342925 
growth rate 353 0.264375 0.571286 -0.54646 7.35523 
margin 353 0.197322 0.109708 0.019915 0.641393 
tax/revenue 353 0.028583 0.020044 -0.00119 0.144987 
capiral 
expenditure 353 146.0977 1080.01 0.031394 19885 
retain earnings 353 349.4264 3190.827 -8.85942 59817 
culture 353 0.767705 0.422895 0 1 
industry 353 0.096317 0.295445 0 1 
The final sample of the year 2007 contains 164 firms in total. Summary statistics 
are shown in Table 14 panel (b). The final sample of the year 2007 contains 120 firms that 
IPO in China, 18 firms that IPO in the U.S, 12 firms that IPO in Hongkong and 8 firms that 
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IPO in Singapore, 2 firms IPO in the U.K. Only one firm that IPO in Japan and two firms 
IPO in Germany. 
      From this simple summary, it’s not difficult to see that the proportion of the firms 
that are IT or IT related companies among the U.S IPO companies is higher than that 
proportion among the China mainland IPO companies. However, the U.S. IPO firms have 
relatively smaller asset value on average. The U.S IPO firms also have the smallest 
tax/revenue proportion and smallest capital expenditure on average. However, those firms 
have the greatest growth rates in revenue in the recent two years than the firms in other 
groups. 
3.5 Estimation results and implications 
3.5.1 Estimation results for the binary response model 








Table 15(a) – Logistic regression results of the data of year 2010142 
Year 2010 sample 
 
Logit Logit Logit 






ASSET -0.00336*** -0.003416*** -0.00336*** 
 
(0.000718) (0.000586) (0.000593) 
GROWTH 0.809322*** 0.758041*** 0.766*** 
 















CAPEX 0.00481*** 0.00433*** 0.00428** 
 




















Equity*GOV 0.00251*** 0.00232*** 0.00230*** 
 
(0.000406) (0.000000183) (0.000356) 
constant -2.5527*** -3.07312*** -3.43430*** 
  (0.70085) (0.2731) (0.31886) 
Log-likelihood -71.8165 -81.6372 -76.4526 
N 409 409 409 
Pseudo R2 0.5603 0.5002 0.536 
 
142 The numbers in the paratheses in this chapter are the MLE standard errors which are estimated by using the 
information matrix unless otherwise specified.  
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Table 15(b) – Logistic regression results of the data of year 2007 
Year 2007 sample 
 
Logit Logit Logit 




















MARGIN 25.007*** 21.436*** 24.79061*** 
 
(6.2830) (4.7462) (5.7629) 
Tax/Rev -169.5436*** -141.4301*** -162.1941*** 
 






















INET*ICTAX 1.360423*** 1.110524*** 1.21941*** 
 
(0.3069814) (0.22488) (0.26225) 
Equity*GOV 0.0004407 -0.00000072 0.000606 
 
(0.0004449) (0.0000071) (0.0004529) 
constant -4.692221*** -5.93512*** -3.95916*** 
 
(1.536001) (1.02433) (1.43213) 
Log- likelihood -18.1671 -56.389 -20.8550 
N 164 164 164 
Pseudo R2 0.8095 0.4088 0.7813 
What we can learn by looking at the results reported in the table is that tax/revenue 
ratio has no significant effects on decisions of IPO overseas for the 2010 sample but has 
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very significant effects on decisions of IPO overseas for the 2007 sample   If we look at 
the estimation result for the 2007 sample, we can see some interesting patterns: The 
coefficient of variable tax/ revenue ratio is always significant and negative. In the 
meanwhile, the coefficient of the term margin is always significantly positive. That means, 
the firms paying lower taxes, in other words, having low levels of information disclosure 
while having high profitability are more willing to IPO overseas. By combing these two 
coefficients, it’s not hard to see that the Chinese firms that pay lower taxes but have higher 
margins are more willing to IPO overseas. In other words, the Chinese firms that have a 
lower level of information disclosure are more willing to IPO overseas in 2007. If we look 
at the coefficient of INET*ICTAX, which measures the expected transparency in the 
destination market, it’s always positively significant. That is to say, the firms that have 
higher expected transparency in the destination market are more willing to IPO overseas. 
Combining the coefficients of the term Margin and the term Tax/revenue ratio, it tells us 
that the incentive for Chinese firms to go public overseas is to improve the firm 
transparency. The firm’s shareholders are sacrificing the high price premium in order to 
improve firm transparency. This finding perhaps is implying that the Chinese firms that 
have bad information disclosure, bad corporate governance and server conflicts between 
managers and shareholders are more likely to go public overseas. 
If we look at the estimation results for the sample of the year 2010, there is a 
structural change in the IPO behaviors. The coefficients of the asset term are always 
negatively significant. That is somewhat betraying our intuition since based on the previous 
research by other scholars, larger firms seem to be more intended to IPO or cross-list in 
other countries. In order to confirm this effect, I also use other proxies for firm size to do 
 157 
the robustness check and I find out that this effect is robust. It means the firms that are 
smaller are more willing to IPO overseas in 2010. The firms that have higher capital 
expenditure and higher growth rates are more likely to IPO overseas in 2010, which implies 
that the firms that develop fast and face borrow constrain are more likely to IPO overseas. 
Combine this with the coefficient of the size measure (asset value and equity),  it’s making 
sense because smaller developing firms usually have lower credit in terms of borrowing. 
Borrowing constraints will more likely be bounding for these firms. These firms are more 
likely to raise money by IPO in other countries. The term Equity*GOV is also always 
positively significant. Basically, it means the quality of the government at the destination 
market is also a concern when firms are making IPO decisions. Given the two firms are 
equal in all aspects, the foreign governments that have better quality will make Chinese 
firms more likely to IPO in foreign countries. 
When we look at the difference between the estimation results for the 2010 sample 
and the 2007 sample, if we compare the Pseudo R-square statistics, we will see that there 
must be some structural changes during 2008-2009. After the 2008 global financial crisis, 
all countries, including the Chinese government, are taking the financial market more and 
more seriously. During that period, the Chinese government tried to make harsher 
regulations and higher standers for IPO. The risk management system was playing a more 
important role than before and corporate governance issues became a focus. These changes 
make the Chinese firm shareholders no longer use oversea IPO as a measure to improve 
the transparency of the firms that they invest in. Instead, they start to focus more on realistic 
issues: Development and borrow constrain. After the global financial crisis, firms also pay 
attention to government quality when they are choosing IPO locations. 
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3.5.2 Multinomial logit regression results 
    After doing the IIA test for the suspected alternatives, I find that the IIA property 
holds for these alternatives. That means by using the multinomial logit regression 
framework here will still match the random utility framework and will give consistent 
estimators. Table 16 below shows the results of the MNL regression. For this part, I only 
looked at the estimation results for the 2010 sample because as discussed above, the 
preference of firms in terms of IPO changes a lot. Looking at 2010 sample will give us 
more valid implications. I drop category 4 because there is only one firm in our sample, 














Table 16 – Multinomial logit regression results of the data of year 2010 
Year 2010 sample 
Multinomial Logit 
 IPO in the U.S IPO in Hongkong IPO in Singapore 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
LEVERAGE -0.1806** -0.1486 -0.06189 
 (0.08209) (0.30075) (0.2749) 
ASSET -0.005317*** -0.00494*** -0.0023** 
 (0.001042) (0.00101) (0.000913) 
GROWTH 1.1064*** -0.6660 -0.4372 
 (0.2788) (1.24506) (0.9831) 
MARGIN -3.7448 0.9007 0.1554 
 (3.503) (6.32113) (5.1638) 
Tax/Rev -3.3166 -7.3063 -13.5196 
 (18.5047) (30.9740) (30.4885) 
CAPEX 0.004998* 0.007765*** -0.01169* 
 (0.002772) (0.00132) (0.006762) 
D2 0.27206 -1.753462 -0.60028 
 (0.71824) (1.2249) (1.4045) 
D1 -0.3727 0.2428 1.2586 
 (0.96685) (1.7702) (1.5347) 
INET*ICTAX 0.01434 0.0000221 0.16544* 
 (0.009417) (0.013792) (0.08573) 
Equity*GOV 0.0031834*** 0.003144*** 0.002186*** 
 (0.000523) (0.0005461) (0.000586) 
constant -2.6336*** -4.06625 -5.5183*** 
  (0.90833) (1.39192) (1.7451) 
Base Category IPO in China Mainland 
log likelihood -90.2526 
N 408 
Pseudo R2 0.5745 
  From the table of estimation results, it’s not difficult to learn that, after the financial 
crisis, information disclosure and firm transparency is no longer a key concern when 
Chinese firms are choosing IPO locations. Government quality becomes a huge concern in 
their decision making. No matter where they IPO, they always care about government 
quality in the destination country. By fixing everything else, if the government quality is 
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better, then the odds ratio of IPO in the U.S., IPO in Hongkong and IPO in Singapore 
relative to IPO in China mainland will be significantly higher. 
   If we look at the estimation results at the alternative level, it’s evident that the odds 
ratio between IPO in China mainland and IPO in the U.S, is also significantly influenced 
by the firm size. Again, it shows that smaller firms have higher odds of IPO in the U.S 
relative to IPO in China Mainland. In the meanwhile, the firms that grow faster and have 
more capital expenditure also are more likely to IPO in the U.S. Firms that are smaller and 
have higher capital expenditure are also in favor of IPO in Hongkong. Those findings may 
imply that smaller and less developed firms that are facing borrowing constraints are more 
willing to IPO in the U.S. and in Hongkong. Among those firms, the firms that grow fast 
will more prefer IPO in the U.S.  
   To sum up, based on our analysis from the perspective of discrete choice modeling, 
I find that the firm size, borrowing constraints and government quality at the destination 
market are the key determinants that drive Chinese firms' IPO overseas in 2010. The culture 
effect is not significant when explaining the decision of IPO in the U.S. There’s no 
evidence showing firms in the IT industry are more willing to IPO overseas. The growth 
rate is also a key concern especially for the firms that want to IPO in the U.S. 
3.6 Ex-post analysis 
    Though the ex-ante analysis can show the motivations of the Chinese firms to IPO 
overseas to a great extent, it doesn’t tell the whole story. Especially, the ex-ante analysis 
only focuses on two specific years and it only shows the ex-ante motivations of those firms 
who IPO during those periods. Blass et al (2001) also do an ex-post analysis in addition to 
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the ex-ante analysis in their research which aims to explore the answer to the question of 
why firms go public. In that research, the purpose of the ex-post analysis is to show what 
actually changes after the firms go public and those actual changes may become the reasons 
for other firms to go public. The logic in this paper is quite similar in the sense that: Though 
there are some factors that firms had considered about before they made the IPO, there are 
some other factors that those firms hadn’t considered about. Significant differences in those 
factors between the firms which IPO locally and IPO overseas may become the reasons for 
other firms to IPO oversea or IPO locally. Therefore, I am also conducting another ex-post 
analysis.  
   The key methodology that I use in this analysis is the Diff-in-diff method. The main 
specification for the Diff-in-diff analysis is 
y𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖 +
𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑇 + 𝜗𝐼 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                      (11) 
Where y𝑖𝑡 is a dependent variable that includes performance indicators that are possibly 
different between firms that IPO locally and firms that IPO overseas. The  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡  the 
term is the dummy variable which equals to 1 if firm i has already gone public at year t, 
𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖 is the dummy variable which equals 1 if firm i IPO overseas. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 
vector of firm-level controls. T is the time fixed effect and I is the industry fixed effect.  
Since we know that the decision of IPO oversea is determined by some firm-level 
factors, variable 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖 is essentially endogenous. In order to resolve this kind of 
endogenous problem, since we already know that growth, capital expenditure, firm size, 
information disclosure level and equity scale, financial leverages can be the factors that 
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determine the IPO location, we need to control all these factors and include all of them in 
the 𝑋𝑖𝑡  vector in order to minimize the bias caused by self-selection. 
The independent variables that I am interested here include Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), profit margins, current ratios, the portion of operating 
income and the portion of non-operational income. The reason why I am looking at these 
variables is that the variables mentioned above are good measurements for performances, 
risk management and the quality of incomes. These are some long-term factors that firms 
may want to consider when making IPO choices.  
The data that I am using in this analysis is also from RESSET database and the 
CSMAR database. The final sample made up of 6822 firms and 37492 firm-year 
combinations. 810 firms IPO overseas and 6012 firms IPO locally. The summary statistics 
are attached in Appendix A table 2. As for the estimation, I use OLS estimation with robust 









Table 17 – Difference- in- difference estimation results for the Ex- post analysis                       
Diff-in-Diff estimation 
Variables ROA ROE Profit Margin 
IPO -8.57***   
(0.35)  
-0.13***   
(0.02) 
0.37    
(0.31) 
IPOoverseas -28.05***     
(1.74)  
-0.31**   
(0.16) 
-2.06    
(1.42) 
IPO*IPOoverseas 
9.12***   
(0.26)  
0.016   
 (0.06) 
-1.38*   
 (0.71) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effectss Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effectss 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 24,325 24,330 24,330 
adj.R-sq 0.1931 0.4652 0.3736 
F-stat 2444.59 239.27 2.72 
Variables Current ratio 
Oprational 
income to total 
profit  
IPO 1.63***    
(0.17) 
-0.014    
(0.017) 
 
IPOoverseas -7.84***    
(0.84)  
1.16***    
(0.24)  
 
IPO*IPOoverseas -0.89***    
(0.24) 
-0.34***    
(0.15) 
 
Controls Yes Yes  
Year fixed-effectss Yes Yes  
Industry fixed-effectss Yes Yes  
N 24,152 24,320  
adj.R-sq 0.0285 0.0321  
F-stat 55.66 49642.53  
From the results shown above in Table 4 (b), the real effects from oversea IPOs on 
firm profitability are positive though the estimator in the regression on ROE is not 
significant. Essentially, the estimation results show that the firms are doing worse in terms 
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of profitability after IPO and the firms which make IPOs overseas suffer even more over 
the whole sample period. However, the firms that make IPOs overseas are doing better 
once they finish the IPO than the firms that make IPOs locally.  
   The profit margin is a measure to see what the proportion of expense is relative to 
the whole revenue for a specific firm. According to the regression results, the real effects 
of oversea IPOs on firm profit margins are significantly negative. However, as we can see 
from the estimation results of regressions on profitability (ROA and ROE) that the effects 
of oversea IPOs on firm profitability are positive. As we know ROA=profit margin*asset 
turnover, then we can also infer that the effects from oversea IPOs on firm asset turnovers 
are positive.  
    By applying the same logic of interpretation,  the real effects from oversea IPOs on 
the current ratio are negative, which implies that the firms that make IPOs overseas will be 
less liquidate and have higher default risks. Basically, it implies that the firm's IPO overseas 
becomes riskier. The reason for this phenomenon is not clear but this definitely can be 
something interesting to conduct research on. 
    If we look at the last two columns of table 4, the two columns are telling us that 
the firms that IPO overseas have different income structures from the firm's IPO locally. 
The firms that IPO overseas have more incomes from the non-operation side: investments, 




3.7 Robustness check 
3.7.1 Sample size and bootstrapping 
    One of the concerns is that our sample sizes are somewhat small in both the 2007 
sample and 2010 samples. This is the limitation of the data: some data for the firms that 
IPO overseas is missing, leaving us with a relatively small sample that can use for analysis. 
In order to overcome that issue a little bit, I perform a robustness check by using the 
bootstrapping strategy. 
    The bootstrapping strategy is leveraging the resampling strategy to estimate the 
distribution of the parameters and then we can make inference based on the expectation 
value of the distribution. I run 500 times of repetition for both samples. The results still 
remain robust, and my finds remain valid though the significance of the parameters does 
change a little bit. The results are attached in the Appendix C.1. 
3.7.2 Measurements of firm size 
    According to the research conducted by Dang et al. (2015),  the market value, total 
asset value, and market caps are three robust measurements for firm size, which will induce 
the least measurement error issue. However, I think it’s still necessary by replacing total 
asset value with other possible proxies to test the robustness of the size effect and the 
empirical specification. 
    Therefore, I also gather the data of market value and market caps from RESSET 
database. Using these data, I replicate the regression, and the results remain the same 
though the magnitudes of the estimators change. The interpretation and conclusion 
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regarding firm size effect on the choice of IPO remain the same and robust. Due to the 
limitation of the space, the results are not displayed. 
3.7.3 Subsample regression 
     Since there is no specific industrial effect that has been found in the estimation 
section, a subsample generated based on the industry should also follow the patterns that 
we have already found. Thus, in this part, I do a subsample regression by dropping all the 
firms in the IT industry. The subsample regression results confirm the robustness of my 
findings. The results are attached in Appendix C.1. 
3.7.4 Probit model 
     As mentioned earlier, since I don’t know whether the error term of the utility 
function is following a standard normal or a logistic distribution, I need to run regressions 
on both models and see which model has a better fitting of data. As shown in the appendix, 
in the binary case, for the 2010 sample, the logit model fits slightly better. For the 2007 
sample, if we look at the log-likelihood ratio and the Pseudo R2 statistics, the logistic model 
fits the data a little bit better.  The coefficients’ significance doesn’t change and signs don’t 
change either. Our conclusion remains robust if we look at the probit models. The results 
for the probit regressions are attached in Appendix C.1 as well. 
3.7.5 Retained earnings 
As Kaplan and Luigi (1997) point out in their paper, the firms can finance their 
expenditure by using internal cash flows. Internal cash flow is even cheaper in terms of 
cost. If a firm has large retain earnings, they may not even want to use common stock 
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financing. The best measure for total internal cash flow is retained earnings. In order to 
make sure our result without retain earning is still robust, I add in the variable of retained 
earnings into different models and previous findings still remain robust. The coefficient of 
the retained earning variable is not significant at all, which means the retained earning level 
is not a key concern that the firms care about when they are making IPO location decisions.  
The results are reported in Appendix C.1. 
3.7.6 Alternative proxies for government quality 
   In order to make sure our conclusion about the 2010 sample is correct, I use several 
other types of proxies for government quality. As mentioned, there are six indexes for the 
government quality included in the Worldwide Governance Indicators database, which are 
Voice and Accountability indicator, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
indicator, Government Effectiveness indicator, Regulatory Quality indicator, Rule of Law 
Control of Corruption indicators. In this subsection, I use the Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator, Regulatory Quality indicator, and Control of 
Corruption indicator to proxy for government quality. 
   The results are attached in the Appendix C.1. Basically, no matter which indicators 
I use to proxy for government quality, the results don’t change. There are very slight 
changes in the significance of the coefficient of capital expenditure but it’s still significant 
at the 95% confidence level. If we look at the log-likelihood and Pseudo R-square numbers 
reported in the estimation results, the Corruption Control indicator gives the highest log-
likelihood and Pseudo R-square compared to the other two indicators. It seems that 
corruption control is a key consideration when they are deciding IPO locations after 2010. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
    In this paper, I try to explore what determinants make Chinese firms IPO overseas, 
giving up the huge premium offered by the domestic investors in the market of China 
mainland. Based on previous literature regarding similar research, I build up empirical 
models to test which determinants are the key determinants that make Chinese firms IPO 
overseas. Also, I decompose the choice of IPO overseas for the 2010 sample and explore 
the determinants that make the firms IPO in the U.S. and other countries/areas.  
    The key finding of this paper is that in fact, huge structural changes have been 
observed in Chinese firms’ preferences over IPO locations. The firm information 
disclosure and firm transparency level after IPO, which are indicated by the combination 
of tax/revenue ratio, profit margin and the interaction term of internet user ratio multiplied 
by the income tax ratio, are key and robust determinants when firms making IPO choices 
in the year 2007. The estimation results also imply that firms which have bad information 
disclosure and shareholder protection are more likely to IPO overseas. It seems telling us 
the shareholders of those firms are willing to give up the huge price premium offered by 
the local investor for the sake of firm transparency.  This finding is sort of supporting the 
findings of previous research. 
    From the analysis for the firms that IPO in 2010, I observe that small firms with 
higher growth rate and facing the borrowing constrains are more willing to IPO overseas, 
especially in the U.S. Also, firms do consider the quality of the government in the 
destination market when choosing where to IPO. It seems that firms care more about 
corruption control in the destination market when they try to make IPO decisions. 
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    In addition to the ex-ante analysis, I also conducted an ex-post analysis to find out 
what may become the reasons for firms to IPO overseas or to IPO locally. The ex-post 
analysis shows that the firms that IPO overseas are doing better in making profits, are 
having lower profit margin but higher asset turnover speeds, are having more default risks 
and are having more incomes from the non-operation side. By looking at these results, 
other firms may make their IPO decisions accordingly. 
    Though these findings are proved to be robust by the robustness checks, there are 
many imperfections and limitations. Though the sample is relatively comprehensive and 
close to the population, some key information is missing. For instance, information 
regarding R&D is not available. The detailed corporate governance information is not 
available. The reason for this is complicated and involves social and political issues. If, in 
the future, a more comprehensive and complete dataset is available, we can find out more 
determinants influencing the IPO behaviors of firms. 
    There are other imperfections in addition to the problem of the data: Endogenous 
repressors. The firm-level characteristics and the firm’s decision can possibly determine 
simultaneously in the sense that firms can make an IPO decision first and then they start to 
adjust their financial reports based on the requirement of the destination market. In that 
sense, the firm-level characteristics that can be obtained from financial reports can be 
endogenous. This issue can be overcome by using instrumental variables. However, it’s 
also very difficult to find the perfect instrumental variables because one can always argue 
that this variable is adjusted by firms based on their IPO choices.  
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    Though there are some imperfections in this paper, I believe this paper has 
contributed to the corporate finance literature regarding the IPO behaviors of Chinese 
firms. The Chinese equity market is emerging in a quick but peculiar way. Learning more 
information regarding firms’ IPO behaviors can help investors to make better decisions. 
Also, my research in this paper gives some policy implications about the structural change 




















APPENDIX A. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND FIGURES OF 
CHAPTER ONE 
A.1   The fitting of linear functional form and polynomial functional form 
 
Table 1  –  Linear Projection v.s. Polynomial 
 
Linear Projection v.s. Polynomial 
 Dependent variable: 
         ROA ROA 
 (1)  
                
(2)  





37.90***    
(6.99)  
Hausman-type 
IV -sq   
-529.79*** 
 (153.99)  
Hausman-type 




5.31***               
(0.15)  
5.37***                 
(0.19)  
Adjusted R-
sq 0.0018  0.0037  
N 13501  13501  
Industry fixed 
effect No  No  
Year fixed 
effect No  NO  
Province fixed 
effect No  NO  
A.2   Description of the text mining process 
     In particular, I wrote a Python Script to text mine from the annual report in order to 
collect gain more information on employee education. The Application Developer 
Interface (API) on the website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) follows a simple 
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logic. If we add the date143 , the stock code assigned by SSE and the year as well as the 
type of the report (n for annual report) at the end of the http address 
“http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c”,  for instance, we can get 
something like http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/2017-04-
01/600000_2016_n.pdf. By using the “request” function in urlutil3 module in Python, we 
can download the pdf files into a folder . Then, by using loops with the OS module144, text 
mining algorithm145 can be conducted on each pdf file and key information can be extracted 
and put into a data frame.  
The key words that are used in our algorithm to scrape the total number employees 
include “雇员总数”，“员工总数”，“员工数量”，“员工人数”，“员工共”146。 The 
key words in our algorithm to abstract the total number of employees with bachelor degrees 
include, “本科学历共”，“本科学历员工”，“本科及以上学历员工”, “本科及以上学
历员工总数”147。After cleaning the data, I merge the data to the firm level data obtained 
from RESSET by using the stock code. 
A.3   Marginal effects of the OLS estimation with different control functions 
 
143 Usually annual report submitting dates for Chinese public firms include the last day and the first day of 
each month. 
144 The OS module is a module in standard Python library to help with the interactions between Python 
developing environment and the operating system. In order to loop through a directory, OS module is 
essential.  
145 The PDFMiner module in Python is used for the purpose of conversion from PDF to HTML text. The 
NTLK toolbox is used for natural language processing and conversion from HTML to text token.  




Figure 1 – Marginal effects on alternative firm performance measurements.148 
A.4   Stock performance robustness checks 
A.4.1   Clustering of firms 
 
Figure 2 – Clustering results from MNM clustering algorithm.149 
 
148  The upper panel is based on the estimation results of OLS with MARS control function approach. The lower panel is 
based on the estimation results of OLS with linear control function approach. 
149 The clustering is based on the asset value which measures the capital level of the firm, the number of employees 
which measures the labor level of the firm and age. The clustering results show that 91.07% of the cross-group variation 
has been explained by those variables. 3, The components are computed through the linear combinations of the 3 variables 
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A.4.2   Non-parametric tests on CARs 
Table 3 – Non-parametric Tests on CARs150 
Non-parametric Comparison 
Panel A. Above Average v.s. Below Average 
Group bachratio>=0.24 bachratio<0.24 
Avg. CAR 0.206 0.1722 
std. error 0.0099 0.0073 
N 6904 3918 
Hypothesis H0:CAR(bachratio>=0.24) > CAR(bachratio<0.24) 
t-stats 2.7436 
Pr(T>t) 0.003 
   
Panel B. Below Critical Value v.s. Above Critical Value(Cluster 1) 
Group bachratio>=0.1312 bachratio<0.1312 
Avg. CAR 0.0302 0.089 
std. error 0.0142 0.0206 




   
Panel C. Below Critical Value v.s. Above Critical Value(Cluster 2) 
Group bachratio>=0.1312 bachratio<0.1312 
Avg. CAR 0.0086 0.116 
std. error 0.0084 0.039 





in order to show the clustering results on 2 dimensions. 4, Circle means the data point belong to cluster 1 while triangle 
means the data point belong to cluster 2.  
150 Table 3 shows the Non-parametric test results on CARs of different groups. Panel A shows the test result of bachratio 
above average against below average group for the whole sample. Panel B shows the test results of the first cluster with 
bachratio >0.1312 group against bachratio <=0.1312 group. Panel C shows the test results of the second cluster with 
bachratio >0.1312 group against bachratio <=0.1312 group. The threshold value 0.1312 is from the baseline results 
since the firms have bachratio larger than 0.1312 is less likely to experience improvement of firm performance.   
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A.5  Marginal effects of the fixed-effects estimator 
 











A.6  Robustness checks of using different measurements of firm performance 
Table 2 – Robustness checks with alternative measurements 151 
 
Alternative Measurements for Firm performance  
 Dependent variable: 
                      ROE        Tobin’s Q 
 (1)      (2)      (3)           (4) 
 
OLS with MARS 
control function 
approach 
OLS with linear 
control function 
approach 
OLS with MARS 
control function 
approach 















































































































Adjusted R-sq 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.30 
N 13481 13481 13501 13501 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
151 The numbers in the parentheses are the bootstrapping standard errors. The variable bachratio is the aggregated 
education level of employees measured by the proportion of proportion of employees holding at least bachelor’s degree 
or above. Log(exp) is the natural log transformation of expenditure. Log(rev) is the  ?̂? is the residual generated by using 
the control function approach. 
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A.7 Proofs  
A.7.1 Proof for the net effect of aggregated employee education level on firm performance 
Since we have the presumed model:  𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕) + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝛆𝒊𝒕 , 
Then 𝑬[𝒚𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝑫𝒊𝒕] = 𝒂 + 𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕) + 𝜹𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝑫𝒊𝒕. 
Based on the property of conditional expectation: 
 𝑬[𝒚𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕]
= 𝒂 + 𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕) + 𝜹𝑬[𝑿𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕]
+ 𝜽𝑬[𝑫𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕] 
Since assumed that 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and 𝑫𝒊𝒕 are exogenous, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 are approximately seen as independent 
of 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕. Also, the location and year fixed effects are not influencing or influenced 
by the employee’s education level of firm it, 𝑫𝒊𝒕 are independent of 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕.  
Based on the Bayes’ rule,  
𝑬[𝒚𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕]
= 𝒂 + 𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕) + 𝜹𝑬[𝑿𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕]
+ 𝜽𝑬[𝑫𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕] = 𝒂 + 𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕) + 𝜹𝑬[𝑿𝒊𝒕] + 𝜽𝑬[𝑫𝒊𝒕] 
∵ 𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝑬[𝒚𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝑫𝒊𝒕] + 𝛆𝒊𝒕 = 𝑬[𝒚𝒊𝒕|𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕] + 𝛆𝒊𝒕
= 𝒂 + 𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕) + 𝜹𝑬[𝑿𝒊𝒕] + 𝜽𝑬[𝑫𝒊𝒕] + 𝛆𝒊𝒕 
Based on the linear property, 
∴ 𝒚𝒊𝒕 −  𝒂 − 𝜹𝑬[𝑿𝒊𝒕] + 𝜽𝑬[𝑫𝒊𝒕] =  𝒇(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕)+𝛆𝒊𝒕 
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A.7.2 Proof for the inability of IV estimator to identity marginal effects when the 
relationship between the IV and the dependent variable is not linear. 
Having linear relationship between the endogenous variable x and the dependent variable, 
we have: 
                                                                    𝒚 = 𝒂 + 𝒃𝟏𝒙 + 𝐞 
For simplicity, assuming only one independent variable and only one endogenous variable 
existing in the model, the conclusion can still be generalized to multi-variables regression 
cases. 
When having linear structure between the dependent variable and the instrumental variable 










In matrix form we can write it as (𝒁’𝒁)−𝟏𝒁’𝒀. 
When having linear structure between the independent variable and the instrumental 










In matrix form we can write it as (𝒁’𝒁)−𝟏𝒁’𝑿. 
Therefore, the true marginal effect from x on y is 
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By written in matrix form we have (𝒁’𝑿)−𝟏(𝒁′𝒀), which is the IV estimator 𝒃𝟏,𝑰𝑽. 
When having non-linear relationship between the dependent variable and the instrumental 








































can no longer be used to identify the coefficient 𝒃𝟏. 
A.7.3  Calculation of the standard error of the marginal effect 
Generally, assume a stochastic cubic polynomial function 𝒎 = 𝒂𝒙 + 𝒃𝒙𝟐 + 𝒄𝒙𝟑, where 
𝒂, 𝒃 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄  are random variables which follow normal distribution and the variance-
covariance matrix for 𝒂, 𝒃 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄 is defined to be V. V is  3X3 matrix.  
V=[
𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐚) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐚, 𝐛) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐚, 𝐜)
𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐛, 𝐚) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐛) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐛, 𝐜)
𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐜, 𝐚) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐜, 𝐛) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐜)
] 
The marginal effect from 𝒙 on 𝒎 can be obtained from the first order derivative:
𝝏𝒎
𝝏𝒙
 = 𝒂 +
𝟐𝒃𝒙 + 𝟑𝒄𝒙𝟐. 
Based on the rule of variance, 𝒗𝒂𝒓 (
𝝏𝒎
𝝏𝒙
) = 𝒗𝒂𝒓(𝒂 + 𝟐𝒃𝒙 + 𝟑𝒄𝒙𝟐) = Ω, 
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where Ω=[
𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐚) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐚, 𝟐𝐛𝒙) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐚, 𝟑𝐜𝒙𝟐)
𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝟐𝐛𝒙, 𝐚) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝟐𝐛𝒙) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝟐𝐛𝒙, 𝟑𝐜𝒙𝟐)
𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝟑𝐜𝒙𝟐, 𝐚) 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝟑𝐜𝒙𝟐, 𝟐𝐛𝒙) 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝟑𝐜𝒙𝟐)
 
 
Based on the rule of covariance and rule of variance:  
Ω=[
𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐚) 𝟐𝒙 ∗ 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐚, 𝐛) 𝟑𝒙𝟐 ∗ 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐚, 𝐜)
𝟐𝒙 ∗ 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐛, 𝐚) 𝟒𝒙𝟐 ∗ 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐛) 𝟔𝒙𝟑 ∗ 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐛, 𝐜)
𝟗𝒙𝟒 ∗ 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐜, 𝐚) 𝟔𝒙𝟑 ∗ 𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝐜, 𝐛) 𝟗𝒙𝟒 ∗ 𝐯𝐚𝐫(𝐜)
] 
Since by doing OLS estimation, the estimated asymptotic variance matrix ?̂?  can be 
obtained, Ω can be obtained by plugging in 𝒙. Ω𝟏/𝟐  will be the standard error for the 
marginal effect from 𝒙|𝒙=𝒙𝟎, where 𝒙𝟎 is the current value of 𝒙. 
Since 𝒂, 𝒃 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄 follow normal distribution, 
𝝏𝒎
𝝏𝒙
 follow normal distribution based upon the 
property of random distribution. 
𝝏𝒎
𝝏𝒙 |𝒙=𝒙𝟎
~𝑵(𝑬[𝒂] + 𝟐𝒙𝟎𝑬[𝒃] + 𝟑𝒙𝟎
𝟐𝑬[𝒄], Ω|𝒙=𝒙𝟎) 






APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL DATA 
OF CHAPTER TWO 
B.1   Robustness checks 
Table 1 – Robustness checks with the control function approach152 
Control function approach with BLP framework 
 Dependent variable: 
  log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) 
              (1)  (2) 
 
Control function OLS 
on whole sample  
 Control function 
OLS on subsample 
Loan interest rate -100.91***          
 (10.80) 
-71.47***             
(16.19) 
Number of employees 0.00015***    
 (8.13e-06) 
0.000066***   
(0.00014) 






Intangible asset per 
employee 
 0.11   
 (0.22) 
 20.66***   
(4.79) 
Liquid asset to total 
asset ratio 
-0.005***        
 (0.002) 
-0.06***            
(0.02) 
Asset per employee 9.81e-06***    
 (3.00e-06) 
-2.34e-06   
(9.49e-06) 
Average staff expenses -0.0002    
 (0.0003) 
0.02***    
 (0.01) 
Total asset - 1.12e-08    
 (1.00e-09) 
-3.05e-09*   
(1.69e-09) 
𝑣 123.2409***    
 (10.88011) 
93.98***   
(18.4) 
constant -2.85***   
 (0.54) 
-8.19***    
 (1.24) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.25 0.63 
N 5476 240 
F (9,N-10) 200.71 46.42 
 
152 Table 1 shows the results of control function approach estimation combined with the BLP framework. The 
estimation specification still follows the structural model framework proposed in Berry (1994). However, since the 
random utility from the price factor is not significant, the simulation technique is not used here and assume the 
individuals all have the same preference over interest rate. The numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. ?̂? 
denotes the control of the endogeneity.  
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Table 2 – Robustness checks on the size effects153 
Testing Size effects 
 Dependent variable: 
  log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) 
              (1)  (2) 
 
 Using the actual asset 
value in the interaction 
term on the whole sample  
Using the size dummy in 
the interaction term on the 
whole sample 
Loan interest rate -138.16***          
 (11.044) 
-126.83***             
(9.13) 
Number of employees 0.001***    
 (0.00002) 
0.000055***   
(0.00001) 






Intangible asset per 
employee 




Liquid asset to total 
asset ratio 
-0.006**        
 (0.003) 
-0.008*            
(0.004) 




Average staff expenses 0.00008    
 (0.0003) 
0.0007    
 (0.0006) 
Total asset - 9.93e-06    
 (1.07e-06) 
-3.05e-06***   
(1.69e-07) 
Size * Loan interest rate 0.00013***    
 (0.00003) 
68.90***   
(1.01) 
constant -1.33**   
 (0.55) 
-2.04***    
 (0.46) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.24 0.53 
N 5476 5476 
F (9,N-10) 193.65 1126.06 
 
 
153 Table 2 shows the results of the estimation by adding an interaction term between the size, measured by total book 
values of assets, and loan interest rates. The estimation specification still follows the structural model framework 
proposed in Berry (1994). However, since the random utility from the price factor is not significant, the simulation 
technique is not used here and assumes the individuals all have the same preference over the interest rate. The numbers 
in the parentheses are the standard errors. When the book value of assets is larger than the average, the dummy equals 
to 1. Otherwise, the dummy equals to 0. 
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Table 3(a) – Robustness checks with random sampling154 
BLP Estimation 
                                          Dependent variable:      
                                         log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) − log(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒0𝑡) 
                        (1) 
 BLP estimation          ∑   




Number of employees 0.00013***    
(0.000036) 
 





Intangible asset per 
employee 
 -0.022   
 (0.023) 
 
Liquid asset to total asset 
ratio 
-0.017        
 (0.03) 
 
Asset per employee 0.00002          
(0.000024) 
 
Average staff expenses 0.0015**    
 (0.0002) 
 
Total asset -0.00001          
 (0.000004) 
 
constant 0.46   
 (6.18) 
 
N 240  
Markets 4  
Halton draws 100  
f (p) ojective function value 131.189  
   
 
 
154 Table 3(a) shows the results of BLP estimation procedure with non-unified preference among borrowers. The 
estimation procedure strictly follows the simulation and GMM estimation procedure proposed by Berry et al. (1995). 
∑  𝑑enotes the variance of the coefficient. The numbers in the parenthesis are the standard error of the estimators. This 
is a robustness check by using the random sample of small banks. 
 184 
Table 4(b) – t-test on interest rate elasticities by using a random sample155 
Non-parametric Comparison 
Large banks v.s. Small banks 
Group Largest 30 




elasticity 7.15 8.81 
std. error 0.38 0.20 
N 120 120 
Hypothesis 
H0: own-interest rate elasticity (Largest 30) < 










155 Table 4(b) shows the results of the t-test results between the largest 30 banks and the randomly selected 30 smallest 
banks. The null hypothesis is that the largest 30 banks are less elastic than the 30 smallest banks. The smallest banks 
are randomly selected from the 0-25% percentile in terms of the total value of assets.  
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B.2   Data used for share computation 
Table 5 – Total book values of loans used for share computation 
Total Book Values of outstanding Loans in 
the U.S. 
Year 
Total of the industry156 
















156 Sources: FDIC quarterly reports. 
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APPENDIX C. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL DATA 
OF CHAPTER THREE 
C.1 Robustness checks 
Table 1 – Robustness check with bootstrapping standard errors 
Bootstrapping for the main specifications 
 Logit 2007  Logit 2010 
Variable Coefficient   Coefficient 
LEVERAGE -0.8637*  -0.01127 
 (0.4713)  (0.07687) 
ASSET -0.00108  -0.00372** 
 (0.00075)  (0.00156) 
GROWTH 0.526**  0.80932*** 
 (0.2178)  (0.2528) 
MARGIN 23.727***  -3.212 
 (6.98)  (3.753) 
Tax/Rev -169.5436***  0.842 
 (58.861623)  (22.80) 
CAPEX 0.0001587  0.00481** 
 (0.0001024)  (0.00231) 
D2 -1.2855  -0.13391 
 (0.56992)  (0.51832) 
D1 1.3567  0.00782 
 0.5630)  (0.6098) 
INET*ICTAX 1.356723**  0.01087 
 (0.5669)  (0.22488) 
Equity*GOV 0.0003501  -0.00251 
 (0.00024)  (0.000736) 
constant -4.856221**  -2.5528*** 
  (2.218)   (0.9490) 
log likelihood -18.513   -71.8165 
N 164  409 




Table 2 – Robustness check with subsamples 
Subsample regression  
 Logit 2007  Logit 2010 
Variable Coefficient   Coefficient 
LEVERAGE -0.5056  0.15488 
 (0.7257)  (0.12343) 
ASSET -0.00062  -0.0028*** 
 (0.001268)  (0.0007315) 
GROWTH 0.507*  0.88841*** 
 (0.2620)  (0.29512) 
MARGIN 21.21***  -7.08123* 
 (5.84)  (3.854) 
Tax/Rev -143.57***  21.3684 
 (39.811)  (18.2762) 
CAPEX 0.0001045  0.003756** 
 (0.000370)  (0.00159) 
D2 -1.213  -0.03391 
 (1.2947)  (0.6083) 
D1    
    
INET*ICTAX 1.1757***  0.00934 
 (0.29834)  (0.00867) 
Equity*GOV 0.0001994  0.00190*** 
 (0.000411)  0.000413 
constant -4.746**  -2.9775*** 
  (1.5415)   (0.78664) 
log likelihood -17.3425   -64.6921 
N 127  366 










Table 3 – Robustness check with probit models 
Probit regression  
 Probit 2007  Probit 2010 
Variable Coefficient   Coefficient 
LEVERAGE -0.3832  -0.0420 
 (0.32012)  (0.03932) 
ASSET -0.00065  -0.001513 
 (0.00062)  (0.0002513) 
GROWTH 0.2212*  0.3904*** 
 (0.12887)  (0.1468) 
MARGIN 11.4509***  -1.56784 
 (2.625)  (1.1623) 
Tax/Rev -74.5275***  -1.4058 
 (15.809)  (6.8803) 
CAPEX 0.0000542  0.001703*** 
 (0.000169)  (0.00053) 
D2 -0.90258  0.01621 
 (0.5568)  (0.28288) 
D1 0.55185  0.01576 
 (0.10045)  (0.39015) 
INET*ICTAX 0.55185***  0.005088 
 (0.100344)  (0.00444) 
Equity*GOV 0.0002063  0.0010492*** 
 (0.0002014)  0.000147 
constant -1.9038***  -1.4354*** 
  (0.60798)   (0.33032) 
log likelihood -22.245   -76.2515 
N 164  409 










Table 4 – Robustness check on retained earnings 
Logit regression with Retained Earnings 
 Logit 2007  Logit 2010 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
LEVERAGE -1.0361  -0.1173 
 (0.74951)  (0.07206) 
ASSET -0.00133  -0.00385*** 
 (0.00131)  (0.00071) 
GROWTH 0.4955**  0.85042*** 
 (0.2503)  (0.25724) 
MARGIN 25.026***  -3.3894 
 (6.2821)  (2.82892) 
Tax/Rev -169.4795*** -2.6543 
 (40.4389)  (15.8192) 
CAPEX 0.000202  0.00526*** 
 (0.000381)  (0.00165) 
D2 -1.28212  -0.09123 
 (1.246)  (0.5902) 
D1 -0.35275  0.13039 
 (1.3245)  (0.84955) 
Retained Earnings -0.00127  0.00118 
 (0.001553)  (0.000760) 
INET*ICTAX 1.3604***  0.00966 
 (0.307)  (0.00836) 
Equity*GOV 0.00044  0.002526*** 
 (0.000445)  0.0004006 
constant -4.6922***  -2.62781*** 
  (1.5360)   (0.71165) 
log likelihood -18.167   -76.2515 
N 164  409 









Table 5 – Robustness check with different proxies for government quality 
Logit regression with different proxies for government quality 
 
(1) Stability (2) Regulatory quality (3) Corruption control 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
LEVERAGE -0.03245 -0.0063 -0.04573 
 
(0.0715) (0.0750) (0.0691) 
ASSET -0.00187*** -0.00142*** -0.00217*** 
 
(0.00052) (0.000454) (0.00054) 
GROWTH 0.605882** 0.5335** 0.6280*** 
 
(0.2503) (0.2369) (0.2400) 
MARGIN -5.09401* -5.4283** -4.8003* 
 
(2.6078) (2.4531) (2.5573) 
Tax/Rev -13.22 15.52544 11.7703 
 
(13.576) (13.31607) (13.758) 
CAPEX 0.002496** 0.001941** 0.0031** 
 
(0.001264) (0.00072) (0.00130) 
D2 0.208751 0.27595 0.15953 
 
(0.52415) (0.51682) (0.53101) 
D1 0.47203 0.60730 0.3899 
 
(0.59541) (0.56262) (0.6238) 
INET*ICTAX 0.002763 0.00342 0.00362 
 
(0.00696) (0.00675) (0.00796) 
Equity*GOV 0.0014315*** 0.0006253*** 0.000913*** 
 
(0.001432) (0.0001367) 0.0001744 
constant -2.5801** -2.6481*** -2.5800*** 
  (0.62778) (0.6204) (0.6335) 
log likelihood -100.3002 -105.25883 -96.0275 
N 409 409 409 
Pseudo R2 0.3859 0.3555 0.412 
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C.2 Robustness checks 
Table 5 – Ex-post Analysis Data Summary Statistics and DID estimation  
Ex-post Analysis Data Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
growth 31,319 31.11% 42.95% -1434.98% 1681.20% 
Tax/revenue 32,907 0.006028 0.811082 -0.89 0.992 
asset 36,916 1.77E+10 3.11E+11 0 1.75E+13 
CAPEX 28,510 0.513799 0.684252 -0.004515 0.8765 
ROA 36,388 5.55% 21.87% -45.61% 679.21% 
ROE 36,169 -0.11% 50.12% -100.67% 751.68% 
Profit margin 35,973 24.55% 14.56% -8.26% 49.68% 
Current ratio 36,108 65.50% 21.74% 346.12% 12.14% 
Operational 
income to 









C.3 Map of coastal provinces 
 
 Figure 1 – The provinces defined as the coastal area of China are in blue. Source: 
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